Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 38, Number 4, Fall 1994

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WINNING THE PEACE
Harvey Sicherman

THE ASIAN INTERIOR

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

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Editor's Column

"Ujedinjene Nacije! Stani ili pucam!"

"Say what!? You think you orderin' pizza back on th' block, troop? Say again, 'oo-tyeh-deen-yen-eh not-see-yeh stan-ee ee-lee poot-sam.' An' this time sound off like you got a pair!"

"Yes, First Sergeant!"

By the time this journal reaches its readers, platoons of GIs (American, but sporting blue United Nations insignia) may well be standing in the plazas of Bosnian towns, silently cursing their sergeants for falling them out in the punishing sun instead of the shade of the half-ruined churches and mosques about them. Their M-16s, M-60 machine guns, and mortars do nothing to relieve their feeling of nakedness as they sneak glances at the hostile heights above the town. They are not permitted to lock and load, much less fire, even these light weapons, except in extreme cases defined at length in bureaucratese. But there they stand, at parade-rest, trying to get their mouths around the very words that could get them killed: "United Nations! Stop or I'll shoot!" in Serbo-Croatian.

"ROE [rules of engagement], I love 'em," was the ironic remark of FPRI's president Harvey Sicherman upon glancing at the U.N. instructions for peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. He recalled the convoluted rules drawn up for Beirut—rules that directly contributed to the death of over two hundred U.S. Marines. Imagine yourself a nineteen-year-old plunked down in the midst of a civil war in a strange land, told not to do anything that might be construed as "taking sides," and ordered to consult a pamphlet of "Thou shalt nots" and "If, thens" when faced with hostile or threatening action. And if forces under American command must often labor under such restrictions, then imagine the ROE of a United Nations command. No, you don't have to imagine them; they're printed inside.

And after you've mastered your Serbo-Croatian, we'll send you the phrases in Haitian, Korean, and Tutsi.

In These Pages

This is the second issue of *Orbis* to appear under my editorship, and the last to appear in its traditional format. It marks, therefore, something of a sea change. In the Summer 1994 issue, we introduced as regular features this editor's column and the new book section composed of review essays instead of short notices. The first number of the 1995 volume, in turn, will boast new graphics and several provocative (or just entertaining) new features. We also

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intend to devote that issue to U.S.-East Asian relations after the cold war, a subject whose importance need hardly be argued whether or not we are at war in Korea by then. So, by all means, check it out come December, and let us know what you think of the "new *Orbis*."

Which is not to say that nothing adventuresome lurks in the pages you hold. Now, *Orbis* has never been a house organ of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Over the past few years, however, its editorial policy specifically discouraged FPRI scholars from publishing their research in *Orbis*. When I came on board, I considered that policy nugatory. We will continue, of course, to entertain excellence and a variety of views whatever their source, but we shall not forego the expertise, experience, and insight of those scholars whose quarters we share on Chestnut Street, just off the campus of Penn.

That is why Harvey Sicherman kicks off this issue, impolitely calling attention to the flatulence that passes for foreign policy in Washington since we won the cold war, and presenting an action plan by which we might, just might, still "win the peace." Three senior FPRI scholars—Martha Brill Olcott, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Ross H. Munro—then tell us what and how to think about Central Asia's dynamic relationships with Russia, China, and the West. Is the Eurasian "heartland" really just hinterland? Or will the fate of its new republics help to shape the geopolitics of the next age of history?

In these pages, James H. Brusstar bucks the conventional wisdom on Russian neo-imperialism and what our response ought to be, and Wallace J. Thies puts to rest once and for all the hope for a new world order. L.H. Gann dissects the literature of apartheid, Paul Hollander does the same for multiculturalism, and my own essay (a final FPRI contribution) reviews the reviews of Henry Kissinger's controversial *Diplomacy*. Enjoy . . . and respond.

Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor

Has William Safire caught on to this? Or am I alone in noticing that the adjective "appropriate" is doing double time in Washington? I first became aware of how popular is that slithery weasel word back in the Carter administration, but it seems that every administration's press conferences invariably assure us that on every hot issue, appropriate action would surely be taken . . . at the appropriate time. What that really means is that the speaker has no clue what action to take or when to take it. But that is not what most listeners conclude, for when we hear the word "appropriate," we tend to go all warm and fuzzy.

A couple of recent instances. When the United Nations took over in Somalia, Bill Clinton said to the CNN Global Forum, "It was quite appropriate for there to be someone to take action, military action if necessary, to protect the lives of the U.S. and U.N. troops there." Well, that's either absurdly obvious, or it masks a deeper confusion. Let's read on.

> Because what happened was, the police operation—which was a legitimate one, that is to protect the lives of the soldiers who were there trying to protect the lives of the Somalis—became viewed as a way of choosing sides in the internal conflict because

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> there was no political dialogue going on. So I think those are the two great lessons. If we're going to go in and try to save lives, we must know that in the beginning, everyone will be glad to see the U.S. or the U.N. or anybody because they're starving and dying. But after a certain amount of time, it will be obvious that it wasn't just a natural disaster. It was a political problem, a military problem.[1]

It would, I think, have been appropriate to consider all that beforehand.

Secretary of Defense William Perry topped his boss when asked if we were facing imminent danger over the confrontation with North Korea. "I think this whole talk of war is quite premature and it's creating a sort of hysteria which is not appropriate to the present situation." Oh, now I feel better. No, wait! Do you mean to say, Mr. Perry, that hysteria *is* appropriate to certain situations, if not the present one? Because that's what you said.

So I consulted the *Oxford English Dictionary* to find out just what "appropriate" does mean and made some startling discoveries. Definition 1: "annexed or attached to, as a possession," as in, "The Sea's now made appropriate/And yields to all the Laws of state."[2] Egad! So we are to be lulled to sleep by repetitions of the mantra, not knowing that the entire U.S. health care system is soon to become "appropriate"! Definition 2: "belonging to oneself; private; selfish," as in, "Policy works ever for appropriate ends."[3] So it's a Freudian slip when the Clintonites confess that their policies are indeed "appropriate"! Definition 3: "assigned to a particular person; special," as in, "The end therefore of her deliberation was to show general gaiety without appropriate favour."[4] Aha! So the president's sex life was really quite scrupulous: he did not want to single out anyone for "appropriate" behavior at the expense of general gaiety. Definition 4: "attached or belonging as an attribute; peculiar to," as in, "We noted in the hede an appropryat dysease, which we called then a frencey."[5] So *that* is what Perry meant when he spoke of "appropriate" forms of hysteria. Definition 5: "specially fitted or suitable; proper," as in, "Remedies appropriat to every membre throughout the body."[6] No comment.

In politics, "appropriate" means nothing. At best, it's avoidance; at worst, a proof of vacuity. So I advise—no, implore—every official and speechwriter in Washington to purge the odious word from their oral and written vocabularies, lest someone be forced—George Will would do nicely—to point out how appropriate it is that "appropriate" is the favorite adjective of presidents who suffer from acute aprosexia.[7]

[1] White House Press Release, "Remarks by the President in CNN Telecast 'A Global Forum with President Clinton,'" Office of the White House Press Secretary, May 3, 1994.

[2] Marchamont Needham, in his 1652 translation of John Selden's *Mare clausum* (Of the dominion or the ownership of the sea, 1635).

[3] Owen Feltham, *Resolves divine, morall, politicall,* 1628.

[4] Frances Burney, *Camilla, or a picture of youth,* 1796.

[5] Thomas Starkey, *England in the reign of Henry the eighth, a dialogue between Cardinal Pole and Thomas Lupset,* 1538.

[6] Thomas Phaer, *The Regiment of life, where unto is added a treatyse of the pestilence, with the booke of children, newly corrected and enlarged,* 1545–46.

[7] No, that just means "the inability to concentrate."

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This, I feel certain, will have been noted and quoted at length should the Clinton administration launch an invasion of Haiti: "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."

Teddy Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, pronounced December 6, 1904, justified American intervention in the Dominican Republic, which shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti. If and when Clinton intervenes, under whatever U.N. or OAS figleaf, he will be doing so in precisely the same way, and for precisely the same reason, as the Yankee "imperialists" whom his professors and he so snidely condemned in the sixties.

Walter A. McDougall

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Winning the Peace

by Harvey Sicherman

Public opinion polls confirm that the American people agree with the experts: U.S. foreign policy is in trouble.[1] Behind the floundering, the American people sense an inner uncertainty: the president and his team are not sure of the American role abroad: whether, when, and how to lead. This vacuum at the center makes Bill Clinton's foreign policy resemble nothing so much as Winston Churchill's famous circus freak: the boneless wonder, ever flexible in principle, always reversible in practice.

Thus, once again, the central problem of American foreign policy has become—America itself. The "reinventing" of U.S. foreign policy has occurred twice before in the twentieth century. In 1919 and again in 1945, the United States emerged from a victorious war only to lose the peace. After World War I, we could not find a way to reconcile Woodrow Wilson's crusade for the League of Nations with the prudent, balance-of-power approach preferred by many in the Senate, with the result that isolationism—a minority position—carried the day. After World War II, Joseph Stalin's ambitions paralyzed Franklin Roosevelt's concept of a U.N. Security Council whose Four Policemen were to enforce a democratic charter around the world. Then, several years of Soviet aggression were needed to prod the United States to develop the doctrine of containment and commit the resources to make it work.

Now we have a third opportunity to "win the peace," a chance widely recognized across the political and intellectual spectrum.[2] But the two efforts launched thus far—George Bush's New World Order and Bill Clinton's doctrine of "enlargement"—have both failed either to obtain public support or to prove effective abroad. Meanwhile, even for the sole superpower, time has begun to run out.

[1] On the eve of the G-7 summit in May, Clinton's foreign policy performance was approved by only 38%, a sharp drop from the 53% who approved a year earlier. See *The Wall Street Journal*, May 5, 1994.

[2] See President Clinton's remarks at the U.S. Naval Academy's commencement ceremony, May 25, 1994, cited in *The New York Times*, May 26, 1994. Henry Kissinger's 835-page book *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994) describes how "peace" was organized in the past.

Harvey Sicherman is president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He served as aide to Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and a consultant to Secretaries of State George P. Shultz and James A. Baker, 3d.

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Serious disturbances rock the ex-Soviet world, the Balkans, and Northeast Asia that threaten our opportunity to win the peace. Henry Kissinger may be right when he assures us that "shortcomings are remediable; the opportunity for great achievement still remains."[3] But how long do we have to take charge of events before they take complete charge of us? What must the United States do—and quickly—before the peace is irremediably lost? We need a new approach with four key elements. First, our foreign policy must be rooted in a new conception of reality: that we live in a world where the technology of the West, not its ideals, is desired, and where the culture that produced it is often denounced. Secondly, our diplomacy must be rooted in coalitions abroad *and at home* (in the U.S. Congress) that make use of the existing international order—our allies and friends—to magnify America's influence. Thirdly, our military strategy must endow us with more flexibility, so that we have effective options between mounting another Desert Storm—and doing nothing. Lastly, our economic strategy should seek long-term prosperity through expanding free trade, not illusory international fixes for our domestic economic ills. These are the building blocks of American leadership. Without them—all four of them—no amount of good will in Washington will suffice to bequeath to the next generation a world more prosperous, free, and, above all, secure.

The New World Order

Before we devise a new approach, it is important to understand why George Bush failed and why Bill Clinton has not yet succeeded.

On the surface, the Bush administration was well suited to the task. The president was deeply interested in foreign policy, and he had in his service many of America's most experienced diplomats. His secretary of state, James Baker, was a past master at cultivating Congress and the press. American foreign policy under Bush sought mainly to encourage Gorbachev's "new thinking": internal liberalization, arms control, and more benign Soviet behavior abroad.

But this hope for a smooth devolution of Soviet power and a "soft landing" in superpower relations was dashed when the Berlin Wall was breached—from the inside—in December 1989. Creative diplomacy through the Two Plus Four process and Gorbachev's own decision to sell a wasting asset rather than fight for East Germany spelled the end of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet threat to Western Europe.

Then came the Gulf War. When Saddam Hussein, a strong Soviet ally, seized Kuwait, the United States hastened to enlist Gorbachev in the anti-Saddam coalition. At the time, this appeared a significant diplomatic achievement. And the combination of events led the Bush White House to reach for a broader goal. On October 1, 1990, with Iraqi troops still in Kuwait and Gorbachev still in the Kremlin, the president described to the United Nations

[3] Henry A. Kissinger, "At Sea in a New World," *Newsweek*, June 6, 1994, p. 38.

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> a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War. A partnership based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations. A partnership united by principle and the rule of law and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment. A partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms.[4]

Thus, once again, the central problem of American foreign policy has become—America itself.

Five months later, after a stunning victory over Iraq, Bush and Baker hastened to "clean up" a whole series of regional conflicts (Arab-Israeli, Angola, Cambodia, Central America) whose resolution now seemed possible as Soviet power faded and Moscow's local allies were cut adrift. But Gorbachev's brutal crackdown against the Baltic states in early 1991, and later the August coup that brought Boris Yeltsin to power, posed a new and more ominous threat: the prospect of the Soviet empire breaking up in orgies of violence. This was the fear that led Bush to caution Ukrainian separatists in his "Chicken Kiev" speech and inspired Baker to advise Slovenia against seceding from Yugoslavia.[5] But American leaders did not succeed where old Soviet bosses had already failed. Russia and the other republics cast off the dead hand of Sovietism on their own, while the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians descended into a savage war.

So the cold war was indeed transcended, but without the superpower partnership, as the Soviet Union disappeared. The New World Order perished, however, not in Eurasia, nor even on the pages of *The New York Times,* but on the political playing fields of Pennsylvania. When, by trumpeting the issue of health care and jobs, Democrat Harris Wofford clobbered the heavily favored former Republican attorney general, Richard Thornburgh, in an election for a Senate seat, the Bush administration's "neglect" of domestic issues became the theme of the year—and threw the White House into panic. On the defensive, Bush quickly rediscovered Japan's trading sins and rushed to Tokyo, where he lost his dinner on the lap of the Japanese prime minister. His "I Care" reelection campaign never recovered, and his foreign policy was the first casualty. Accused of not leading at home the way he had led abroad, the president's answer was to stop leading abroad. It took Richard Nixon and the Senate Democrats to

[4] President George Bush, "The U.N.: World Parliament of Peace," Address to the U.N. General Assembly, Oct. 1, 1990, in *Dispatch* (U.S. Department of State), Oct. 8, 1990, p. 152.

[5] On Aug. 1, 1991, President Bush addressed the Ukrainian parliament in Kiev and warned that Washington would not support self-determination based on "suicidal nationalism" and "ethnic hatred." See *The New York Times,* Aug. 2, 1991. Accusing the president of timidity for his failure to embrace nationalist movements in the Soviet republics, some American commentators dubbed this address the "Chicken Kiev" speech. See William Safire, "After the Fall," *The New York Times Magazine,* Aug. 29, 1991.

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embarrass Bush into offering aid for Yeltsin. Bush's final act, deliberately designed to avoid "order building," was to sponsor a strictly humanitarian mission into Somalia.

The Doctrine of Enlargement

In the course of his own victorious campaign for president, Clinton was careful not to challenge the overall Bush foreign policy. Instead, he appealed to selected constituencies on a very few issues: to American Jews over Bush's cold relations with Israel; to African-Americans over Haitian refugees; to the human-rights crowd over China and Bosnia. And once safely elected, he preoccupied himself with "change" at home. Secretary of State Warren Christopher accordingly reflected the president's domestic agenda. He emphasized "economic security," supported Russian reform because that was what *allowed* Clinton to focus on domestic issues, and he looked to multilateralism as the best instrument for the exercise of U.S. influence. The new team assured the world that it had learned the lessons of the Vietnam War, the Reagan-Bush years (Iran/*contra,* Grenada, Panama), and the Carter era, especially when it came to the use of force.[6] U.N. ambassador Madeline Albright gave the posture a name: "assertive multilateralism."[7]

These ideas and Clinton's campaign promises were soon put to a rough test. On Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, Clinton appeared to be rushing in, and then rushing out, with much money spent, some lives lost, and very little achieved. In East Asia, Clinton picked quarrels with China (over human rights) and Japan (over trade) at the same time that he tried to boost the idea of an Asia-Pacific community. Later in the year, the North Korean nuclear crisis erupted. Only in his firm support for Yeltsin and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) did Clinton display any consistency, and only on these issues did he obtain bipartisan support in the Congress.[8]

By Fall 1993, an avalanche of criticism and slipping polls forced the White House, State Department, and Defense Department to develop a "doctrine." The administration speeches that followed deliberately played down the troubles in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti as minor waves on an otherwise placid sea of achievements, such as the denuclearization of Ukraine and progress towards peace in the Middle East. Finally, on September 21, 1993, national security advisor Anthony Lake proclaimed the new Clinton doctrine: "Enlargement," the

[6] See Secretary of State Warren Christopher's confirmation testimony, *Dispatch,* Jan. 25, 1993.

[7] Madeleine K. Albright, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Management," Testimony before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, June 9, 1993.

[8] In Nov. 1993, both the House and the Senate passed NAFTA with bipartisan coalitions. Of the 234 House members to vote for the agreement, 132 of them were Republicans. In the Senate, the NAFTA vote recieved 34 of 61 affirmative votes from Republicans.

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essence of which was the expansion of the ranks of democratic and free-market nations and resistance to attempts by rogue states to prevent such expansion.

Challenging America "to lead on the basis of opportunity more than fear," Lake described a world in which the United States was the dominant power and democracy and market economics were "ascendant." But this world, he granted, was also disfigured by ethnic conflict and subject to "the accelerated pace of events" brought on by technological change. Hence, to enlarge the community of free nations, the United States must: (1) work to strengthen the existing community; (2) foster new democracies; (3) counter aggression; and (4) accompany humanitarian efforts with a program "to help democracy and market economics take root." Compared to this mission, the debates over Bosnia, Somalia, and multilateralism were simply "overdrawn." After all, these episodes did not "define our broader strategy in the world." Of course, he paused to justify U.S. policies in those areas, and added his personal belief that the "habits of multilateralism" would promote the rule of law as envisioned by the founders of the United Nations. But he emphasized nonetheless the view that "America's interests" overrode all other considerations, and on the key issue of whether to act alone or in concert with other nations, he professed a cheerful pragmatism: "The simple question in each instance is this: what works best?"[9]

Lake's comments were given a further boost into the rhetorical stratosphere on September 27, 1993, by Clinton himself. Addressing that echo chamber of soaring ambitions, the U.N. General Assembly, the president declared: "For the first time in history we have the chance to expand the reach of democracy and economic progress across the whole of Europe and to the far reaches of the world."[10] But all of this levitation to high purpose begged an obvious question: if Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and so forth were indeed peripheral to U.S. interests *and* its dream of "enlargement," then why was the administration considering the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia or, as in Somalia, already using them against one faction in a civil war?

Most Americans had not noticed the transformation of the U.N. and U.S. missions in Somalia. As Bush's limited humanitarian mission reached its conclusion, the United Nations took up the political burden, which Bush had called the "security function." Already on December 3, 1992, the American humanitarian intervention had been justified by U.N. Resolution 794, which for the first time authorized military action to create "a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." Then, on March 26, Resolution 814 authorized the United Nations not only to assume responsibility for that "secure environment" but also to seek financing for the "rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia." As Ambassador Albright noted, "With this resolution we will embark on an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable

[9] Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., Sept. 21, 1993, pp. 13–14 (typescript).

[10] Bill Clinton, "Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World," Address to the U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 27, 1993, *Dispatch*, Sept. 27, 1993, p. 650.

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member of the community of nations."[11] Thus, the United Nations had taken up both peace enforcing (chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter) and nation building, fully supported by the United States. This was truly assertive multilateralism.

An administration that moved from assertive multilateralism to deliberative multilateralism was moving from slow to stop.

Not all Somalis agreed. In early June, one of the warlords, General Muhammad Farah Aydid, massacred some U.N. peacekeepers, putting the whole mission in doubt. Then, armed with a fresh U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the arrest of those responsible, U.S. forces spent the summer blasting Aydid's hideouts but failed to find him. Not three weeks after Lake's speech, however, a U.S.-planned operation intended to seize Aydid ended with the deaths of eighteen Americans, one of whom was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu for the delectation of CNN.

Ten months earlier, Americans had seen dying children in Somalia and urged their government to get in; now they saw dead U.S. soldiers, and they urged their government to get out. Christopher protested any "talk about getting out," but only until the polls were in. To make matters worse, it surfaced that Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, fearing Congressional alarm, had denied the American force the heavy armaments it sought to protect itself.[12] The Clinton administration discovered that the loss of American lives and prestige for less than vital American interests was intolerable. And it did not matter to the American people that many other nations were implicated in the folly.

In Washington, there was a sudden loss of enthusiasm for both the United Nations and "assertive multilateralism." When U.N. secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali volunteered that "if it helps the Americans solve [their problems] by blaming me, I'll be a scapegoat," and Christopher confessed that "we got undue focus on the military side of this . . . right up to and including the president,"[13] the Somali debate acquired a candor it had previously lacked. But there would be no doubt of the outcome: enlargement had been mugged in Mogadishu.

So yet another new doctrine was hastily drafted and issued as Presidential Decision Directive No. 25. It took as its text the restrictive principles first laid down by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1984 after the Beirut disaster. It then added the requirement for massive, decisive force that was put forward by Colin Powell when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[11] *Facts on File,* Apr. 1, 1993, p. 224.

[12] See *The Wall Street Journal,* Oct. 19, 1993.

[13] For Boutros-Ghali, see *The New York Times,* Oct. 10, 1993; for Christopher, see *The New York Times,* Oct. 11, 1993.

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And, finally, the directive internationalized these strictures. Presidential Decision Directive No. 25 meant that the United States would not support even "peacekeeping" operations, unless these conditions were met.[14] It also sought to reduce the U.S. contribution to peacekeeping to 25 percent of the total budget from the current nearly 32 percent. (The United States is over $1 billion in arrears.) The new policy was called "deliberative multilateralism."[15] "Peacemaking" was dropped.

An administration that moved from assertive multilateralism to deliberative multilateralism was moving from slow to stop. What had survived of the doctrine was the president's plaintive insistence that if only he could communicate better, the American people would be "much more understanding of what I'm trying to do and that will give me the flexibility I need."[16]

Crisis No. 1: Russia

Washington's pratfalls are providing rich tender for the critics, but time is running out for the United States to define a new leadership role. Three foreign policy crises are bearing down upon us, all of which jeopardize the chance to win the peace. To be fair, all three were bequeathed by Bush; but in each case, Clinton made the problem worse. And, in each case, the president now operates in the most dangerous of situations: no bipartisan consensus; a paralyzing ambivalence about the use of military power; and an exaggerated rhetoric of democratic ambitions.

The first crisis is Russia. Since August 1991, Yeltsin has defeated two coups and made two of his own. He led the resistance to those who sought Gorbachev's overthrow, then brought about the overthrow of both Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. But vexed by the inherited Soviet constitution and an anti-democratic Congress, he then contrived an election, and finally—when the resulting parliament sought to seize power in October 1993—he attacked the parliament and captured the ring leaders. But the new constitution for which Yeltsin fought is now itself in the hands of an elected Duma, a majority of whose members are neo-fascists or ex-communists.[17] Yeltsin himself admitted that a third of the army voted for ultranationalist Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky, and a recent survey revealed that a solid third of all Russians want the Soviet Union restored.[18] Meanwhile, the Russian economy continues to shrink, and the country

[14] *The New York Times,* May 6, 1994.

[15] Unidentified senior government official quoted in *The Philadelphia Inquirer,* May 6, 1994.

[16] *The New York Times,* June 29, 1994.

[17] The Russia's Choice group calculated 174 of 444 elected Duma members are "democratically minded," while the opposition can count on at least 195 votes. See "Balance of Forces' Calculated," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia,* Dec. 29, 1993, p. 12, from Interfax (Moscow), Dec. 28, 1993.

[18] See Adrian Karatnycky, "Back to the U.S.S.R.," *The Wall Street Journal,* June 30, 1994.

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is plagued by inflation, low foreign investment, and organized crime associated in the popular mind with capitalism.

Grim as this picture might be, Russia's experiment with political and economic reform should not be written off as a complete failure. We are as hard put to understand the chaos that is Russia today as we were in the time when Sovietology meant reading the tea leaves in *Pravda*. The point is different.

The real problem lies not in Russia's chaotic domestic politics but in Russia's inability to play the role Clinton assigns to it.

The real problem lies not in Russia's domestic politics but in Russia's inability to play the role Clinton assigns to it: as a stable democratic partner in peace whose interests are much the same as our own. There is a good reason to prolong this illusion and for the excessive reliance on Boris Yeltsin himself: admission of a Russian "problem" would refocus attention on security issues and distract attention from Clinton's domestic agenda.

The reality, however, is that Russia remains a great power rapidly re-equipping itself with a geopolitical vision. Russians across the spectrum share the idea that the "near abroad," the Baltics, and the former members of the Warsaw Pact, contain areas of special interest for Russian security.[19] Not surprisingly—indeed, partly *because* of its domestic problems—Russia even under Yeltsin has begun to reassert its influence everywhere from the Central Asian Republics to Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, and, most directly, Belarus and Ukraine. Indeed, Russian military doctrine today legitimates intervention on behalf of Russians living in the near abroad.[20]

Many of the former Soviet republics suffer from failure of leadership, economic distress, and civil strife that makes them look to Moscow, or at least makes them susceptible to Moscow's wishes. But the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, notably Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, have observed this Russian assertiveness and petitioned for membership in NATO and the European Union (EU). The Western response has been simply indecent. The EU has been stingy with trade, while NATO, under American guidance, offers only a destructive ambiguity called "Partnership for Peace."

The Partnership was originally launched in the Fall of 1993 in full expectation that Yeltsin and the Russia Choice Party would win the December

[19] For example, see Teresa P. Johnson and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Russian Security after the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, with the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1994).

[20] See Mary C. FitzGerald, "The Russian Military's Strategy for 'Sixth Generation' Warfare," *Orbis*, Summer 1994, pp. 474–75. For a sample of current Russian military thought on Russia's geopolitical "space," its reach for a neutral East Europe, and special privileges in the Baltics, see "Chief of Russia's General Staff Academy Speaks Out on Moscow's New Military Doctrine," *Orbis*, Spring 1993, pp. 281–88.

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elections. Thus, a place was made for Russian participation, while membership anytime soon for anyone else was deferred to help Yeltsin. Vice President Al Gore, in Moscow to celebrate the expected pro-Yeltsin election results, saw first-hand instead that the Russia imagined in Washington was not the Russia of reality. Still, the administration flinched. Strobe Talbott, soon to become deputy secretary of state, abandoned the reformers with the ill-considered words that Russia needed "less shock and more therapy."[21] Yeltsin soon jettisoned the remaining free marketeers in his government.

The president did little better on his January 1994 tour promoting the Partnership. To be sure, he revised his rhetoric, before an audience in Prague, saying that "the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how."[22] He then offered the Partnership to all countries that might apply, Russia included, and the first to sign up was Romania, the *least* reformed of the former Warsaw Pact states. But if NATO were to include *all* former Warsaw Pact members, how then would it differ from the extant Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)? What purpose was there in a military alliance to which *all* belonged?

In May 1994, the Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev presented Russia's ideas on NATO membership to the NATO defense ministers. His manner was friendly, but the proposals themselves could have come from the Soviet era. He wanted a de facto Russian veto over alliance action, disguised as a subordination of NATO to a new European security structure consisting of NATO, the EU, and the CIS, topped off by a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NATO plus the ex-Warsaw Pact). And just to ensure against the remote chance that some twitch might emerge from that somnolent body, Grachev would superimpose the truly inert CSCE.[23] Then, on June 22, 1994, the Russian foreign minister suddenly endorsed the Partnership, dropping Grachev's proposals but extracting from NATO a separate channel of consultation, "enhanced dialogue," that reflected Russia's "weight and responsibility as a major European, international, and nuclear power."[24] Did Russia's joining the queue mean that Moscow no longer objected to former Warsaw Pact members joining NATO? There were conflicting reports.[25] Meanwhile, the nuclear disarmament treaties remain unfulfilled, reports spread of hidden Russian chemical warfare programs, and Russia and the United States have been at odds over Bosnia, peacekeeping, joint military exercises, and spying.

In sum, Clinton has fashioned the worst of both worlds. He has declared his desire not to draw "new lines" against the Russians, but the result of his

[21] *The New York Times,* Dec. 21, 1994.

[22] *The New York Times,* Jan. 13, 1994.

[23] For the fullest public account of Grachev's presentations, see Frederick Bonnart, "Is There Really Room for the Russians," *The International Herald Tribune,* June 8, 1994.

[24] See *The Wall Street Journal,* June 23, 1994.

[25] See Ibid., which reported Andrei V. Kozyrev as having told NATO ministers in private that Russia no longer objected. On the same date, however, *The New York Times* reported that Christopher "hedged" and that Kozyrev declined to answer on this point.

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policy is to let the Russians draw new lines against NATO, all in an atmosphere of dangerous ambiguity. By using words and expressions—"democracy," "partnership"—that are contradicted by reality, the administration has unwittingly left the American public unprepared for Russian great-power behavior, heightening the risk of a massive reversal of U.S. opinion when and if Moscow does something we deem egregious. We have already had a foretaste in the rough nomination passage the Senate gave Strobe Talbott. After several years of bipartisan consensus, important Republicans, such as Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, withdrew their support from Clinton's Russia policy, and Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana called the Partnership for Peace "an artful dodge . . . focusing on the marginal at the expense of the critical."[26] The ground has thus been prepared for a profound disillusionment that, in the event of Russian provocations, could land us in a new cold war.

Crisis No. 2: The Balkans

The second crisis that threatens our chance to win the peace is the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Unlike those of 1914, today's Balkan conflicts will not ignite a world war. But, ironically, if the stakes had been higher, they might have led to a greater sense of Western responsibility. Instead, there could hardly have been a greater record of Western irresponsibility. The United States, a major supporter of Yugoslavia throughout the cold war period, has tried to pretend that the country is a European problem, while the European Union seems to have been at pains to prove that it is anything but united. So, the Germans hastily recognized Slovenia's and Croatia's independence, while an Anglo-French peacekeeping contingent signally failed to prevent the escalation and spread of fighting in Bosnia.

It would be well to dispose of the argument that Balkan history ordained this tragedy. The dry tinder of history is everywhere, but someone has to light the match. The Western powers knew from the start that Serbia's president Slobodan Milosevic was the principal arsonist. It was he who looted the Yugoslav treasury and set aside the constitution, thus precipitating the crackup. Moreover, the West had a free hand for at least two years, thanks to the embarrassment of Russia, Serbia's traditional protector. Lastly, like Saddam before him and Kim Il Sung after him, Milosevic quickly established himself as a liar and thug; he had no Western apologists. So it was that this typically nineteenth-century Balkan-style problem cried out for a nineteenth-century concert-style solution in which the great powers imposed solutions on the lesser powers, recognizing the military balance on the ground, to be sure, but making clear to the victor that no more fighting would be tolerated. But instead of acting boldly and in concert—as only a coalition led by the United States could do—the Western powers handed Bosnia to the United Nations. U.N. forces were thereupon

[26] *The Washington Post*, July 1, 1994.

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dispatched to "keep" a peace where no peace existed, to become hostages themselves to possible reprisal, and to give humanitarian aid to populations who were in fact combatants, or at least considered such by the Serbs. A horrified West then threw a heavy rhetorical and bureaucratic barrage at the target: CSCE resolutions, United Nations Security Council resolutions, EU resolutions, and, on the ground, the U.N. Protection Force, the name itself a study in irony as it could not protect itself, much less the population looking to it for safety. Add to that a Wilsonian economic embargo on Serbia and an arms embargo on everyone.

It would be well to dispose of the argument that Balkan history ordained this tragedy. The dry tinder of history is everywhere, but someone has to light the match.

That was the Bush legacy. Clinton at least saw a need to bloody the Serbs, but his hesitant talk of doing so only turned the Balkan crisis into a NATO crisis. In the spring of 1993, he dispatched Christopher to ask American allies what to do. Not surprisingly, the Europeans sought an American commitment to police any implementation of the peace plan proposed by Cyrus R. Vance and Lord Owen, the essence of which was to "cantonize" Bosnia; at the least, they wanted some U.S. troops on the ground whenever U.S. bombs began to fall. Washington refused. The only player to take the Clinton plan seriously was Milosevic himself. He threatened to cut off aid to the the Bosnian Serbs should they fail to accept Vance-Owen. But before Milosevic could bring his allies around, Clinton discovered that Bosnia was in fact a humanitarian problem and a European problem. Convinced now that he had nothing to fear, Milosevic dumped the would-be deal makers from his regime, while Washington blamed its NATO allies for refusing to support the president's "get tough" policy.[27]

Later in the summer of 1993, Clinton told his NATO colleagues that the last thing needed was more tough talk and no action. But there was no action until a bomb exploded in a Sarajevo marketplace, whereupon CNN-induced outrage obliged the administration to do something. So NATO threatened again to bomb the Serbs, whose reply was simply to shift some units from Sarajevo to other Muslim enclaves. The humiliating result was that NATO, the most successful alliance in history, found its prestige and deterrent power confided to a Japanese civil servant assigned by the United Nations to keep its forces "neutral" and its efficacy measured by whether or not one hundred Serb gunmen still remained on the outskirts of a ruined town called Gorazde, near the Bosnian-Serbian frontier. Belated Russian intervention then resulted in a new plan for a 51–49 percent partition of Bosnia, still without a settlement in

[27] For a review of this and other incidents, see *The Washington Post*, Oct. 17, 1994; and David Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbia," *Foreign Affairs*, July/Aug. 1994, pp. 30–47.

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neighboring Croatia or any credible enforcement mechanism. Meanwhile, the U.S. Senate displayed its level of confidence in Clinton's latest Balkan policy by coming within a single vote of lifting his arms embargo against the embattled Bosnians. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia may or may not subside in the months to come. But the damage done to the NATO alliance and to the bipartisan coalition any president needs in Congress in matters of foreign policy may well endure. That—and not the precise division of spoils in the Balkans—is why this crisis threatens to lose us the post–cold war peace.

Crisis No. 3: East Asia

The Bush administration left office with its Asian policy in disarray. Bush had vainly attempted to hold the line on China after the Tiananmen Square massacre, but his Chinese friends disappointed him. Beijing's leadership, convinced that Gorbachev's blunder was to allow political change before achieving economic success, tolerated no popular challenge to the supremacy of the Communist Party. Hence, Bush could not secure from Beijing the face-saving gestures he needed to deal with a Congress determined to punish China. At the same time, Bush joined the Japan-bashing chorus in order to fend off Democratic criticism on the trade deficit. But these were the flailings of a political campaign. The administration's real inclination was to treat China as a geopolitical partner and to deal with Japan as an ally whose strategic importance overrode commercial disputes.

Clinton entered office determined to bully the Chinese into humane behavior and Japan into "fair trade." His regional experts also picked up the Bush idea of a Pacific community and tried to give the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) a political dimension. Somewhere on the road to the Seattle Summit in May 1993, the administration awoke to the unwisdom of picking quarrels with China and Japan simultaneously. So the Chinese were given a year to improve their human rights record, and Clinton finessed the embattled Japanese prime minister into a vacuous "framework" agreement on trade. The Seattle Summit and APEC itself were thus becalmed by the steamy airs of delay and ambiguity.

Security issues, however, cannot be wished away, and so it was that North Korea's Kim Il Sung exploited the year of U.S.-Chinese-Japanese friction to purchase an insurance policy of his own against the "collapse of communism": nuclear weapons. Kim let Gorbachev persuade him, in 1985, to join the Non-Proliferation regime but only so he could keep receiving Soviet nuclear assistance. Later, in 1991, he secured the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea on the promise of a nuclear-free peninsula. But when it gradually emerged that North Korea was, in all likelihood, cheating, one of the Clinton administration's few clearly enunciated security policies was challenged: the determination to prevent rogue regimes from acquiring nuclear weapons. But would the United States go to war to prevent it? That was a question no one wanted to have answered. So the administration resorted to sanctions intended

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to make North Korea admit inspectors. But what if the inspectors found evidence that nuclear material was indeed being diverted? What if North Korea already *had* a bomb? Sooner or later, the United States would face a potential military clash, unless North Korea were not cheating in the first place.

Anxious to avoid such a dangerous test of its resolve, the administration adopted a carrot-and-stick approach based on the assumption that the North Korean dictator would be willing to trade his nuclear capability for the recognition and aid that might sustain his regime. That called for a very steady, persistent diplomatic probe, a persuasive military buildup, and international solidarity with the regional powers that mattered most: China and Japan. Too bad that Clinton had spent a year and a half feuding with Beijing and Tokyo to the point that he could not even get them to focus on North Korea, much less rally behind an effective policy. So the United States poured concessions on North Korea while Kim broke barrier after barrier with impunity. Finally, in June 1994, Washington picked up the stick. A U.S. military buildup was under way, and stiffer U.N. sanctions were prepared. And that was when *Kim* threatened war.

The Clintonians then resorted to the unlikely figure of Jimmy Carter to bail them out. Encouraged to visit North Korea on a mission of communication, Carter sang the praises of Kim Il Sung, condemned Clinton's "stick policy," and offered North Korea a high-level parley, an inter-Korean summit, and *Western* nuclear assistance in exchange for a freeze on its nuclear program. Carter's mission had given the political initiative back to North Korea while Clinton's drive for sanctions was stalled in its tracks and the military buildup went in slow motion. The U.S. stick shrank into twigdom, even as the sudden death of Kim Il Sung increased uncertainties.[28]

Clinton's belated reversion to a geopolitical policy toward China has restored a certain realism to the U.S. position in Asia. But he had little to show for his wrestling matches with Beijing, Tokyo, and Pyongyang except a continued crisis in Korea, confusion in Japan, and a certain contempt by the Chinese. We may still have time to recoup, to assert U.S. leadership within the context of Asian realities, and build the Pacific "community" the administration imagines. But by all accounts, it has been a poor beginning in a region where the political uncertainties, the potential for miscalculation, and the stakes for U.S. interests are enormous.

Toward a New Concept

The mishandling of these crises over so short a time carries ominous implications. At worst, we could have a new cold war with Russia; a disruption of NATO; an arms race in volatile Northeast Asia—all following one on the

[28] Kim's death deprived the United States of its newly found entrée into North Korea's inner sanctum. Voices were quickly raised urging Washington to consecrate his succession as soon as possible. See Stephen W. Linton, "When the Headman Dies," *The New York Times*, July 11, 1994.

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other. Such a sudden and drastic reversal of American fortunes would be an astonishing commentary on a country that prided itself on being the sole superpower and only three years before led a victorious coalition against Iraq. Even more troubling, the current range of policies seems entirely inadequate to the challenge. Russia, the Balkans, and Northeast Asia have this in common: the United States could not deal with them alone; the United Nations cannot do the job; economic sanctions are inadequate; and a Desert Storm military effort is either unwarranted or useless. Nor can these crises be categorized as either primarily moral issues or issues of national interest. So Washington remains baffled, searching vainly for "what works" until the next sensational development, conveyed by television, forces another shift of policy.

There has got to be a better way.

The beginning of wisdom is for Washington to get a grip on itself.

The beginning of wisdom is for Washington to get a grip on itself, that is, to spend less time on counting complexities and more time reminding us of our strengths. These facts are the most important of our era:

- The United States and its allies in Europe and Asia hold the preponderance of political, military, and economic power in the world. We cannot fix every problem but surely we can handle the most important.

- The United States has a unique combination of power that none of its allies can match. Our economy is the largest and still overall the most diversified; our military still has incomparable global reach, although shrinking too fast.

- Above all, the United States can define the common interest like no other nation.

The latter is of greater importance than we realize. To sense its measure, consider which power in Europe could rally the others to a common purpose: the Russians are still in flux; the Germans do not want to lead nor does anyone want them to lead; the French want to lead but no one wishes to follow them; the British have left the business since Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher resigned. As for Asia, no one there wants either Japan or China to define a common purpose. In short, if the United States does not lead, the result must be, as Paul Johnson put it, "a world without leaders," or worse, a world ripe for dictators and demagogues.[29]

[29] See Paul Johnson, "A World without Leaders," *Commentary*, July 1994, pp. 19–22.

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But American leadership must have a purpose and a policy suitable to the times. There is no sense in prescribing a task for America repugnant to its people or beyond reasonable means. What follows are some suggestions for crucial changes in four areas: (1) ideals, or the world we seek; (2) the diplomacy to achieve it; (3) the military power we need; (4) the economic strategy to pursue. No one, or even three, of the four is sufficient. Each depends on the others.

Ideals and Reality

The Duke of Wellington said that the correct solution to any problem depends on understanding what the problem is. In the U.S. system of government, that problem is defined either by the president or by events. The essence of statesmanship, of course, is to shape these events rather than be at their mercy. Inevitably, that obliges the president to persuade Americans of what the country should be doing and why. One thing is certain. Taking one's cue from public opinion only reflects back upon the public its own confusion.[30]

President Clinton declared to the graduating class at Annapolis in June 1994 that America's goal should be to "win the peace." But he has not yet defined that peace and the obstacles to achieving it. He might begin by disabusing the American people of their (and his) biggest illusion: what we call democracy and free markets are *not* ascendant in the world, and most nations are *not* remaking themselves voluntarily in our image. As the playwright-poet-president of the Czech Republic, Václav Havel, has said, our world is a single technical civilization without a unified style. Everyone prefers the technology of the West, but few accept its values, democratic or otherwise. In this transition from the cold war world to whatever will replace it, Havel says, "everything is possible and almost nothing is certain. . . . People . . . cling to the ancient certainties of their tribe." And in a world of unified technique but discordant values, the only suitable international order is "a new model of coexistence . . . within a single interconnected civilization."[31] We know well the basic design for such a model of coexistence because in Western Europe and much of the Pacific littoral we have *already promoted* such an order. Its main features are a decent respect for individual rights on the political level; relatively free markets and trade on the economic level; and peaceful resolutions of disputes on the international level. This model provides a modicum of peace and freedom that can form the basis of an international order worthy of the name. It does not insist on specific cultural, religious, or institutional forms, only on what Churchill called the politics of decency. Above all, it is an order hospitable to American interests and values.

[30] Recent polls have revealed an American public holding the usual contradictory ideas: fairly savvy about U.S. interests, not too concerned about foreign affairs but wanting to succeed without paying a price. See Robert C. Toth, "In Search of a Foreign Policy," *Foreign Service Journal,* Jan. 1994.

[31] "Address of the President of the Czech Republic, His Excellency Václav Havel, on the Occassion of the Liberty Medal Ceremony," Philadelphia, July 4, 1994, pp. 4, 5 (typescript).

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Diplomacy, or How to Get There

How does the United States promote such an order? American diplomacy has long been troubled by an unsettled argument over whether we should act primarily on behalf of ideals, such as human rights, or interests, be they economic or geopolitical. History teaches that the American people will not support one to the exclusion of the other: a foreign policy of preaching offends our sense of reality, and realpolitik offends our sense of right. But to call simply for a balance between the two is in itself unattainable. In a world where most nations do not share our values but may respect our power, we must secure our interests in order to pursue our ideals. But since the Gulf War, U.S. policy has moved steadily in the opposite direction.

This revisits the historic error of 1919, played out then in the clash between Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt.[32] Wilson argued that through collective security, the "weight" in international politics would always bear decisively against an aggressor thereby fixing the defect in a balance-of-power system that required frequent adjustment, amoral shifts of alliance, and, ultimately, miscalculation. But Theodore Roosevelt thought this to be a formula for committee-like paralysis; interests would never bring nations together long enough to deal with aggression except in desperate crises. After Roosevelt's death, his followers in the Senate stymied Wilson's League of Nations on the grounds that it offered an open-ended commitment of U.S. resources to right every wrong. Wilson's reply that economic sanctions would be the League's chief instrument struck them as an ineffective substitute for regional military alliances.

In a way, the United States has been experimenting anew with the Wilson approach over the past two years, envisioning a vast expansion of U.N. peacekeeping to "right every wrong" and using sanctions as the major tool of enforcement against aggression. But the verdict is in on this one, too. It does not work, and the American people do not support it. The Clintonians have backed away from the policies of "disinterested" peacekeeping, while sanctions have proved to be less and less effective, especially when applied in stages.[33]

Moreover, the underlying assumption about commonly held "U.N." values is wrong. We defend values that are *not* commonly held. The "clash of civilizations" scenario perhaps exaggerates the case, but it does illustrate a truth: if a new international order depends on commonly held values, then we shall not have one any time soon.[34] This suggests a fundamental error of our diplomacy: we are bidding for a collective security by nations that pay lip service to the U.N. Charter but in fact are loud (or silent) apostates from it.

The more relevant argument perhaps is the one between Franklin Roosevelt and Churchill. Roosevelt's United Nations also depended on a

[32] Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 40ff.
[33] *The New York Times*, July 3, 1994.
[34] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, pp. 22–49.

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unanimity of "values," in this case, the value of defeating aggression, which was presumably shared by the United States, the USSR, Britain, and China. Today, if one substitutes "Europe" for Britain, the U.N. Security Council, free of Soviet veto, should function in this way. But as we have seen in one problem after another, the parties may agree on ends but not means. And both Russian and Chinese vetoes could soon reappear on a range of vital issues.

Churchill wanted the United Nations to have its own police force. Short of that, he had little faith in collective security as a global instrument of statecraft. In his "iron curtain" speech, the most important passage was not the warning about the USSR, but his call for a U.S.-led regional alliance to uphold the principles of the U.N. Charter. Such coalitions, sharing interests and values, were the real "sinews of peace."[35]

Today, the United States increasingly faces the choice between acting through an ineffective United Nations and going it alone. This is a self-imposed straitjacket. The most effective means of action remains Churchill's regional alliances, which is to say, NATO and our Asian security relationships. These constitute the central sinews of peace around which larger coalitions can be built.

Some will say that because the USSR no longer exists, we can no longer expect these alliances to respond to our will. Not as quickly or as easily, perhaps. But the same circumstances that allow us to define the common interest allow us to work for common action. Without U.S. support and leadership, the security of our allies will be diminished, and they know it. It will require more effort, and at earlier stages. But that is not to say that the allies will fail to respond. Especially when the threat or use of force is needed, it is crucial to engage our allies when a problem is still proportional to their limited capabilities. Surely this is a lesson from Bosnia.

There is another lesson, too. The prestige and deterrence power of our alliances are not to be risked with impunity. The worst blunder we ever committed with NATO was to be seduced by the slogan "out of area or out of business." The business of NATO is still to keep the Germans down (that is, secure in collective alliance), the Russians out (that is, not dominant in Europe), and the Americans in (that is, engaged as a European power on the ground). A decade ago the Alliance had a more effective formula for "out of area": those who could act (Great Britain, France, and the United States) should act, and the rest should support them. The alliance as a whole, governed as it is by consensus and a unified military command, was best kept focused on the main business. That formula is still workable. NATO has enough to worry about in extending its umbrella eastward to those who share its values, without risking

[35] An intriguing account of the "iron curtain" speech, delivered at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, is given in Martin Gilbert, *Never Despair: Winston S. Churchill, 1945–1965* (London: Heinemann, 1988). Reaction to the speech in the United States was quite hostile, and Truman denied supporting it. Churchill spoke a week after the arrival of Kennan's famous telegram, which first sketched the need for containment.

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its credibility far afield or subjecting its forces to the ludicrous intricacies of U.N. Rules of Engagement.[36]

Only regional coalitions, composed of like-minded states and loyal to U.S. leadership, have any chance of defending, much less promoting, the values to which the United Nations pays lip service. Indeed, they must be prepared to act even if the United Nations does not.

Lastly, U.S. leadership means presidential leadership, both to educate public opinion *and* to build a Congressional coalition. President Clinton did just that in his successful fight for NAFTA. The coalition he built—mostly Republicans but with an admixture of Democrats—is the same coalition that has sustained U.S. leadership abroad ever since the Vietnam War splintered the Democratic Party. To be sure, that bipartisan majority has frayed: some of the Republicans are turning isolationist and some of the Democrats focus exclusively on domestic affairs or are strongly protectionist. Should those neo-isolationists find each other in common cause, the United States will shun its responsibility to lead and ruin the international coalitions that defend its values abroad.

U.S. leadership means presidential leadership, both to educate public opinion and to build a Congressional coalition.

The president, therefore, must cultivate an "inner coalition" in Congress even as he tends an "outer coalition" of friends and allies abroad. His best argument is the fact of political and economic interdependence: the United States cannot succeed at home if it fails abroad, and vice versa. If he fails to make the effort, he will face a Congress where the isolationists, protectionists, and declinists are the only ones who know what they want.

Role of the U.S. Military

Today, the U.S. military is facing a double gap: the first relates to resources, the second to strategy. After bottom-up, top-down, and sideways reviews, the Clinton Defense Department reached a familiar conclusion: we need forces sufficient to guarantee the security of our allies in Asia and Europe if we are to meet our commitments. This ratified the strategic decision after 1945 not to leave German or Japanese security to chance or their unilateral actions.

The end of the cold war meant that we needed less of a force to do that and a prudent way to reduce the military without leaving us either an obsolete force or one too small to do the job. And no one can make the case now that we are spending too much or that some imperial burden bogs down

[36] See "Rules of Engagement for U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia," in this issue of *Orbis*.

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the economy. Defense spending is at a historic low as a percentage of GNP and the federal budget, and this situation will soon seriously harm our military readiness.

Yet, already important assumptions about how to get a two-and-a-half-war force out of a one-war budget are at risk: operating tempos are as high as ever, meaning that equipment will be wearing out; and, as the force shrinks, recruitment for more active duty becomes difficult. DOD has long needed but never achieved a drastic change in the way it procures equipment.[37] Lastly, and of enormous importance, the industrial base to support an emergency expansion is shrinking rapidly and may be increasingly inadequate. This is a quiet crisis but a deadly one, and part of the solution is to halt the decline in defense spending or even to reverse it.

Then there is the strategy gap. Today's military philosophy seeks to avoid another Vietnam through an elaborate checklist of requirements: U.S. military engagements should occur only with popular support, with a good chance to win, and most important, with a decisive application of massive force. Speed and size would hold down U.S. casualties; in contrast, "limited" gradual applications of force, such as in Vietnam, would prolong operations, increase casualties, and give the enemy the opportunity to adjust.

In practice, that philosophy has meant a preference for Desert-Storm-style warfare or nothing. But a high-tech, low-casualty campaign is not the historic rule. Desert-Storm-style warfare cannot be our only option, if only because our opponents, having seen what our weapons can do, will not challenge us in that way again. Secretary of Defense Perry pointed out earlier in his career that America's high-tech weapons were of dubious utility in "regional conflicts that are basically civil wars or dominated by guerrilla warfare."[38] It is clear already that our curtain of deterrence does not touch the floor of potential conflict, and the weapon of choice, air power, has important limitations that must be clearly understood by policy makers.[39] We should revisit the lessons to be learned from the limited wars and defeats of our recent experience—Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon—so that we are prepared to overcome the challenges of the warfare we are more likely to face, not the wars we would prefer to fight.[40]

Economic Policy

The Clinton administration's foreign policy has often seemed an economic policy barely disguised. This pattern reflects both the president's convictions and the public opinion polls that put "job protection" at the top of the foreign

[37] See *The New York Times*, July 5, 1994.

[38] See William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1991, p. 81.

[39] Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan–Feb. 1994.

[40] For an account of recent Pentagon thinking under Secretary of Defense Perry, see Michael J. Mazaar, *The Revolution in Military Affairs* (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 10, 1994).

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policy wish list. And the White House has something to show: GATT, NAFTA, and a Japanese bureaucracy on the defensive.

Now, economic policy as foreign policy has come to the end of its agenda. GATT and NAFTA take time to absorb, and at the G-7 summit, the president's colleagues cautioned him against overloading the circuits.[41] In any event, the United States engages in foreign trade because it is to our benefit. But this is not the most serious distortion of a "jobs first" foreign policy. It simply neglects the real economic issues, even as it narrows the focus of the American people on their relations abroad.

Whether you buy the "competitiveness" issue or not, all sides agree that American education is deficient; that our budget deficits are too high; and that we do not save enough. It is hard to see how selling more U.S. cars to Japan can fix these issues, which are quintessentially domestic, economic—or, in the case of education—social problems.[42] These domestic issues should be dealt with domestically; they will not be fixed by aggressive action against Japan or other U.S. trading partners. U.S. economic policy abroad should revert to the patient work of building free trade and stable monetary exchange rates, not counterproductive clashes with allies that cannot solve our real economic problems.

Conclusion

Eras of transition between international orders are inevitably filled with confusion and false starts. Twice, American presidents have tried to find their footing, and twice they have failed: Bush's New World Order and Clinton's Enlargement. This article has enumerated the reasons: illusions about the ascendency of democratic values; overconfidence in the United Nations; mishandling of alliances; and the belief that somehow we could succeed in foreign policy even if we failed at home—and vice versa.

To be generous, the purposes and character of the major nations are in flux, and, therefore, statesmen must act on information even more imperfect than usual. Their decisions may also be more imperfect than usual. But one rule has no exceptions: Those who know what they want have a vast advantage over those who do not.

To "win the peace" the United States must know what it wants. To suggest that we want an international order that resembles the order we created among our allies, over the last half-century, is still revolutionary. As one analyst noted, "Only the late twentieth century has seen durable international alliances

[41] For a transcript of notes taken at the meeting where Clinton's desire for a follow-on to GATT was shelved, see *The Wall Street Journal*, July 11, 1994.

[42] See Paul Krugman, "Competitiveness—A Dangerous Obsession," Mar./Apr. 1994, pp. 28–44; and Krugman, "The Fight over Competitiveness: Proving My Point," *Foreign Affairs*, July/Aug. 1994, pp. 198–203.

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and associations of a new kind, directed not simply against common dangers, but also for common constructive purposes."[43] But is that sustainable?

The answer to that depends on the means, and this article argues that American leadership of select coalitions can do the essential job. And that brings us back again to the essential problem: whether America itself, even if the president were more inclined to lead, can in fact rise to the task.

Neither history nor the opinion polls are very encouraging. As Theodore Roosevelt wrote at the dawn of America's international career:

> In domestic policy, Congress in the long run is apt to do what is right. It is in foreign policy, and in preparing the Army and the Navy that we are apt to have the most difficulty, because these are just the subjects as to which the average American citizen does not take the trouble to think carefully or deeply.[44]

Bereft of a mobilizing threat, the temptation is not to think carefully or deeply or, if one has, to conclude that the country is not up to it. There are plenty of clever people to declare that the United States should get out of the international-order business and focus on something else: let the United Nations do it or let our allies do it or leave it undone while we "restore" our commercial competitiveness or the hundred other things our society needs to do for itself.

These arguments, too, will be sustained by polls that show a crude isolationism (38 percent fear that Clinton is paying too much attention to foreign policy) or an economic determinism (protecting jobs).[45] It may very well be that no president can rally the American people behind an activist foreign policy except when aided by made-for-TV crises.

The burden of this essay has been to say that turning inward would not only miss a historic opportunity, it would be a historic blunder that would deprive the next generation of the "peace dividend" it deserves. Already crises are upon us that if left untended could lead to a world much less friendly than even the imperfect one we have today. There is no need for us to "seek dragons abroad to slay"; they are headed our way whether we like it or not. And the American people, much as they might dislike a president tending to their interests abroad, will like even less the price that may be paid for failing, which can range from a falling dollar and economic dislocation to war itself. To win the peace, a president must organize not only coalitions abroad but coalitions at home.

Ultimately, foreign policy is a test of character, the foundation of leadership. The American character as it applies to foreign affairs carries the

[43] Paul W. Schroeder, "Rediscovering the New World Order," *The Washington Quarterly,* Spring 1994, p. 31.

[44] Quoted in Nathan Miller, *Theodore Roosevelt: A Life* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1992), p. 384.

[45] *The Wall Street Journal*/NBC News Poll, cited in *The Wall Street Journal,* May 6, 1994, and Toth, "In Search of a Foreign Policy."

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ideals of a Wilson and the scheme of a Roosevelt, the ambition to get beyond a balance of power but the wit to use the balance as it is found. The ideals are there and the tools are at hand—the great coalitions now grown into communities bequeathed to us by the cold war. It is risky to try to win the peace, but riskier still not to attempt it.

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The Asian Interior
An Introduction

by Graham E. Fuller

The world has discovered Central Asia over the past three years, but Central Asia has not yet discovered itself. The area occupied by the five states of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—has over long periods of time constituted the proud center of flourishing Islamic civilizations. Nonetheless, the five states have never existed as modern nations before, or within their current borders. Their national identities are still highly unformed—even in a state of flux. Despite Soviet national nomenclature, they are not truly nation-states. As a result, they are still in a process of determining their true character, interests, allies, and opponents.

The region that surrounds them is also in turmoil: Russia, deep in the throes of perestroika; Turkey and Iran claiming new interests in Central Asia; China facing a highly unpredictable future; and, in many places, Islam being reintroduced as a political factor. Central Asia is also surrounded by four nuclear powers: Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. The leaderships of the Central Asian states are nearly all neocommunists who do not reflect the deeper character of the states or their future nationalist inclinations. Too many observers of Central Asia today have been quick to draw far-reaching conclusions about the character of future political relationships there based on the present. But given present fluidity, such conclusions are not only premature but imprudent. The chances are that Central Asia's relationships ten years from now will not resemble those—domestic or international—that we see today.

This issue of *Orbis* brings together three interesting essays on current Central Asian issues. Alvin Z. Rubinstein brings his years of experience observing this area to analyze the influence of external actors, especially Russia, on Central Asia. He rightly concludes that we should not yet ring alarm bells about resurgent Russian neo-imperialism there. In fact, in my judgment, despite Russian efforts to rebuild some voluntary form of the former empire within a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) structure, Russia is doomed to figure in a relatively decreasing way in the future Central Asia. New natural, "organic" economic

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relations with Russia based on market needs must be built to replace the old artificial "command" economic relations of the past. At the same time, the economies of the external world, long barred from the region, will grow in relative importance as this area returns culturally to the mores of the original, broader Central Asia, which included Iran, Afghanistan, the northern Indian subcontinent, and "Chinese Turkestan."

Martha Brill Olcott examines the degree to which Central Asia may or may not represent a united region. Her interesting essay highlights areas of differences among these states and the modest steps so far taken towards the resuscitation of any kind of consolidated region that the old term "Turkestan" embraced. Her description of present realities is on the mark. What is harder to determine is the existence of other factors that may ultimately strengthen or weaken the individualistic character of the republics today: the weakening of local neocommunist fiefdoms, fear of Russia or China, rivalry or even war among them to settle outstanding territorial issues—especially of an ethnic nature—the imperatives of joint cooperation on water, resource, ecological, and transportation issues, as well as a vision of the potential leverage to be gained from acting as a bloc along "pan-Turkish" lines where useful.

Orbis is particularly to be commended for bringing the China factor into the discussion—usually ignored in much Soviet-centric discussion of the region. Ross H. Munro offers a highly provocative and challenging piece on the resurgence of China around its land peripheries, including Central Asia. He paints a remarkable and detailed portrait of a China on an almost unstoppable economic roll that is already sweeping its land neigbors into its zone of economic and geopolitical sway. These realities are highly important for anyone interested not only in the geopolitics of Central Asia but for the even more important future of China itself. Russia and China will be the two grand determinants of Central Asia's future. I would offer only a few sobering notes on Munro's excellent essay.

It may be premature to project an unbroken Chinese economic surge forward into the next century. China, unlike Russia, has yet to face the political half of the perestroika process, an undertaking that has proven very messy in all other former communist states—especially when communism is self-imposed, as in China. To be sure, a rising economy as in China will go a long way towards softening the harshness of the transition away from communist party rule, a process that will unleash major political and regional tensions in China. As economic reform takes hold in China, it will increasingly face Russian-style problems: massive numbers of inefficient factories that retard the economy but that, if closed, will throw hundreds of millions out of work. Already, China has a floating, migrant-vagrant population of over one hundred million people who represent a truly volatile political and social element. They will increase. Peasants grow ever more restive.

And, lastly, China is not just an observer in Central Asia but a participant and overlord: it has eight million Muslim Turkish Uighurs in Xinjiang province who have a history of rebellion. No Muslim peoples are ever happy living under non-Muslim rule. Economic opportunities for the Uighurs in cross-border

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Central Asian trade is great, but it's not likely to be enough to satisfy them in this era of ethnic resurgence. They are joined by Tibetans who have an independence cause familiar to the world. Mongols in China seek reunion with the independent state of Outer Mongolia. In short, huge imponderables make the future of China a major question mark. The Munro essay is an important salvo in a necessary longer-term debate of this issue.

In the end, Central Asia must hoist itself by its own bootstraps if it wishes to emerge from the backwater it has existed in for so long. Will the future Central Asia in fact lie at the center of many Asian developments, a new "Silk Road" between East and West? Or will it simply be a tempestuous but otherwise irrelevant piece of terrain? Central Asia will have much to say about this—but so will the giants who surround it.

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This book should outrage every American*



In *And Weapons For All*, William D. Hartung, a senior research fellow at the World Policy Institute, shows the pernicious effect of the U.S. arms trade on our foreign policy and democratic institutions. By using examples such as the U.S. role in the arming of Saddam Hussein and the unsavory machinations behind the Iran/Contra affair, Hartung reveals that attempts to achieve policy objectives through weapons sales have become a staple of our diplomacy.

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The Asian Interior

The Myth of *"Tsentral'naia Aziia"*

by Martha Brill Olcott

Meeting in Tashkent in January 1993, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and the chairman of Tajikistan's parliament concluded their discussion of common concerns with what they saw to be a momentous declaration. The collective name of the region they shared would no longer be known by the Soviet-era term of *"Sredniaia Aziia i Kazakhstan"* (Middle Asia and Kazakhstan) but would now become *"Tsentral'naia Aziia,"* or Central Asia.

While that may strike the Western reader as little more than a semantic footnote, to those gathered it was a statement of unity, an explicit declaration that the five states now shared a common fate in what one Russian newspaper called a "Central Asian Commonwealth."[1] For more than seventy years now, many in Central Asia have dreamed of such unity, while policy makers in Russia have expended far greater energies to impede them from achieving their goal.

Can the Central Asian states be drawn together? While less than three years of independence is a short span of time, and although fears of the volatility of the region have proven to be exaggerated, initial indications are that internal developments are pulling the five states of Central Asia in different directions.

Ironically, the most forceful impetus for regional integration still lies outside of the region, with Moscow. Should Moscow press for the transformation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into a more formal commonwealth or confederation, all of the Central Asian states are likely to opt for membership. Should Russia become more inwardly directed—especially in a context of growing domestic turmoil—then the Central Asian states are likely to band closer together as a form of economic self-defense.

[1] *Rossiiskaya gazeta,* Jan. 5, 1993.

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A Single Region?

Like it or not, the Central Asian states are closely interconnected. Containing just under 20 percent of the land area and population of the former USSR, defined on the east by high mountains and China, on the south by more mountains and Iran and Afghanistan, and on the west by the Caspian Sea, these five states have long seemed to be a logical geopolitical unit. The titular people of all five states are of Muslim heritage, and four of them are Turkic-speakers, descendants of nomads who had begun to push into the region from the east, beginning in about the eighth century.

The Tajiks, of Persian heritage, are the odd group out linguistically, but long periods of shared history have left their culture and traditions more similar to those of their Turkic neighbors than to those of any of the other Soviet peoples. Indeed, one of the long-running arguments of Soviet-era academics was whether or not Tajiks even existed as a separate group; many Uzbeks argued that Tajiks were simply Persian-speaking Uzbeks, while a number of Tajiks argued the opposite about the Uzbeks. How large a distinct Persian genetic pool still exists in Central Asia seems less relevant than the fact that Persian and Turkic cultures have developed in a layered and intermingled way for most of modern history.

Joseph Stalin's decision to turn Central Asia into five separate republics created five nationalities out of the region's more loosely defined ethnic groupings, and by doing so, reshaped the history of the region. Although juridically distinct, however, the elites of these republics were often drawn together to address common regional concerns, such as the maintenance of a common transportation network, water management, ecological crises, and problems of economic planning.

More important, when the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 rudely and unexpectedly thrust statehood on the five republics of *"Tsentral'naia Aziia,"* each of the leaders of these states inherited similar problems. Although some of the states, such as Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan, are vastly better endowed with natural resources than others, such as Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, they nevertheless shared the characteristic of having underdeveloped industrial sectors relative to their resource-extraction and agricultural sectors. That was so because Soviet economic practice was to use these five states as suppliers of raw materials.

Equally important is the fact that administration and staffing of Central Asian industry was overwhelmingly the responsibility of Russians and other non-natives, which now inhibits the new states from maintaining production in their few factories. Indeed, the ongoing out-migration of Russians from Central Asia (about two million a year for the past five years) has led to a serious loss of trained personnel of all sorts.[2] In Kazakhstan, the most industrialized of the five states, Russian domination of manufacturing also led to concentrations of

[2] *Delovoi mir,* Mar. 14–20, 1994.

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non-Kazakh populations as high as 85 percent in some of the regions contiguous to Russia.

These five states also shared demographic features, as Soviet journalists began pointing out in the late 1970s. Largely dependent upon labor-intensive agriculture, the peoples of these states have much larger families, and at much younger ages, than do people elsewhere in the USSR. Although population growth began to slow somewhat by around 1990, Central Asians remained the youngest, poorest, unhealthiest, least-educated, and most under-employed people in the USSR. Further exacerbating these conditions was the region's ecological crisis borne of limited water resources, ballooning populations, the dessication of the Aral Sea, widespread industrial pollution, and intense radiation contamination in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan.

Unhappily, the five nations also shared a limited ability to deal with the problems they faced. The economic transformation of the region faced impediments both because of Soviet economic practices, which had scattered lines of supply and sale all across what now had become fifteen separate states, and because of geographical chance, which had so placed all five states that goods going into or out of any of them have at minimum to cross either China, Russia, or Iran before reaching the open waters of international trade.

Soviet favoritism toward Russians and other Europeans in education and promotion also left these five states with almost no professionals trained in such essential fields as diplomacy, international law, and international finance; indeed, there was a great shortage even of people with simple knowledge of major European languages, since for most of the Central Asians, Russian had been their major second language. Lastly, all five states were threatened to varying degrees by an Islamic revival. If left unchecked, an Islamic revival *might threaten* the secular foundation of Central Asia's new states, but it would be *certain to threaten* the continued domination of the old communist-turned-nationalist elite that still ruled these states.

Rivalries within the Region

For all the apparent logic of trying to coordinate approaches to their problems, the Soviets encouraged the republics to view one another as administrative rivals, competing for centrally allocated resources. Politics in the Soviet period was a zero-sum game, in which one republic's gain usually was another republic's loss. Though the USSR is gone now, that distrust and competitiveness has had the intended effect of diminishing the likelihood of regional cooperation.

For almost all of Soviet history, Central Asian regionalism was viewed as potentially seditious by Moscow's rulers. The present five republics were carved from the feudal states of Khiva and Bukhara and the colonial provinces of Turkestan and Kazakhstan in such a way as to create irredentist populations throughout the entire region. More than a million each of Tajiks and Uzbeks live outside their eponymous republics. Some Turkmen dwell in Kazakhstan and some Kazakhs in Turkmenistan, but the Turkmens' main pretension is to

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Uzbekistan, which now contains their ancient capital of Khwarazm (which the Uzbeks renamed Khiva). For their part, the Uzbeks claim as their ancestral soil all of Khiva's lands, including those now in Turkmenistan. The Uzbeks claim southern Kazakhstan, which in the early nineteenth century was part of Kokand, to which the Kazakhs reply that, in the eighteenth century, Tashkent, now Uzbekistan's capital, was on the lands of the Kazakh Great Horde.

Central Asia's biggest territorial losers, though, are the Tajiks, since the Soviets assigned the region's two main Persian centers, Samarkand and Bukhara, to Uzbekistan, and left the Tajiks with the backwater town of Dushanbe as their republic capital. Central Asia's main danger zone, however, has turned out to be the Fergana Valley, divided up among Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Small irredentist Kirghiz and Tajik populations remain in each other's republics, where the two communities vie for land and water rights. Much greater tension, however, exists between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, for there are several districts in Uzbekistan that are predominantly Kirghiz, while nearly half of the physically isolated southwestern part of Kyrgystan is Uzbek.

The Fergana Valley was the scene of violence twice during the last two years of Soviet rule. In June 1989, some Uzbek youths turned on local Meshket Turks, one of the peoples that Stalin had deported from the North Caucasus in the 1940s. These clashes led to a rampage of several days' duration, resulting in more than one hundred deaths. A year later, a second, bloodier clash between Uzbeks and Kirghiz erupted in Osh after a dispute over housing in the Kyrgyzstani border city. According to unofficial accounts, the result may have been nearly one thousand deaths.

First Steps towards Regional Cooperation

Given these disincentives to regional unity, representatives of the Central Asian republics first began to meet only in 1989 to explore creation of some kind of regional entity.[3] The first formal summit meeting of the heads of these republics occurred a year later, in June 1990. But it was not to press for independence and regionalization—rather, Central Asia's leaders became the most stalwart *supporters* of the perpetuation of the Soviet Union, and turned their populace out in droves to vote for Mikhail Gorbachev's revitalized union in the March 1991 referendum. Several leaders were so frightened by Gorbachev's apparent failures and the Communist Party's loss of power that they even saw the abortive August 1991 coup as a possible solution to their problems.[4] Tajikistan's Kakhar Makhkamov publicly supported the coup attempt, while Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov fell just short of doing so; even Kazakhstan's

[3] *Pravda vostoka,* Mar. 17, 1989.

[4] Only Kyrgyzstan's Askar Akaev immediately came out against the coup. *Slovo Kyrgyzstana,* Aug. 19, 1991.

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Nursultan Nazarbaev did not publicly condemn the putsch until its failure was imminent.

Pro-Soviet sentiment is easily explained by the fact that all of the leaders save Kyrgyzstan's Askar Akaev were Moscow appointees charged with containing separatist sentiment in their republics. Equally important, however, was the Central Asians' growing understanding that they were being treated as part of the problem in the USSR, and that getting rid of them was likely to be part of the cure. That these suspicions were well founded was proven on December 8, 1991, when the three Slavic republics of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus agreed, on their own initiative, to dissolve the USSR.

The Central Asian response was to convene in Ashgebat three days later, but with the purpose less of creating a "Turkestani response" than of pressuring the original Slavic signatories into expanding to become the wider post-Soviet creature that has evolved into the CIS. With the collapse of the USSR, the Central Asian leaders faced three choices: they could push for inclusion in what came to be called the CIS; they could form a regional grouping of their own, such as a Central Asian Community or Turkestan Confederation; or they could work out their terms of independence individually. Their decision is, of course, well known: they all resolved to join the CIS, but to try to preserve some sort of expanded regional structure as well.

The apparent unity displayed at Ashgebat was not, however, to prove a pattern for future unity. Once the Slavic leaders signalled willingness to open their post-Soviet structures to other ex-Soviet republics, a *"Tsentral'naia Aziia"* was once again put on hold, because the region's leaders were all willing to accept a form of statehood that was more symbolic than real, sharing control of their respective republics' natural resources with a central authority structure that they supposed would be smaller and more benevolent than the Soviet one it replaced.[5]

What the Ashgebat meeting better demonstrated was Nazarbaev's powers of persuasion, for it was he who seems to have engaged in the hardball tactics necessary to keep some form of transnational union alive, by calling publicly for the creation of a Central Asian organization to parallel the new union of the three Slavic republics.[6] This specter of renewed Slavic-Turkic confrontation was at least part of the reason why the Russia-Belarus-Ukraine trio felt it prudent to widen the CIS, as Nazarbaev had intended.[7]

Although Nazarbaev was the main architect of this stillborn "Central Asian Commonwealth," all those present in Ashgebat seem to have understood that they had reached agreement more through fear of worse alternatives than through hope of shared purpose. The Central Asian states have embraced their status as independent nations with enthusiasm, exploring independent devel-

[5] Islam Karimov, press conference, Uzbekistan television, Sept. 20, 1991.

[6] *Vremya* (Ostankino television, Moscow), Dec. 10, 1991.

[7] This interpretation is consistent with Nazarbaev's later reflections on those days, see *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, July 28, 1993.

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opment and economic relations, developing individual foreign-policy identities, and joining just about every international body that offered any of them membership. The Central Asian states have all entered the United Nations and the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in the process extending the geography of "Europe" halfway across Asia. In addition, all have applied for membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and all have begun to talk of membership in the Common Market, NATO, or the Partnership for Peace. The republics have also joined two "Eastern" organizations, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the Islamic Confederation Organization.[8]

By contrast, the attempt to create any organization designed to treat Central Asia as a single unit has remained what it was in Ashgebat—a specter conjured to ward off specific threats or problems. Otherwise, *"Tsentral'naia Aziia"* has proved workable only in such initiatives as educational and scientific policy,[9] a regional commission on the media, and in commissions to address ecological conditions, such as the Aral Sea or the disappearing caviar yields of the Caspian.[10]

Centrifugal Forces

Cooperation by the various Central Asian states has not proved effective in resolving the region's most pressing problems. This has certainly been the case with regard to the civil war in Tajikistan. Although the breakdown of civil authority there is a local phenomenon and does not necessarily bode ill for the other Central Asian states, regional leaders showed increasing concern throughout 1992, as Tajik president Rahmon Nabiev was gradually pushed from power by a coalition of democrats and Muslim religious leaders.

Karimov of Uzbekistan took the lead in attempting to find a Central Asian solution to the Tajik disorder, but quickly discovered a lack of unanimity among his fellow Central Asian presidents. Sapamurat Niiazov of Turkmenistan (which shares no border with Tajikistan) preferred to treat events in Tajikistan as an internal matter. Presidents Nazarbaev and Akaev, by contrast, proposed a joint military intervention as a demonstration of Central Asian self-policing. But neither Akaev nor Nazarbaev enjoyed the compliant legislature that Karimov does, so only Uzbekistan was able to dispatch troops in significant numbers. Rather than an exercise in Central Asian unity, therefore, the installation and maintenance of the government headed by Imomali Rahmonov in Tajikistan became a joint Russian-Uzbek exercise that enhanced Karimov's regional stature but diminished incentives for inter-republic cooperation.

[8] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 6, 1992; *Slovo Kyrgyzstana*, Dec. 11, 1992.

[9] *Izvestiya*, June 8, 1993.

[10] "Caspian Sea States to Coordinate Caviar Trade," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Near East and South Asia*, Aug. 25, 1993, from Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), Aug. 24, 1993.

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More important still are the difficulties of economic transition and creation of post-Soviet economies. This is the greatest problem that the Central Asia states have faced, and against which *"Tsentral'naia Aziia"* has proven of very little effect.

When the USSR collapsed, most of the founding members of the CIS, and certainly all the Central Asian ones, assumed that this new organization would evolve into the sort of "supra-government" envisioned for the European Economic Community (EEC). In the much-heralded run-up to 1992, the EEC was planning to enlarge the economic integration that tariff-free borders had already brought about by introducing a single currency throughout the EEC.

Inflation brought the ruble's value from about sixty to the dollar in December 1991 to more than one thousand to the dollar in 1993.

As was emphatically stated by both Nazarbaev and Karimov, the Central Asian states wanted to remain within the "ruble zone," with a single currency and customs system. That would promote the free movement of goods within the CIS but would also ensure the flow of necessary goods and services from Russia, primarily energy supplies, at the heavily discounted prices upon which their economies had grown dependent.

Both assumed that currency regulation would be a shared responsibility, but the new government of Russia proved unwilling to give up either control of the ruble or the idea of a single CIS currency bloc until Moscow had worked out the details of its own economic reform program. Russian officials were also operating under what proved to be an incorrect assumption, that a single monetary system would slow the fall of industrial production in Russia and the republics.

That this was a misconception was demonstrated when the Russian Central Bank ignored the tight-money program of the Russian reformers, responding to rising prices and a growing budget deficit by continuing to print currency. The result was an inflation that brought the ruble's value from about sixty to the dollar in December 1991 to more than one thousand to the dollar in June 1993.

By 1993, the Russian government was blaming the ruble's drop partly on the republics, whose governments were demanding, and for a time receiving, enormous shipments of rubles to cover the rising cost of meeting payrolls, pensions, and other state obligations. In summer 1993, for example, Kazakhstan was requesting shipment of an additional fifty to sixty *billion* rubles to meet immediate obligations.[11] When Russia began to withdraw Soviet-era rubles from circulation, Kazakhstan's cash shortage worsened, forcing the republic to continue

[11] *Kommersant,* Aug. 14, 1993.

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to use old bills. As a consequence, the republic was nearly drowned in currency brought in from republics where the bills were now worthless,[12] one reason why Kazakhstan's inflation rate for 1993 was about 2,500 percent.

Denied any voice in the formulation of Russian financial policies, the Central Asian states fell victim to currency-transfer and debt-clearing mechanisms that could take six months or more to execute fund transfers between republics. That further exacerbated the growing inequities of having to honor contracts to sell resources to Russia that stipulated old, pre-inflationary prices, while having to buy goods and services from Russia at the new, inflated prices. Not surprisingly, the republics' trade deficits with Russia ballooned, with some of the new nations piling up astronomical debts, particularly to Russia's energy sector.

The republics had few options available, but the one they chose both angered Russia and further weakened the CIS. Unable to print money, several states sought to reduce inflation in their republics by controlling prices on basic commodities, keeping them artificially low, while protecting against cross-border purchase of cheap goods by setting up trade barriers. Not only were such barriers a violation of the founding principles of the CIS, but they also effectively stopped most inter-republic trade.

The broader purpose of the January 1993 meeting in Tashkent at which the existence of *"Tsentral'naia Aziia"* was formally declared was to seek a regional solution to growing trade problems by creating a smaller, Central Asian version of the single economic space that the CIS was failing to become. Declarations of intent to do away with customs posts and to preserve a joint currency were signed, and one source even has suggested that the possibility of creating a single Central Asian state was put forward.[13] In practice, however, the interests and needs of the various nations increasingly diverged.

The reasons for divergence were many. The government of Turkmenistan had begun to argue against creation of a separate Central Asian entity as early as 1992,[14] probably because the republic's petroleum wealth was such as to permit it to pursue its own path. With a population of less than five million, Turkmenistan has become the world's fourth-largest supplier of natural gas (after Russia, the United States, and Canada), permitting the government to keep subsidized prices the same as during the Soviet era, while raising salaries to post-Soviet levels; indeed, plans have been made to supply water, domestic gas, and bread to citizens free of charge.[15] At the same time, Turkmenistan has become the most obviously Islamic of the new republics, although it remains officially committed to a secular government. Hundreds of new mosques have been built, religious instruction has been introduced in the schools, and President

[12] *Izvestiya,* Sept. 13, 1993.

[13] *Kazakhstanskaya pravda,* Jan. 5, 1993.

[14] "Central Asian Security System Not Favored," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia* (hereafter FBIS, *CEur*), Sept. 9, 1992, p. 51, from Radio Rossii Network (Moscow), Sept. 9, 1992.

[15] *Izvestiya,* June 24, 1993.

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Niiazov is increasingly encouraging his country's close ties with Iran, to some degree on religious grounds, but even more so on economic ones.

The Birth of National Currencies

In May 1993, the other face of economic national interest pushed Kyrgyzstan to undertake what proved an even greater impediment to Central Asian unity, the introduction of Central Asia's first national currency. Lacking Turkmenistan's natural resources, and tied to Russia's plummeting ruble, Kyrgyzstan was on the brink of total economic collapse. Having almost no source of funds beyond international assistance, the government decided, with little or no warning, to introduce an experimental currency, the som. The damage done to Central Asian unity was immediate. First, only about 10 percent of the republic's rubles were changed into som, creating the fear that these rubles might flee to neighboring republics, magnifying inflation and the pressure on inadequate stocks of goods. Secondly, Nazarbaev and Karimov moved at once to seal their borders against Kirghiz goods and money, and put transactions between the republics on a dollar-payment basis. Eventually, customs barriers were lifted, but only after Kyrgyzstan dispensed more than a third of its international currency-stabilization fund in order to settle debts with other CIS states, primarily Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia.

President Niiazov is increasingly encouraging his country's close ties with Iran, to some degree on religious grounds, but even more so on economic ones.

Kyrgyzstan's withdrawing from the ruble zone, and Turkmenistan's announced intention of withdrawing might have accelerated the demise of any concept of a *"Tsentral'naia Aziia,"* had it not been for the procrustean conditions Russia began to impose on those remaining within the ruble zone. Both Karimov and Nazarbaev continued to argue until November 1993 that preserving economic linkages with Russia would stimulate a rapid economic recovery, and so they agreed to a series of humiliating conditions. If enacted, these conditions would have turned total control of the republics' economies over to Russia, which was to be the sole emission source for new currency.[16]

Internal critics and foreign observers quickly pointed out that to hand over to Russia the right to decide questions of budget, tax, customs, and investment policy would have made Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan into little more than Russian confederates. In the case of Kazakhstan, that tie would have been

[16] *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* Sept. 8, 1993.

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all the tighter because of Nazarbaev's agreement to accept Russia's claim that Kazakhstan owed Russia 547.6 billion rubles for goods and services supplied since independence.[17] It was only when Russia demanded, in November 1993, that member states also turn over their gold reserves to Russia that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan opted for single country currencies, the tenge and som, respectively.

The collapse of the ruble zone in the region breathed new life into the movement for *"Tsentral'naia Aziia,"* especially as the new currencies began to encounter difficulties. The Kazakh tenge fell to about an eighth of its introduction value within six months; that has created additional state expense for printing more of the elaborately engraved tenge, which literally are becoming not worth the paper on which they are printed. The more cautious Uzbeks have protected themselves against reprinting costs by using a som coupon while the currency stabilizes at a realistic exchange value, but the som's drop has been even greater than that of the tenge, more than 90 percent in the first six months. Because of its stabilization funds, but even more because of the collapse of economic activity, the Kirghiz som has done rather better, losing only about 60 percent of its original worth. Worst of all has been the totally unbacked Turkmenistani manat, which is now worth less than 1 percent of its introduction value.

A Three-Nation *"Tsentral'naia Aziia"*

Although Niiazov continued to insist upon a separate path for Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan turned itself into a Russian protectorate in everything but name, Russia's actions gave the three other Central Asian governments new impetus to explore the prospects for cooperation. Invoking their peoples' shared nomadic history, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan began to emphasize their common interests; as Karimov put it in a sentimental moment, "It is even possible that I have a certain amount of Kyrgyz blood, and Kazakh too, and that Nursultan [Nazarbaev] has Kyrgyz blood."[18]

More substantively, the three republics began to take such steps as creating a regional banking school, lifting customs restrictions along their shared borders, and, to Russia's apparent surprise, signing a trilateral pact of military cooperation.[19] The three republics also seemed to reinforce one another's resistance to the increasing pressure from Russia to modify state constitutions so as to allow dual citizenship for the large numbers of Russians who had suddenly found themselves residents of the Central Asian new states.

As always, however, this three-sided *"Tsentral'naia Aziia"* quickly showed signs of falling apart. Although Kyrgyzstan has so far resisted pressure to permit dual citizenship and to soften laws mandating Kirghiz as the state

[17] *Kommersant,* Sept. 18, 1993.

[18] *Slovo Kyrgyzstana,* Jan. 21, 1994.

[19] *Nezvisimaya gazeta,* Feb. 8, 1994; *Izvestiya,* Feb. 2, 1994; "Trilateral Central Asian Military Pact Signed," FBIS, *CEur,* Feb. 14, 1994, p. 1, from Turan (Baku), Feb. 19, 1994.

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language, its growing need for Russian economic support gives President Akaev little choice but to accept Russian "friendship," on whatever terms it is offered. His month-long visit to Moscow in February 1994 produced a number of economic agreements between the two countries, among them a seventy-five-billion-ruble line of credit and some sixty-five million dollars in trade agreements for Kyrgyzstan. Russia also promised to give the republic "most-favored" conditions for the purchase of oil and other fuels. For its part, Kyrgyzstan agreed to the creation of a Kirghiz-Russian investment company, which will purchase idle defense-related factories in the republic in order to provide employment for the increasingly dissatisfied Russian population.

Russia's motivation for reaching out to its "little Kirghiz brother" (publicity photos of ursine Yeltsin embracing minute Akaev make the metaphor particularly vivid) appears to be the desire to create successful precedents in the evolving policy towards what it has dubbed the "near abroad." As Kyrgyzstan grows hungrier, reluctance to permit dual citizenship or to allow Russian as a state language is likely to fade,[20] creating an example that Russia can then hold up to Akaev's less hungry but still malleable fellow Central Asian leaders.

The "Big Bear" Next Door

All of the Central Asian leaders are aware that the future of their states will be determined by Moscow. The difficulty, as Nazarbaev admitted in an interview in Madrid, is that nobody knows what it is that Russia wants, including perhaps Russia itself.[21] It is difficult to gauge how enthusiastic most influential Russian policy makers are about taking up the reins of empire again, since if Russia did, the country would immediately face again the dilemma that first prompted it to cut Central Asia free. Even the most larcenous and exploitative form of neo-imperialism would still require Russia to provide Central Asia with some form of social services, which Russia cannot afford and does not wish to provide.

For the three years since independence, Russia has appeared to vacillate between two poles, eager to exercise its old power and prerogatives, but reluctant to assume the trouble and expense of sorting out Central Asia's economic and political problems.

Thus, the question of Russia's proper role in Central Asia finds no generally agreed-upon answer. The regime in Tajikistan needs Russia for its political and economic survival, while the Kirghiz teeter on the brink of full economic dependence on Russia. Turkmenistan claims to be fully independent, but reality suggests otherwise; the plummeting manat and, especially, Turk-

[20] On June 15, 1994, *RFE/RL Daily Report* stated that Akaev was calling for the introduction of Russian as a state language in his republic's Russian enclaves.

[21] "Nazarbayev: 'Nobody Knows What Russia Wants,'" FBIS, *CEur,* Mar. 28, 1994, p. 52, from *ABC* (Madrid), Mar. 23, 1994.

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menistan's growing inability to collect payment for gas already delivered suggests that it, too, will be forced to seek more Russian assistance.

One point that seems certain is that Moscow will not abandon the twelve million Russians who now live in Central Asia. Neither, however, does it wish them to move back to Russia, since it has yet to cope with the approximately two million who have moved back to Russia since 1992.[22] This dilemma makes Russian policy difficult to read or predict, particularly since the various Central Asian leaders assess in different ways the threat to their sovereignty resulting from Russia's interference in their internal politics. That is particularly true of presidents Nazarbaev and Karimov, who govern the largest and most viable of the Central Asian states. Although the two have a satisfactory working relationship, there are a number of points of contention between them, which Russia can easily exploit if it wishes to drive a wedge between them.

Although statehood for Kazakhstan has given Nazarbaev a great deal of discretionary authority that he lacked while a first secretary within the USSR, it has also given him the enormous responsibility of finding ways to define Kazakhstani nationhood without offending the Russians, Ukrainians, and other Europeans who still constitute a plurality in the republic. The Kazakhs, their numbers hugely reduced by three waves of Russian-led genocide, saw the collapse of the USSR as the birth of Kazakh nationhood. The Russians, on the other hand, who alone almost equal the Kazakhs in number, understood independent Kazakhstan to be a multi-national state in which they would preserve the same rights and privileges that they had enjoyed in Soviet times.

Public sentiment in Kazakhstan is growing increasingly anti-Russian, which will mean that any move to grant dual citizenship rights to Russians or modify provisions making Kazakh the state language could increase civil tension, which in turn would increase Russia's inclination to intervene in the republic directly.

A Euro-Asian Union?

These sorts of issues preoccupy Kazakhstan's Nazarbaev, for nowhere else in Central Asia is the demographic balance between European and non-European society so equal, or the economic gap between the two societies so wide. It is for this reason that Nazarbaev has consistently been the region's most ardent spokesman for supra-republic unions. Before the collapse of the USSR, Nazarbaev strongly supported Gorbachev's vision of a renewed Union Treaty. Since the collapse, he has been the strongest proponent of the CIS. Indeed, Nazarbaev used his chance to address the heads of state gathered for a meeting in Istanbul to argue that the ECO should be expanded to include any nations wishing to join, especially Russia and Ukraine.[23]

[22] *Delovoi mir,* March, 14–20, 1994.
[23] *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* July 14, 1993.

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As the CIS has failed to materialize into what he needs it to be, Nazarbaev has proposed an even greater umbrella—a Euro-Asian Union with a shared supra-national currency for use in intra-bloc trade, a multi-member International Investment Bank with an integrated economic policy, a multinational parliament, and a governing Council of Presidents.[24] A Euro-Asian Union would mean less autonomy for Kazakhstan, but would guarantee the state's continued existence with a status equal to that of the other union members. Absent such a union, Kazakhstan may well have to make disproportionate concessions to Russia, or even risk losing its independence entirely.

All of Central Asia's leaders accept some form of greater integration as inevitable, but as of summer 1994, only Kyrgyzstan's Akaev has endorsed Nazarbaev's plan, as did Georgia's Eduard Shevardnadze. President Niiazov, by contrast, has said that the plan is unnecessary, while Karimov's tightly controlled press went so far as to say that it was a plan for simpletons.

Even Russia seems uneasy with the proposed arrangement, at least on Nazarbaev's terms. But much could change before the September 1994 CIS presidents' meeting at which the plan will be discussed. At the spring 1994 meeting of CIS leaders, Yeltsin endorsed a substantial strengthening of the CIS, but Russia seems to want an expansion of CIS powers and responsibilities as part of gaining an even more disproportionate share of authority within that body.

Whether Russia will be able to institutionalize a "first among equals" status for itself remains to be seen, but it is no surprise that Moscow is finding little enthusiasm among Central Asian leaders for a deal that would institutionalize their second-class status. In the present environment of growing economic uncertainty, however, even second-class status in the CIS may seem preferable to a wholesale ceding of sovereignty to Russia on a bilateral basis.

The current rulers of Tajikistan have already been reduced to that point, forced to run their country on specially marked rubles. Russian troops maintain Rahmonov in power, but Russian statesmen force him to send delegates to the negotiating table that they have laid out in Moscow. For all the obvious drawbacks of this transparent dependency upon Russia, the Kirghiz, too, may soon be willing to trade all but the trappings of sovereignty for desperately needed fuel and food.

Uzbekistan's Dreams of Greatness

In the end, Uzbekistan also is likely to submit to some form of greater integration with Russia, although its preference would be for a looser association than that proposed by Nazarbaev. While Karimov and the Uzbek elite dream of a day when their nation is free of Moscow's influence, for now, Moscow is their source of energy and food.

[24] *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* June 8, 1994.

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CENTRAL ASIA



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Historically, the settled peoples of Central Asia are accustomed to accepting the suzerainty of a strong but distant master, while living their daily lives in their traditional and accustomed manner. Under the tsars, the Emirates of Bukhara and Khiva managed to survive complete dismemberment in this fashion, while in recent Soviet times Sharif Rashidov managed to turn Uzbekistan into a sort of "red emirate" under Brezhnev. It is no accident that Karimov has rehabilitated the memory of Rashidov, renaming Tashkent's main street and central square in his honor. The other Uzbek leader whose reputation has recently been upgraded is none other than Timur (Tamerlane), now acclaimed as founder of the Uzbek nation.

Historically, whoever controls the lands between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya also dominates Central Asia; it is precisely this territory that now lies largely under Uzbek control, in Central Asia's most populous state. Perhaps as important, President Karimov has declared his country to be responsible for the well being of all the Uzbeks in Central Asia, the region's largest single ethnic group, implying a right to intervene in the affairs of all his neighbor states.

To date, Karimov has not publicly flexed his republic's muscle in either Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan, although he makes little secret of his contempt for Niiazov's "khan-like" presidency. He has, however, treated Kyrgyzstan's autonomy and Akaev's presidential dignity with calculated carelessness. Karimov's immediate neighbors are fully and cautiously aware of the potential of Uzbekistan's army, the only one in Central Asia that may be considered a usable arm of state policy. Russian troops have done the bulk of the fighting in Tajikistan, but Uzbekistani troops have also played an important role and gained invaluable experience. The Uzbekistani air force has had informal control of Tajikistan's air space since December 1992, formalized by treaty in March 1993.[25]

Be it Karimov or someone else, Uzbekistan's leader is bound to consolidate the republic's position, particularly if neighboring states are crumbling. With the possible exception of Kazakhstan, *Russian* expansionism in Central Asia is unlikely in the near term. But *Uzbek* expansionism could become a reality by the end of the decade. If Kazakhstan should begin to split up, the Uzbeks may claim part or all of Kazakhstan's three southern oblasts. The Uzbeks could also choose to move into southern Kyrgyzstan (Osh oblast), which is nearly half Uzbek, especially if the spiralling descent of Kyrgyzstan's economy is not halted. Uzbekistan could also claim the western part of Turkmenistan, which once were the Khivan outlands.

Mutual Toleration

With the exception of the Tajik civil war, Central Asia is—for the moment—quiescent, and all the region's presidents are determined to keep it

[25] "Airspace Falls under Uzbek Control," FBIS, *CEur*, Dec. 23, 1992, p. 73, from Interfax, Dec. 23, 1992.

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that way. Age-old ethnic rivalries may flare at scholarly sessions, but when economic and political questions are debated, such antagonisms are kept well submerged.

Clearly, Central Asia's leaders have found since independence that they must take increasing account of the ways that their foreign policy decisions affect each other. Hence, the need for some degree of consultation. They are also aware that the one defense they have against Russian intrusions on their sovereignty is their membership in overlapping organizations. All are members of the United Nations, even if the United Nations tacitly grants Russia special privilege throughout the CIS. Central Asian states are also all CSCE members, but none of them is an active participant in that organization.

The biggest impediment to "Tsentral'naia Aziia," is that the Central Asians do not trust each other, and indeed do not trust themselves.

The only real possibility for counterbalancing Russia or the CIS lies with regionally based organizations. Should ECO become stronger, it could play such a role. The present relations between Turkey and Iran make the strengthening of that organization unlikely, however, as does the relatively poor economic prospects that all of the original ECO members currently face.

Thus, Central Asia's most realistic hope of any sort of immediate organizational counterbalance to Russia lies in a strong regional confederation within Central Asia itself. The framework of a Central Asian regional organization has been put into place, and the five heads of state gather several times a year. There is also an economic union of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, for which the presidents of the three countries meet in regular working sessions; all three presidents seem to be in even more frequent telephone contact.

"Tsentral'naia Aziia" remains a myth, however, and is likely to be so for some time yet. Certainly, Niiazov's determination to carve out his own path for Turkmenistan's economic and foreign policies has made the prospect of regional cooperation more remote. What may be the biggest impediment to *"Tsentral'naia Aziia"* is that the Central Asians do not trust each other, and, indeed, do not trust themselves. The ferocity and duration of Tajikistan's civil war seems only to confirm what all of Central Asia's leaders, and its elites, were taught as students in Soviet schools, which is that, left uncontrolled in their traditional societies, the Central Asians are violent by nature. The Central Asian states are all new and fragile. None believes itself capable of withstanding aggression, internal or external, without outside support, the only realistic source of which remains Russia.

It is clear that no Central Asian unity will develop if Russia wishes to prevent it. For nearly two hundred years, the political and economic futures of the peoples of Central Asia have been shaped by events and decisions made by others. That history will not change overnight. Independence has without

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question broadened the range of decisions Central Asia's leaders must take, but it has not entirely transformed them from virtual puppets into leaders of independent states.

The Central Asian republics are at the first stage of their transition to becoming responsible members of the world community, as indeed is Russia itself. The major feature of this period is reintegration of the constituent parts of the former USSR in a way that acknowledges the hegemony of Russia while preserving the independence of new states. How long this first period of transition will last is difficult to say. Shaped by their Soviet careers, the leaders of Central Asia still instinctively think in five-year blocks, but the status quo may change long before a half decade passes. The transition period will nevertheless end—inevitably—when a new, post-Soviet generation comes into power. The Central Asian states will then begin to create new identities and forge a new regional identity as well. To be sure, both Moscow and the current elite, all former members of the *nomenklatura,* will try to stave off this second transition phase as long as possible. And even when it arrives, the result may not be a genuine *"Tsentral'naia Aziia"* encompassing the present five republics. For all of recorded history save the last hundred years, those who live south of the Syr Darya River, in what is today southern Kyrgyzstan, southern Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have been integrated into, or at least oriented toward, the countries of the Near East and southern Asia. This has been a Muslim region for a millenium, as well as the point of intersection between Turkic and Persian cultures. It has also been the road that joined China with the Middle East.

Russian historical precedent is also a force for fragmentation in Central Asia. Since tsarist days, Russians have distinguished "the Steppe" of the north from Central Asia further south, and so are likely to pursue a different policy in Kazakhstan than in the rest of the region. The gravitational fields exerted by Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey, in sum, are likely to perturb the politics of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in very different ways than they will affect the politics of Kazakhstan and perhaps Kyrgyzstan. Barring a reprise of Russian imperialism on the grand scale—the only consistent motivation for regional unity—it is likely that *"Tsentral'naia Aziia"* will remain a myth for a long time to come.

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The Asian Interior

The Geopolitical Pull on Russia

by Alvin Z. Rubinstein

Professor Firuz Kazemzadeh of Yale University has cautioned against expecting the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—to develop into democracies in the near term:

> Democracy is a tender plant that has existed for only very short periods of time among very limited numbers of people even in the West. At present, Central Asian republics are governed essentially by the same men who ran them on behalf of Moscow. Whereas a particular leader may be overthrown or voted out, the old ruling apparat is in place and will remain in place for the foreseeable future. There is even less of an alternative to the old communist cadres in Central Asia than there is in Russia.[1]

This observation may well prove accurate with regard to the domestic politics of the Central Asian republics, which are now independent after more than a century of tsarist and Soviet imperial rule. Geopolitically, nevertheless, their independence, international recognition as nation-states, and membership in the United Nations have far-reaching consequences for the region and for the great powers. To grasp the importance of the Central Asian republics, it is necessary to place their emergence on the international stage in a broader perspective.

The end of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union profoundly affected the international configuration of power. The bipolar era that dominated the international system from 1945 to 1991 is now history. With its disappearance, virtually every government of the globe must rethink basic foreign-policy assumptions and approaches to national security. That is as true for the Third World as it is for the United States, Europe, and East Asia. A changed geopolitical environment mandates reassessment of long-established foreign-policy positions.

[1] Firuz Kazemzadeh, "United States Policy toward Central Asia," *Vital Speeches,* Sept. 1, 1992, p. 679.

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For the great powers, today's international environment more nearly resembles that of the 1920s than the 1940s: the absence of a serious military threat to any of them; the lack of a defining ideological adversary; the uncertainty in Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East in the wake of collapsed empires; and the impulse to look inward to domestic problems and politics at the expense of any ambitious foreign-policy agenda. The passing of the bipolar era has ushered in a transitional acentric world composed of independent, asymmetrically equipped nations vying for advantage. Acentrism epitomizes the new diffusion of power in the multipolar system of the post–cold war era. New influential actors are emerging—Japan, Germany, China, India—but they still lack the necessary mix of political will and economic and military capability required for a role as a world power. At the same time, the United States, although the world's most powerful country, finds its influence limited. A straitened economic condition circumscribes the political leverage that should be the concomitant of such a military superpower.

Relevance for Central Asia

All of the above bears on the situation of the Central Asian republics. Having unexpectedly and suddenly had independence thrust on them, the elites—both those in power and those in opposition—are growing accustomed to ruling in their own nation-state. Their attachment to sovereignty over their own domain may become strong enough to make permanent the arbitrary territorial framework that Stalin stitched together in the 1920s and 1930s, the better to rule the Soviet empire. No matter that the prospects of most of these new nation-states are bleak. Few have politically unified elites, all are economically vulnerable, and their security is an even more daunting problem. Notwithstanding all of this, the appeal of nationhood is a potent force. It suggests, for example, that none of the Central Asian republics is likely to consider integration or merger with any other nation-state, even if there are strong affinities of language, ethnicity, religion, or combinations of these. Moreover, the longer these countries can function as nation-states, the more their elites will grow accustomed to self-rule, and the less likely Russia will find it feasible to reestablish its former imperial rule.

Having said this, there is need to stress how heavily dependent the Central Asian nations are on Russia for economic necessities, trade, finances, expertise, and security; how very limited is their access to the outside world. But this dependence does not make reincorporation into the Russian empire inevitable. The condition of obvious vulnerability need not in and of itself contravene the nation-building process; it is not tantamount to being without bargaining chips. Much will depend on regional stability and cooperation, and on the extent to which the personal ambitions and political skills of the Central Asian leaders are consonant with the advancement of domestic cohesion and development.

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What was noteworthy during the period of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third World was not the vulnerability of Third World regimes but rather their ability to obtain resources "ranging from economic assistance and advanced weaponry to political advisers and combat troops for the promotion of their regional ambitions, national defense, or internal consolidation; and their skill in doing so without relinquishing sovereignty or freedom of action on vital issues in foreign policy."[2] Thus, the Soviet Union was not able to dictate the foreign policy of Gamal Abdel Nasser or Anwar Sadat, nor was the United States able to impose its wishes on clients such as Iran (under the shah), Israel, or Pakistan, even though both superpowers served as generous patrons.

Two lessons seem relevant for Central Asia. First, Third World clients elicited support, in most instances, far beyond their needs, because Washington and Moscow, utterly fascinated by each other, underestimated the extent to which they were being exploited by their clients. In their quest for strategic advantage, the two superpowers adopted a de facto de-ideologization that led them to take whatever clients became available instead of seeking them on the basis of their complementary political and ideological beliefs. But in today's emerging acentric international system, such generous and often uncritically provided assistance is likely to be the exception rather than the norm: the U.S.-Soviet cold war is over and key Third World regimes can no longer exploit "The Great Game" for their own uses. As a consequence, local leaderships must look to their security and developmental needs without the luxury of a reliable patron-protector as a supplier of arms and a hedge against defeat at the hands of a regional rival.

The second lesson is that ambitions need to be tailored to capabilities. Excessive reliance on a great power can lead to the militarization of politics and foreign policy. Great powers are usually more willing to furnish swords than plowshares, in part because their defense industries produce far more than is essential for deterrence or defense. Any Third World leader wants sufficient weaponry to safeguard national interests. But heavy infusions of arms can warp a leadership's national priorities, causing it to focus on expanding its power at home and abroad at the expense of economic growth and political stability.

Too often in the past, Third World elites proclaimed their commitment to economic development, but then proceeded to act otherwise. They may have wanted to modernize, but when confronted with a choice of policy options, they opted for the securing of more power. To paraphrase what Harold Beglie (1871–1929) once said about Christianity, it is not that development was tried and found difficult, but that it was found difficult and not tried. The way to institutionalize power is to build a stable and growing socioeconomic system.

Thus, in groping for a successful foreign-policy orientation, Central Asian elites should take special care to avoid the mistakes of their Third World compatriots, many of whom mismanaged their affairs, squandered resources

[2] Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Moscow's Third World Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 227.

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and opportunities in pursuit of overly ambitious agendas, and adopted grandiose economic plans whose consequences were inflated urban bureaucracies and sharply decreased output and efficiency. They need to look inward to the monumental tasks of nation building. The Soviet legacy is a doleful one: artificial boundaries that divide ethnic groups; distorted economic development that makes self-sufficiency, even in basic foodstuffs, almost an impossible dream; bureaucratic structures that depended on Moscow for money, direction, and patronage; and reckless waste of scarce water resources. For example, the problems caused by plowing up large expanses of steppelands in Kazakhstan during the Khrushchev period (1954–1964) led to a degradation of the land in such a short time that much of the acreage had to be removed from grain production altogether. Soil erosion and loss of fertility, dessication, severe wind erosion, and increased dust storms are continuing reminders to the leaders in Central Asia that the marginal lands over which they preside require special care if they are to help provide for the needs of a growing population. With Central Asia's population growth one of the highest in the world—an increase of more than 3 percent a year—there is a premium on job creation, resource maximization, and judicious investment. These tasks constrain and challenge even the best-intentioned of leaderships, and indicate a foreign policy both affordable and security-oriented.

In coming to grips with the parlous problems of security and survival in an inhospitable environment, the governments of Central Asia appear to be pragmatic and aware of the need to work together. Admittedly, early discussions on regionalism fell flat. Thus, at Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), in April 1992, "the idea of a Central Asian confederation was decisively laid to rest. It was undermined by the president of Turkmenistan, Sapamurad Niiazov, who refused to sign the protocol to create a single investment fund and investment bank for the states of Central Asia, to adopt a common price policy, and to coordinate the program for economic development in the region."[3] That dispelled the notion of a special solidarity along ethno-religious-linguistic lines among the Central Asian Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union and strengthened their acceptance of the interrelated but sovereign nature of each of them. After the "failure" of Bishkek, the second regional summit meeting, held in Tashkent in January 1993, emphasized the importance of closer economic interaction and the urgency of adopting measures to tackle the environmental problems of the Aral and Caspian Sea basins. But the ensuing year was more notable for economic deterioration than progress. There was also disenchantment with the economic benefits of the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), reluctance of some members to remain in the ruble area, and realization of the West's limited interest in providing significant amounts of investment capital.

More recently, there have been indications of a move toward some form of economic unity. On January 10, 1994, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

[3] Boris Z. Rumer, "The Gathering Storm in Central Asia," *Orbis*, Winter 1993, p. 93.

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announced that they intended to push economic union. Shortly thereafter, Kyrgyzstan joined the new association, "which is far less ambitious than previous regional plans for cooperation and appears therefore to have a greater chance of success."[4] The announcement on February 1 of the removal of customs posts on the borders of the three countries was the first tangible move toward stimulating inter-republic trade. All the parties have reassured Moscow that their bilateral relations with the Russian Federation will not be affected; and each understands the importance of maintaining good relations with Moscow.

The pragmatism and prudence of the Central Asian republics in the realm of foreign policy is evident in their approach to three crucial issues: relations with Russia; standard setting by Kazakhstan; and diplomacy along the borderlands.

Relations with Russia

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late December 1991, 450 years of imperial Russian history came to an abrupt end. The termination of Russian rule in Central Asia and the Caucasus means that Russia is no longer a Middle Eastern power. Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan are not threatened by the Russian and Soviet military with which they had contended throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The full foreign policy and defense implications of this historic development have, understandably, not yet been absorbed by all the regional actors, or, for that matter, by the United States.

For the moment, Russia is pursuing modest goals in Central Asia. It has seemingly accepted the loss of the empire, although it is hard-pressed by various ultra-nationalist and imperial-minded political groups to assert Muscovite rule and project Russian influence in the areas of the "near abroad," the *blizhnee zarubezhe,* an expression coined by Russians to distinguish between independent former imperial domains with Russian minorities and the rest of the world. Under President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Russia's policy has been nonthreatening in Central Asia. Admittedly, tough border issues remain unresolved and could implode with dire consequences for all the parties. For the moment, however, Yeltsin has been nonconfrontational. He has accepted the independence of the Central Asian republics, and has focused on the critical political and economic problems besetting the Russian Federation. His foreign policy has its roots in Gorbachev's approach and is likely to persist for as long as friendship with the West remains Moscow's prime goal.

Although Russian policy toward Central Asia "is still fairly vague," Moscow is actively involved on a number of fronts.[5] By way of illustration, it viewed with equanimity the discussions on inter-republic cooperation among

[4] Bess Brown, "Three Central Asian States Form Economic Union," *RFE/RL Research Report,* Apr. 1, 1994, p. 33.

[5] *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* May 29, 1992.

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the Central Asian republics at a meeting in Tashkent in January 1993. It knows that economic necessity is a strong cement, and that the Central Asians will be dependent on the Russian market, monetary system, and expertise for the indefinite future. Most of Central Asia's trade is still with the Russian Federation: despite erratic production and delivery schedules in both republics, the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan were each other's best trading partner in 1992.[6] Such economic relationships remain the norm between the Russian Federation and the individual Central Asian republics. Moreover, according to one Russian specialist on the region, "Russians and Ukrainians make up the bulk of the modern labor force and the senior technicians and managers of Central Asia. Their exodus would jeopardize all economic reform, so the governments of the region need to calm the fears of the Russians who dominate urban areas and often hold key jobs."[7]

In Central Asia, there is little to substantiate the thesis, increasingly heard in Western commentaries, that the empire is striking back.

Military ties between Moscow and the Central Asian republics also remain close, in great measure because republic leaderships want a residual Russian military presence as protection against *internal* challenges to their position, which they evidently fear more than external threats or even a return of Russian rule. When the Turkestan Military District, one of the largest in the former Soviet Union, was officially abolished on July 1, 1992, Russian troops stationed in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan were placed under the general jurisdiction of the authorities in these republics; those in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, however, remained under Moscow's control.[8] Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and the Central Asian Republics serve as the legal and institutional bases for close cooperation in the realm of defense. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, Russian troops play a major role in patrolling the borders with Afghanistan and Iran, and in March 1994, Russia and Uzbekistan signed a treaty strengthening their military cooperation.[9] The reaffirmation in all of the treaties of the existing borders between republics of the CIS is of considerable political significance. It suggests that at least for the foreseeable future, Russia has no designs on the sovereign status of the Central Asian republics.

[6] "Russian-Turkmen Trade Indicators Up," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS Report: Central Eurasia* (hereafter, FBIS, *Report: CEur),* Dec. 16, 1992, p. 8, from *Turkmenskaya iskra,* Oct. 17, 1992.

[7] George I. Mirsky, "Central Asia's Emergence," *Current History,* Oct. 1992, p. 338.

[8] "Grachev on Russian-Turkmen Military Agreement," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia* (hereafter, FBIS, *CEur),* June 12, 1992, p. 15, from *Izvestiya,* June 10, 1992. See also, "Officials on Military Treaty with Russia," FBIS, *CEur,* June 12, 1992, pp. 82–83, from Interfax (Moscow), June 11, 1992.

[9] "Presidents Sign Accord," FBIS, *CEur,* Mar. 2, 1994, pp. 15–16, from Itar-Tass, Mar. 2, 1994.

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In Central Asia, there is little to substantiate the thesis, increasingly heard in Western commentaries, that the empire is striking back, that a more forceful Russian policy seeks to reimpose Russia's rule. Moscow has not destabilized any of the republics (in contrast to its quite different behavior in the Caucasus), nor has it intruded itself directly into factional struggles, except in Tajikistan. Even there, Moscow may have been drawn into the civil war by the specter of Islamic fundamentalism raised by the pro-Moscow Tajik leader Imomali Rahmonov and Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov, and by the increasing boldness of cross-border attacks from Tajik fundamentalists in Afghanistan. At present, Russian troops serving in the Muslim republics are there at the request of the host governments. According to President Karimov, Russia is today "a guarantor of stability in Central Asia."[10]

That does not mean that Moscow is averse to using economic leverage to obtain political and military concessions deemed essential for its security. Such an approach is consistent with the influence that a strong power can usually exercise over a weak power that is located in its perceived sphere of influence. Russia's preponderant strength and position make it a force to be reckoned with for the long term, but that is not tantamount to assuming that a repeat of its past territorial expansion is inevitable.

The most serious danger of conflict between Russia and the Central Asian republics inheres in the precarious situation of the approximately nine million ethnic Russians living in the region. Several hundred thousand have already left Tajikistan to escape the civil war and endemic domestic instability. Similar exoduses have begun elsewhere in the region. One Russian deputy foreign minister noted that Russia could not intervene militarily on the spur of the moment without incurring international isolation and possible sanctions, nor could it repatriate beleaguered nationals, because Russia lacks adequate housing and employment for them. "We will have to remain, lingering on as we did in Afghanistan."[11] The way to protect ethnic Russians living in the former Soviet republics, he argued, was to draw attention to violations of their human rights and to negotiate agreements with the governments concerned, at the same time that democratization was being nurtured.

No doubt, Russian military officers who have spent their lives in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or one of the other republics have a vested interest in drawing Moscow's attention to the near abroad. And in Russia, domestic politics plays an important role in dramatizing the issue. Egged on by ultra-nationalists, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky from Kazakhstan, the problem has been linked to the broader issue of "what is Russia," and what the limits of the Russian Federation should be. Considered in terms of security, the present borders are porous,

[10] "Central Asian Presidents Hold News Conference," FBIS, *CEur,* Feb. 1, 1994, p. 1, from Kazakh Radio Network (Almaty), Jan. 31, 1994.

[11] "Shelov-Kovedyayev on Western View of Russia, Rights in Republics," FBIS, *Report: CEur,* Sept. 11, 1992, p. 31, from *Novoye vremya,* Aug. 14, 1992.

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make-shift, and difficult to imagine as permanent lines of demarcation between nation-states.

Yet, thus far, the exodus from Central Asia has not adversely affected efforts by Moscow and the Central Asian republics to normalize their relationships. Moscow is working with each of them to safeguard the rights of the Russian community, work out incentives designed to persuade trained personnel to stay on the job, and make the departures, when undertaken, as smooth as possible. There have been no attacks on Russians, no efforts to expel them forcibly, and no official manifestations of anti-Russianism. The Russian minorities are uneasy, however, and any palliatives are apt to be brief in duration.[12]

An important step toward staving off any dangerous surge of migration was taken on December 23, 1993, in Ashgebat, when President Yeltsin and President Sapamurat Niiazov of Turkmenistan signed agreements permitting dual citizenship and regulating migration.[13] These were the first of their kind between CIS members, and may well improve the situation. But according to one American scholar, Turkmenistan "was not the best partner for such a test" because "its public track record in the treatment afforded the resident foreign community was good, especially in comparison with how outlanders fared elsewhere in the C.I.S. constituency." Moreover, he adds, "why a set of legal constraints on official behavior should succeed in sanitizing popular culture is not quite clear."[14] Notwithstanding the subsequent actions of the Kirghiz and Tajik governments to adopt similar legislation, his skepticism is appropriate. Although accurate statistics are not available, Russians are leaving. An estimated 10 percent of Turkmenistan's population in 1991, they may well be less than 8 percent now. Ultra-conservative Russian journalists deride the agreement on dual citizenship. One termed the ceremony "in which Boris Yeltsin was awarded a Turkmen passport, ordained 'an honored citizen of Turkmenistan', and declared to be the first possessor of dual citizenship . . . a rare genre of political buffoonery."[15] Despite the calm situation in the country, Russia's ambassador to Turkmenistan acknowledged that "there is an exodus of the Russian-speaking population."

> I consider it an entirely natural process. It began a while back, at the start of the 1970's, and the increase in migration following the disintegration of the Union is perfectly explicable: People have a certain feeling of estrangement from their historical homeland, relatives and friends. And there are, in addition, transport and currency barriers and difficulties over children's tuition in Russian higher educational institutions. The children

[12] *Izvestiya*, Jan. 4, 1994.

[13] "Bilateral Agreements Signed with Russia," FBIS, *CEur*, Dec. 27, 1993, pp. 78–79, from Itar-Tass, Dec. 23, 1993.

[14] George Ginsburgs, "The Issue of Dual Citizenship among the Successor States," *Ost-Europa Recht*, no. 1 (1995), forthcoming. The analysis is comprehensive, covering not just Russia's relations with CIS states but also its attempt to come to terms with the former autonomous republics of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic that now seek the status of sovereign states.

[15] "Russian Diplomacy, Results of Ashgabat Summit," FBIS, *Report: CEur*, Jan. 14, 1994, p. 1, from *Segednya*, Dec. 28, 1993.

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are taking in their old folk. Having completed their service, servicemen are leaving. And despite the very warm, friendly relations between our two countries, it was important to put the resettlement process on a legal, controlled basis.[16]

The agreements on dual citizenship (which neither Uzbekistan nor Kazakhstan favor), the Treaty of Collective Security of May 15, 1992, which enjoins the signatories from participating in any grouping of states hostile to any of the members, the follow-up bilateral defense treaties, the presence of Russian troops in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan along the 1,600-mile border with Iran and Afghanistan, the persistent pressure to create a ruble zone, and the periphery's close and dependent economic links to the center—these all testify to the centrality of Russia's position in Central Asia. Foreign Minister Kozyrev denoted Moscow's purpose: "We must not abandon those regions that have for centuries been spheres of Russian interests. And we must not be afraid to say so."[17]

With respect to Central Asia, we may be witnessing the emergence of a kind of Russian Monroe Doctrine.

On January 25, 1993, the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs published "Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation," which set forth in general terms the country's foreign-policy agenda.[18] With respect to Central Asia, the document sees an urgent need for protecting "the external borders of the Commonwealth [CIS]," Russia's assumption of responsibility "for ensuring stability and human rights and freedoms in the space of the former USSR," and the negotiation of "treaties and agreements guaranteeing the protection of the rights of Russian citizens living outside the limits of the Federation, on the basis of reciprocity and in full accordance with the standards of international law."[19] At the same time, the document insists "that it would be a mistake to believe that this conceals a claim to the role of the new 'center' of the Commonwealth, or that the Russian interest is so great that its realization may be paid for at any cost."[20] And Kozyrev has frequently contended that Russia's special role in maintaining stability in the former Soviet Union is not that "of a gendarme but of a peacekeeper." Moreover, this "special role does not signify Russia's claims to some 'free hand' in respect to its neighbors."

[16] "RF Envoy to Turkmenistan Cited on Improved Situation of Russians," FBIS, *Report: CEur,* Apr. 4, 1994, p. 3, from *Rossiyskiye vesti,* Mar. 16, 1994.

[17] "Neighbors Need Not 'Take Offense' over Shared Interests," FBIS, *CEur,* Jan. 27, 1994, p. 8, from *Komsomolskaya pravda,* Jan. 26, 1994.

[18] "Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation," FBIS, *Report: CEur,* Mar. 25, 1993, pp. 1–20.

[19] Ibid., pp. 4–5.

[20] Ibid., p. 5.

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> We are organizing our actions strictly in accordance with the principles of international law: respect for the sovereignty and independence of the states involved in conflicts, noninterference in their internal affairs, and recognition of their territorial integrity, with respect for the rights of national minorities. In all cases where this is possible Moscow aspires to joint actions within the framework of the CIS.[21]

With respect to Central Asia, in contrast to the Caucasus, we may be witnessing the emergence of a kind of Russian Monroe Doctrine. Moscow's aims are a combination of security, traditional great-power influence over weaker neighbors, and strategic denial. The absence of an all embracing neo-imperial ideology, the preoccupation with socioeconomic reform of flawed institutions, the need to foster Russia's integration into the world economy and attract foreign investment, the quest for stability on its periphery to permit the reconstruction of a strong state at home, and the increasingly intolerable costs of using military instruments to impose and manage political domination make it unlikely there will be a repetition of the Bolsheviks' success in mounting an imperial comeback in the post-1917 period.[22]

The government in Moscow is weak, and the system it administers fragmented and quasi-chaotic. Given the priorities of recreating a viable political system and developing a market-oriented economy, it has good reason to nurture friendly relations with the Central Asian republics and a step-by-step, pragmatic accommodation that institutionalizes their independence. For the Central Asian leaderships, Russia's weakened condition and uncertain strategic situation offer the opportunity to consolidate their sovereignty and normalize their relationships with Russia. The key to this process may well be found in Kazakhstan's experiment in international living.

Standard Setting by Kazakhstan

Larger than the other four republics of Central Asia put together, Kazakhstan is a vast area stretching from the Caspian Sea in the West to China in the East. Although the recipient of much attention internationally because of its vast oil reserves and the arsenal of nuclear weapons on its territory, Kazakhstan's full geostrategic importance derives from the fact that its independence:

> improves the prospects that Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan will survive as independent states;

[21] "Kozyrev Details Russian Peacekeeping Effort," FBIS *Report: CEur*, Feb. 16, 1994, p. 32, from *Novoye vremya*, Jan. 25, 1994.

[22] Mohiaddin Mesbahi, "Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus," *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 12, no. 2 (1993), pp. 210–12.

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> largely ends the likelihood that Moscow will soon resume an imperial-minded policy in Central Asia;
>
> strengthens the buffer zone between Russia and the Middle East;
>
> eliminates Moscow as a threat to the flow of Persian Gulf oil or to the key oil-producers of the region—and, in the process, precludes a revival of a major source of past tension between Washington and Moscow during the period of the U.S.-Soviet cold war.

An essentially indefensible borderland region, Kazakhstan faces many of the classic problems of nation building, including the need to stabilize relationships with its neighbors, develop a national identity, train native elites, and find a way of building institutions suitable to its political culture and economic potential. Solutions to these difficulties must be accomplished without triggering an interventionist response from Russia, on which Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent. Thus far, President Nursultan Nazarbaev has shown impressive acumen. He favors the Turkish model, with its strong president, multi-party system, statist outlook on the economy leavened by a receptivity to private enterprise and foreign investment, and commitment to secularism. Unlike Turkey, however, Kazakhstan is constrained by its four-thousand-mile border with Russia and its unusual ethnic mix. Nazarbaev, realizing that the Kazakhs are not a majority in their own country, nonetheless seeks to institutionalize power in the hands of the 42 percent of the population of seventeen million that is Kazakh. The Russians (38 percent of the population), other Slavs (7 percent), and Germans (5 percent) dominate the northern half of the country. The contiguity of Russia mandates a policy of political prudence toward the Slavs. If Nazarbaev is to succeed in cementing national cohesion and keeping the levers of power in the hands of the Kazakhs, he must maintain close and friendly relations with Russia, which not only continues to dominate Kazakhstan's economy, but still provides many essential domestic and international services, including currency, passport and internal civilian documentation, external security, embassies, and representational functions.[23]

Kazakhstan may, in time, emerge as a regional power in its own right. For the moment, however, it must forge a common identity for all the inhabitants of the country and avoid polarization along ethnic lines. Nazarbaev wants good relations with Moscow, if only to buy time for his nation-building process. To this end, he has guaranteed all nationalities within Kazakhstan equal rights, even as he shrewdly and methodically concentrates power in the hands of strategically placed Kazakhs in the government. He senses the intense opposition of Kazakh nationalists to permitting Russians to wield power and fears that were that to happen, there could be a repeat of the political unrest that occurred

[23] Stephen C. Robb, "Lessons for Kazakhstan," Apr. 30, 1993, p. 5 (typescript).

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in late 1986 when Gorbachev replaced the Kazakh party boss Dinmukhamed Kunaev with Gennadi Kolbin, a Russian.

At the same time, however, Nazarbaev has instituted a policy of "Kazakhification" that is quietly but steadily nudging Russians out of positions of power and patronage in favor of Kazakhs. Kazakh is being pushed as the official language: it is estimated that only 1 percent of the six million Russians in the country are fluent in Kazakh.[24] On December 14, 1993, the Kazakhstani Ministry of Justice prohibited official recognition of all Russian community organizations.[25] Coming on the heels of changing Russian city names, placing restrictions on the Russian Orthodox Church, and curtailing Russian-language education, the move suggests that Nazarbaev's strategy of consolidating power at home may soon exacerbate tensions with Moscow. Reports of inter-ethnic tensions are increasing. Supposedly, more than two hundred thousand Russians emigrated from Kazakhstan in 1993. Nazarbaev's opposition to dual citizenship may have the intended consequence of encouraging a continued emigration of Russians. That will inflame ethnic relationships in Kazakhstan and give the Russian ultra-nationalists in the Russian Federation the fuel they need to fire mass support for ethnic Russians in the near abroad, and, in the process, feed secessionist dreams among Cossack groups in northern Kazakhstan. Seccessionist pressures (epitomized by the quip, "when we leave, we will leave with the land") would be difficult to contain, once released.

Nazarbaev has guaranteed all nationalities within Kazakhstan equal rights, even as he shrewdly and methodically concentrates power in the hands of strategically placed Kazakhs in the government.

Ultimately, Nazarbaev's secularism, statism, and populism must rest on a sound economy. Kazakhstan has the energy and natural resources, and international investment and expertise are available. A loosening of government control of the economy and fostering of a market-oriented economy are needed, as are privatization and development that benefit the entire population, not just the clans loyal to Nazarbaev. Should economic divisions coincide with ethnic divisions, the situation could become volatile.

Meanwhile, at the diplomatic level, Russia and Kazakhstan have resolved the politically important issue concerning the joint use of the Baykonur cosmodrome, the largest space center in the world. This agreement helped meliorate

[24] "Ethnic Russians in Central Asia Face Pressure," FBIS, *Report: CEur,* Mar. 24, 1994, p. 69, from *Rossiyskaya gazeta,* Feb. 19, 1994.

[25] "Anti-Russian Campaign Reported in Kazakhstan," FBIS, *Report: CEur,* Jan. 24, 1994, p. 75, from *Rossiya,* Dec. 29, 1993.

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tensions arising from disputed issues relating to citizenship and the rights of Russians in Kazakhstan. Under the agreement, Kazakhstan agreed to lease the cosmodrome to Russia for twenty years with the option of an additional ten years. In turn, Russia will pay $115 million to Kazakhstan annually in lease payments. Under the terms of the agreement, Baykonur is considered "Russian territory for the duration of the lease period where all Russian laws will have equal force as in the rest of Russia."[26] Not too much, perhaps, should be read into the symbolism of Nazarbaev's making his first official visit as president to Moscow to sign the agreements. Still, the reports of the two presidents concluding agreements on economic cooperation and integration, as well as "a memorandum of the basic principles for resolving issues concerning the civil and legal status of citizens of Kazakhstan living in Russia and Russian citizens residing in Kazakhstan," and an agreement on strategic Russian nuclear forces temporarily stationed in Kazakhstan suggest a realization in Moscow and Almaty that the stakes for each are too momentous to tolerate a policy of drift and indecisiveness.

What happens in Kazakhstan will have enormous implications for the nations of Central Asia and the Middle East, for Kazakhstan is the buffer separating them from Russia. Stable Kazakh relationships with its neighbors will strengthen the sovereignty of all the new states, while the future of Russia as a "normal" great power, able to transcend its imperial past, also depends in part on the ability of Kazakhstan to thrive as an independent nation-state.

Diplomacy along the Borderlands

Forget the "Heartland" thesis. Popularized at the turn of the century by Halford Mackinder and his German rival, Karl Haushofer, the romantically attractive but dubious notion that control of Central Asia was the key to dominance of the Eurasian landmass cannot be shown even to have influenced (much less determined) the behavior of nations. Stalin's military-industrial buildup in Central Asia in the 1930s was "primarily determined by the critical situation in the Far East, where the Soviet position was weaker than elsewhere," while Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in contravention of "Haushofer's grand concept of a Eurasian Transcontinental bloc, rallying Germany, Soviet Russia, India, China, and Japan and stretching 'from the Rhine to the Amur and Yangtse.'"[27] Clearly, any strategic vision worthy of critical examination must be rooted in historical context. With respect to Central Asia, this means a view of the region as a vast borderland between Russia and the Middle East. Any policy that contributes to the viability of the new republics and that ensures their nonthreatening character to Russia must, by virtue of consolidating this strategic buffer zone,

[26] "Yeltsin Terms Visit Successful," FBIS, *CEur,* Mar. 29, 1994, p. 4, from Itar-Tass, Mar. 28, 1994.

[27] Milan Hauner, *What Is Asia to Us? Russia's Heartland Yesterday and Today* (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp. 196–97.

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redound to the long-term security of Turkey, Iran, and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region.

The political survival and future economic well-being of the Central Asian leaderships are highly interdependent: no one of them can succeed without support from, or reliance on, the others. To this end, there is need for a network of meaningful (as opposed to symbolic) bilateral relationships, expansion of inter-republic trade, joint investment in projects of mutual benefit, especially in the areas of water resources and conservation, energy, transportation and communications, and finally reassurance to Moscow that the civil rights of the Russian minorities are being protected.

It is perhaps too early to discern a pattern in the foreign policies of the Central Asian states. But Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan seem to be prompted by a sense of what is important. All three, in varying degrees, have taken steps to establish close political and economic ties with Russia, as well as with Turkey and Iran; and all have been active farther afield, with China, India, the United States, and key West European countries. Bilateral trade and economic agreements, such as the ones concluded in November 1992, between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have become commonplace. The Central Asian countries have agreed to keep import and export tariffs low, but such agreements are being "undermined by current formal and informal quantitative restrictions on trade."

> As under the Soviet regime, explicit tariffs are of little consequence when the trading mechanism effectively prevents the free flow of goods. For example . . . payments restrictions to balance trade have reduced trade volume . . . In addition . . . participants have blatantly ignored other aspects of the common customs policy. Each, for example, is setting its own tariffs vis-à-vis outside parties without really consulting the others.[28]

Frequent summits notwithstanding, the Central Asian countries are not taking the decisive steps needed for economic cooperation. Their trade is still overwhelmingly with Russia, which is to be expected, but what is somewhat disappointing is the low volume of trade and investment with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, all of which are strongly committed to developing ties with Central Asia. Nothing better illustrates the gap between intentions and behavior than the case of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which was originally formed by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey as the Regional Co-operation for Development in 1964 and expanded on November 30, 1992, to include the five Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. The agreement, hailed at the signing ceremony in Islamabad as a significant step towards strengthening multilateral ties among countries that share the Islamic faith and culture, called for lower tariffs, establishment of an investment bank, increased trade, and a joint airline for ECO members. But ECO has no funds, no permanent secretariat, and no credible political or economic agenda.

[28] Sheila Marnie and Erik Whitlock, "Central Asia and Economic Integration," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Apr. 2, 1993, p. 39.

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The critical views of two leading Pakistani journalists typify the generally dismissive assessment of ECO made by most analysts. According to Arif Nizami, editor of *The Nation,* "Pakistan, Iran and Turkey want to have strong economic ties with the Central Asian Republics and, in the process, are willing to offer the moon, but there are practical difficulties of enormous magnitude which have to be overcome even before a semblance of a meaningful basis for cooperation can be laid."[29] Najam Sethi, editor of *The Friday Times,* an intellectually lively and far-ranging weekly, noted that ECO compares poorly on any number of measures of economic cooperation to the European Union and ASEAN countries. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan did not make much headway with ECO's predecessor (Regional Co-operation for Development) at a time when they at least had common security concerns and alliances with the United States. They are therefore less likely to do so now. Today, "Turkey's state is avowedly 'secular' as Iran's is 'Islamic.' Turkey is solidly behind the United States, Iran is implacably opposed to it. Pakistan is lost somewhere in between. Despite the pious rhetoric, chances are they will push and shove, rather than cooperate with, one another."[30]

Turkey and Iran have a potential for influencing Central Asia second only to Russia's.

Turkey and Iran have a potential for influencing Central Asia second only to Russia's. No two countries have benefited more from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of the five new nations of Central Asia. Both have been active in Central Asia and, for the most part, helpful. But they need to do more to strengthen institutional linkages and present alternatives to Central Asia's excessive economic reliance on Russia. For the immediate future, Russia's weakness, more than their wisdom, has been Central Asia's principal security asset. Although a certain competition is inevitable, it would be tragic if they were to shortchange the political collaboration that could bring them more security than any they have known for centuries and certainly more than they could realize alone. Recent developments in Central Asia should occasion new thinking, not only in Turkey and Iran but also in the United States, on how best to secure their gains in the post-Soviet period.

A Time of Testing for the United States

The Central Asian republics are, and will remain, of marginal interest to U.S. foreign policy, but their continued independence is nonetheless a windfall strategic development, and should be encouraged far more than has been the

[29] Arif Nizami, "Competitors Promising Moon to Cetral Asian Republics," *The Nation,* Feb. 9, 1993.
[30] Najam Sethi, "ECO or What?" *The Friday Times* (Lahore), Feb. 18–24, 1993.

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case to date. Russia's preeminent interests in the region must, of course, be recognized and respected, and nothing should be done to heighten its sense of military insecurity. But if China can pursue an active policy of nurturing political ties and expanding economic relations without jeopardizing its détente with Russia, so can the United States.[31]

At the diplomatic level, major embassies, not just a minimal representation, should be established and staffed with specialists who know the local language, not just Russian. The teaching of English should become a major project for each U.S. Information Agency post. It would signal America's long-term interest and encourage local elites to look beyond their own region to interaction with the global information and intellectual system.

Politically, America encourages democracy, pluralism, and market economies, but it needs to temper advocacy with understanding of the limits imposed by geography, culture, and weak political-legal structures. For example, President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan allows a free press, but his close associates are reputedly as corrupt as in the communist era, and he runs an unabashedly authoritarian system. Widely hailed for its efforts to democratize and develop a market-oriented economy, Kyrgyzstan faces serious economic problems, the result of a concatenation of natural disasters (earthquakes and mud slides), worsening terms of trade, and falling industrial production. It permits privatization of much of the commercial sector, which has brought support from the International Monetary Fund and international investment in mining and hydroelectric power development, but does not, in accordance with the constitution approved in May 1993, permit private ownership of land, thereby sending mixed signals. Moreover, there is a loss of trained manpower owing to the emigration of non-Kirghiz groups: more than 10 percent of the one million Russians, about a third of the 110,000 Germans, and comparable numbers of the less numerous other European nationalities have left.[32] The result is growing uncertainty about the republic's democratic prospects.

Arguably, the United States government could do much more in the economic realm to strengthen the Central Asian republics economically and politically: lobbying for their membership in the international cotton cartel in order to decrease their dependency on the Russian market; organizing bilateral and multilateral irrigation and soil conservation programs for the ecologically catastrophic Aral and Caspian Sea basins; and supporting programs to train public health, pollution control, and market management specialists. U.S. government funds for new aid programs are limited, however, both by domestic priorities and budgetary constraints.

[31] See Ross H. Munro, "Central Asia and China," in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *Central Asia and the World* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 221–34.

[32] "The President's 100-Meter Dash," Joint Publications Research Service, *Central Eurasia,* Aug. 25, 1993, p. 85, from *Komsomolskaya pravda,* Aug. 4, 1993; "Akayev Denies NATO to Establish Facilities in Kyrgyzstan," FBIS, *CEur,* Feb. 25, 1994, pp. 34–35, from Interfax, Feb. 22, 1994; "Askar Akayev: Russians Do Have a Future in Kyrgyzstan," FBIS, *CEur,* Mar. 1, 1994, p. 1, from *Pravda,* Feb. 24, 1994.

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The private sector is prepared to invest in major projects but in certain instances it needs Washington's political approval. One such proposal calls for the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran and then on to Turkey. A consortium involving Iran poses a political problem for Washington, as, in a sense, does the relatively poor human rights record of President Niiazov of Turkmenistan. But no government funds would be involved; all the parties would benefit; and, moreover, this is Turkmenistan's one opportunity to develop a degree of economic and political independence vis-à-vis Moscow.

The Clinton administration has expressed its reluctance to slight Russian sensitivities. But, in this case, that should not even arise. By its own official statement of foreign-policy objectives, Moscow approves of projects that promote regional economic cooperation:

> The expansion of relations and the strengthening of positions of third states with the former union republics may be accompanied by aid for their economic development, which in itself creates tangible plusses for Russia due to the retained interdependence between our production complexes.[33]

The indecisiveness is to be found in Washington not Moscow. Any U.S. administration prefers to steer clear of involvement with Iran. But given that the Commerce Department already permits the sale of certain advanced technologies and equipment to Iran, and that the proposed natural gas pipeline would contribute to the economic strengthening of Turkmenistan (and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as well), the political risk seems worth running. In the period ahead, Central Asia's prospects for developing stable internal systems will depend, in important measure, on timely and wise support from the United States.

[33] "Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation," p. 6.

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The Asian Interior

China's Waxing Spheres of Influence

by Ross H. Munro

Most current discussions of China's relations with the rest of Asia tend to have a primarily eastward or southward focus—eastward to Taiwan, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula, or southward to the South China Sea, where China's claims of sovereignty clash with those of several countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Such preoccupations are easily understood. China's relations with Japan, the other giant of East Asia, will continue to have major global and regional implications. China is playing a key role in the continuing crisis on the Korean Peninsula. And Beijing's announced determination to "reunify" the Mainland and Taiwan, and its unwillingness to renounce the possible use of force in achieving that goal, have kept alive the possibility of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. To the south, China's claim of sovereignty over the waters and islands of the South China Sea has inspired fears of a Chinese military offensive that would alter the balance of power in Southeast Asia and threaten the vital interest of the United States and Japan in maintaining the sea as an international waterway.

This eastward and southward focus is not confined to non-Chinese analyses. Recently, a book, which evidently originated in military circles in China and was intended only for limited circulation within China, surfaced in Beijing. The authors of the book, *Can China's Armed Forces Win the Next War?* treat the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula as the three locales where China's armed forces are most likely to see combat in the foreseeable future.[1]

Chinese intentions on these eastern and southern flanks clearly command close attention. However, far too little attention is being paid to the significant changes under way in China's ties across its *land* borders. Central Asia (that is, the five newly independent republics bordering on or close to China that were

[1] See *The New York Times*, Nov. 16, 1993. For translated excerpts, see Ross H. Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects War—Where It Doesn't," *Orbis*, Summer 1994, pp. 355–72.

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once part of the Soviet Union), South Asia (primarily India and Pakistan), and peninsular Southeast Asia (Burma, Laos, and Vietnam, as well as nearby Cambodia and Thailand). This study is neither definitive nor exhaustive, but it does shed new light on China's rapidly changing relations with its many landward neighbors.[2]

Indeed, China's rapidly evolving relationships with these countries offer the best current illustrations of the strategic implications of China's explosive economic growth.[3] Never before has the world witnessed such a large nation growing at such a rapid rate for such a sustained period of time.

Most articles about China's economic takeoff overlook the booming economies of two provincial-level units in China's interior that have foreign land borders.

The strategic implications of China's growth are already grasped in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Japanese political and business leaders, taken aback by China's rapid economic growth that, in turn, has made possible its military buildup, have adopted a policy of engagement—increasing aid, trade, and investment levels—as a long-term strategy for minimizing Sino-Japanese conflict. South Korea, propelled primarily by the lure of the China market, is now moving closer to China in both political and diplomatic terms. Many leaders of the Hong Kong business community have formed a de facto alliance with the Beijing government to oppose the colony's democratic movement, evidently to ensure their continuing participation in the China boom. A comparable situation may be unfolding in Taiwan where some corporations are pressing the government to end its restrictions on direct trade and investment links with the Mainland, a move that would bring major, permanent changes in Taiwan's political and diplomatic stance vis-à-vis the People's Republic. In short, China's growth has strategic implications even for neighbors whose economies are strong. Imagine, then, how great the strategic implications must be for China's neighbors in Central, South, and Southeast Asia, most of whose economies are still relatively weak.

Most articles about China's economic takeoff overlook the booming economies of two provincial-level units in China's interior that have foreign land borders. They are Yunnan Province, which borders on Southeast Asia, and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which borders on Central Asia and a sliver of South Asia. In fact, their prosperity undercuts the glib generalization

[2] The study is indicative and not comprehensive. For instance, it excludes China's relations with Mongolia and with the Russian Far East. These interactions are also changing significantly because of China's rapidly growing economic power. The study also excludes relations between the Chinese provincial-level unit of Guangxi and its foreign neighbor, Vietnam, because of inadequate data.

[3] See, for example, Ross H. Munro, "Awakening Dragon," *Policy Review,* Fall 1992, pp. 10–16.

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that only China's southern and eastern coasts are thriving while its interior provinces lag further and further behind. Xinjiang and Yunnan respectively ranked first and third nationwide in rate of real income growth in the 1985–1991 period.[4] The coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian ranked second and fourth respectively. A key reason for the rapid growth of Xinjiang and Yunnan is their burgeoning economic links with foreign neighbors.

Lastly, China's relations with South Asia are also in the early stages of transformation. India, which has lagged far behind in economic development, must struggle to adjust to a newly dynamic China with growing links to its traditional ally, Pakistan.

It is important to note at the outset that the impact of China's economic surge is magnified by the simultaneous collapse of the Soviet Union, with the result that the increases in China's relative and absolute power vis-à-vis its neighbors have both been enormous. For instance, the Soviet crackup has had a huge, negative effect on Vietnam and India, both of whom relied on the Soviet Union as the ultimate guarantor of their security with regard to China. Both countries are now forced to come to terms with Beijing from a position of relative weakness that is military as well as economic. Vietnam's weakness vis-à-vis China, in turn, has an impact on much of Southeast Asia, while India's weakness vis-à-vis China affects all of South Asia. Meanwhile, in Central Asia, the legally independent, but economically prostrate, republics have concluded that they cannot rely on Russia and must look to China and other countries if their economies are going to grow. In sum, China today wields more influence in Southeast, South, and Central Asia than at any time since the height of Ch'ing power in the eighteenth century.

Southeast Asia

In the wake of the Soviet collapse, China has achieved all of its previously announced strategic objectives in Indochina. The Soviet military presence is no more. Vietnam has withdrawn from Cambodia, which is already being labelled a "client state" of China.[5] And Vietnam's dream of dominating Indochina is dead.

For four decades, the issue of communism dominated Southeast Asia and, at one time or another, involved all the major world powers. But today, while Vietnam and Laos are still led by Communist Party elites, the division of Southeast Asia into communist and noncommunist has much less importance than it once did. Indeed, one can already easily discern the outlines of a new bifurcation of Southeast Asia into two subregions—peninsular and archipelagic. The concept of a post–cold war Southeast Asia being divided along these lines

[4] *China: State Statistical Bureau,* cited in William H. Overholt, *The Rise of China: How Economic Reform Is Creating a New Superpower* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), p. 105.

[5] Larry M. Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status," *Orbis,* Spring 1994, 157–75.

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

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Note that Myanmar is referred to in the text as Burma.

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first emerged in the late 1980s in Thailand. But the concept gave little weight to China's role in the bifurcation that now is clearly under way.

Archipelagic Southeast Asia consists of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. These are island nations, with the partial exception of Malaysia, and are vitally concerned about the future of the South China Sea and increasingly anxious about China's military capabilities and intentions there. Significantly, archipelagic Southeast Asia includes Indonesia and Malaysia, the two countries where tensions between the "indigenous" population and ethnic Chinese residents have historically been more pronounced than in other parts of Southeast Asia. The interests of archipelagic Southeast Asia seem increasingly to be fundamentally different from the interests of most of peninsular Southeast Asia, the more northern tier that borders on or near China.

Peninsular Southeast Asia consists of Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Today, we can already see how China has begun the process of extending its hegemony over peninsular Southeast Asia with the cooperation of Thailand. This process will continue for many years, but the trend is clear. Burma, Laos, and Cambodia are already coming to terms with this trend. Only Vietnam will put up significant resistance. But Vietnam will be hobbled by its continuing international isolation in the post-Soviet era. Its attempts to overcome that isolation, mainly its concerted efforts to make common cause with the nations of archipelagic Southeast Asia, are showing scant results.

Burma

Even before the cold war unwound in 1989–1991, China had begun sweeping Burma into its sphere of influence with a combination of economic, diplomatic, and military ties. China was the first country to come to the assistance of Burma's reviled and isolated ruling junta after it came to power in 1988. By mid-1993, it was estimated that the Burmese junta had acquired $1.4 billion worth of tanks, aircraft, artillery, and other arms from China. The junta, which has been chronically short of foreign exchange, obtained the arms on undisclosed but highly favorable terms.[6] Indian government officials say that Burma, in turn, has, among other things, granted China access to a reconnaissance facility on Great Coco Island in the Bay of Bengal where it can monitor Indian naval and air activities. There are also unconfirmed but persistent reports that China has agreed to construct a deepwater port in Burma on the understanding that the Chinese navy could have access to the port.

China has displayed great enthusiasm for financing the development of transportation in Burma, a pattern that we will see repeated along China's land borders, particularly in Southeast Asia. China is assisting Burma in building roads that will create new links with Yunnan Province. For instance, county-level

[6] William Ashton, "Chinese Naval Base: Many Rumors, Few Facts," *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, June–July 1993, p. 25.

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construction brigades from Yunnan have been rebuilding abandoned sections of the old Burma Road.[7] This road building will facilitate growing bilateral trade between Burma and China, which is conservatively estimated to have passed the $1 billion mark, not counting narcotics.[8] The construction of modern roads will also facilitate the flow of Yunnan's exports to third countries, both through Burma's ports to world markets and by land to adjacent countries such as Thailand. Behind these new export routes may be a well-developed plan. As far back as 1985, an article in *Beijing Review* argued that Yunnan could develop as rapidly as east coast provinces because it could use Burma as its outlet to overseas markets.[9]

China is also selling railroad equipment to Burma's railway agency.[10] It is noteworthy that provincial- and county-level organizations in Yunnan appear to have a lot of leeway in making deals with Burma. For instance, a joint-venture bus company formed by private Burmese interests and a county-level Yunnan company recently purchased two thousand Chinese-made buses, clearly on highly favorable terms.[11]

As a result of this economic assistance and economic integration, as well as its liberal subsidization of Rangoon's arms purchases, China has incorporated Burma into its sphere of influence in less than five years. China is now Burma's de facto military and diplomatic ally and its largest trading partner. What is more, the leaders of the Burmese junta, shunned by all other major nations, were enthusiastic and conscious participants in this seduction. Nor should the China-Burma relationship be portrayed as only a government-to-government phenomenon. China's economic takeoff, especially since 1989, has been marked by an explosion of entrepreneurial energy. Enterprising Chinese, working in state, semiprivate, and private entities, have been seeking profits wherever they can be found. In border provinces like Yunnan, that has often meant conducting informal foreign trade and commerce. The evidence can be found in burgeoning trade and smuggling—the dividing line is increasingly difficult to draw—on the China-Burma border, and in shops in Mandalay run by new immigrants from China. As Chinese officials look on approvingly, thousands of market-driven transactions every day are helping tie Burma closer to China. Similar phenomena are also highly visible in Laos and parts of Central Asia.

All this has great strategic significance. Burma was long viewed, and rightly so, as a buffer state between India and China. Indeed, history and geography both suggest that India would automatically seek to counterbalance Chinese influence in Burma. But India's lagging economy, the continuing backwardness of its northeast states bordering Burma, and the insurgencies that

[7] "Inauguration Ceremony Held for PRC-Burma Road," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Asia* (hereafter, FBIS, *EA*), May 25, 1993, p. 29, from Radio Burma, May 20, 1993.

[8] Bertil Lintner, "Rangoon's Rubicon: Infrastructure Aid Tightens Peking's Control," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter *FEER*), Feb. 11, 1993, p. 28.

[9] "Opening the Southwest: An Expert Opinion," *Beijing Review*, Sept. 2, 1985, pp. 22–23.

[10] Xinhua, Dec. 2, 1993.

[11] "Yunnan, Burma Begin Joint Bus Corporation," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (hereafter, FBIS, *China*), Dec. 1, 1993, p. 9, from Xinhua, Nov. 24, 1993.

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still thrive there have all made India a secondary player in Burma. Simply put, India has very little leverage in Burma and views the situation there as increasingly grim. The Chinese have recently agreed to build three new roads linking Yunnan with Burma's northernmost Kachin State. This is the buffer of the buffer, wedged tightly between China and India. In effect, China has advanced its forward perimeter.

Laos

Much of Laos is following in Burma's footsteps. China began building roads in northern Laos decades ago, primarily for military purposes, when Laotian communists were still contending for power. But now, growth-hungry officials in Yunnan Province are making major strides in their plan to transform Laos into the main transportation link between China and peninsular Southeast Asia. As the *Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)* observed last November, the vision is not exclusively Chinese. "Some local officials and institutions like the ADB [Asian Development Bank] see Laos fulfilling the role of a way-station and service centre between China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand for everything from road, rail and river transport to power and telecommunications networks."[12] Although the *FEER* writer predicted that would take decades to achieve, if it transpired at all, recent events suggest that his prediction was far too cautious. The transformation is already well under way.

In 1992, boats began regularly carrying commercial cargo from Yunnan down the Mekong River to the delta in Vietnam, realizing the old and unfulfilled dream of European colonialists.[13] China is currently negotiating with Laos as well as with Burma and Thailand to establish a quadripartite river authority that will facilitate increased commercial boat and barge traffic on the Mekong.[14] And April 1994 marked the scheduled opening of the Mittraphap (Friendship) Bridge across the Mekong, linking Laos and Thailand. The bridge makes it possible to drive from Kunming, Yunnan, through Laos (on largely Chinese-built roads) to anywhere in Thailand. By 1996, it will be possible to drive from Beijing to Singapore completely on paved roads.[15]

Once the Communists took control of Laos in the mid-1970s, they deferred to Vietnam on major international issues. But in 1989, a beleaguered Vietnam had to withdraw most of its troops and advisers from that country, and by December 1990, Beijing was sufficiently satisfied that Laos was moving away from subservience to Vietnam that Chinese premier Li Peng made an official visit to the country. Since then, trade between China and Laos has increased, and the two countries have started several joint ventures, such as hotels, a brick factory, and light manufacturing (textiles, batteries, and shoes).[16]

[12] Paul Handley, "Making Connections," *FEER*, Nov. 4, 1993, p. 31.

[13] *The Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 12, 1994.

[14] Xinhua, May 19, 1993.

[15] Ibid.

[16] "Paper Views Ties with PRC's Kunming," FBIS, *EA*, May 10, 1993, p. 46, from *Pasason* (Vientiane), Apr. 28, 1993.

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Vietnam will find it virtually impossible to reassert substantial influence in Laos. Putting aside its political and military limitations, Vietnam simply doesn't have the economic wherewithal to compete with China in the financing of infrastructure and industry in Laos. The economies of China and Yunnan are growing at such a rapid rate that they can easily finance projects in Laos. One indicator of China's tightening relationship with peninsular Southeast Asia was a report in August 1993 that Yunnan has *current* construction projects worth $1.6 billion under way, much of it transportation projects that will connect Yunnan with its foreign neighbors.[17]

Thailand

Among recent reports from Laos, one of the most intriguing asserted that "some [Laotian] border province officials appear to have better relations with their Chinese and Thai neighbors than they do with Vientiane." That is about as practical a definition of "spheres of influence" as one can find. And it serves as a reminder that China and Thailand now appear to have reached a working understanding regarding their respective spheres of influence in Laos. If current trends continue, China will dominate northern Laos while Thai influence will predominate in most of the rest of the country. Thailand's influence will overlap with China's, except in the north, but will be greatest in southern Laos and, of course, along much of the Thai-Laotian border. Cooperation in some endeavors will be very close. For instance, Thai and Chinese businessmen are currently discussing jointly building toll roads in Laos and Burma.[18]

An entente between China and Thailand seems to be emerging that encompasses all of peninsular Southeast Asia.

Indeed, an entente between China and Thailand seems to be emerging that encompasses all of peninsular Southeast Asia. To a limited extent, Burma, China, and Thailand also appear to have an understanding regarding Cambodia. Thailand now exerts substantial influence over adjacent, western Cambodia. Chinese influence over the Phnom Penh government serves Thailand's historic interest in maintaining Cambodia as a buffer between itself and Vietnam.

Thailand seems quite comfortable with China's continuing efforts to subjugate Vietnam, which is not just China's but also Thailand's historic enemy. Official Thai statements imply that, by continuing to strengthen its ties with

[17] Xinhua, Aug. 18, 1993.

[18] "Minister to Discuss PRC Investment in Roads, Ports," FBIS, *EA*, July 15, 1993, p. 47, from *Bangkok Post*, July 15, 1993.

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China, Thailand can ensure that Vietnam will never again become a threat.[19] There is evidence that Thai military strategists have already concluded that the historic threats from the northern and trans-Mekong regions (China and Vietnam), have substantially receded for the first time in centuries. In fact, the commander in chief of the Thai army declared in 1993 that he wasn't concerned about any military threat posed by China.[20] And anxious Malay strategic analysts say the pattern of Thailand's recent acquisitions of military equipment suggests the same thing.[21] Meanwhile, Thailand is displaying little real concern about China's intentions in the South China Sea—intentions that have profoundly upset Thailand's fellow ASEAN members in archipelagic Southeast Asia. What all this suggests is a major shift in Thai strategic thinking, namely, a new assessment that Thailand and China have common, long-term interests in Southeast Asia.

What lubricates this emerging Sino-Thai entente are the opportunities for business circles in both countries to create great wealth both in China and throughout peninsular Southeast Asia. There seem to be no mixed feelings in Thailand, as there are in archipelagic Southeast Asia, about local companies, controlled by local ethnic Chinese businessmen, investing in China. Thai officials have been quoted as encouraging this trend.[22] Thai media enthusiasm about closer Sino-Thai economic ties also seems unalloyed. There are no reliable figures for total Thai investment in China, but the Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group claimed that its assets last year had reached the $1.3 billion mark. The CP Group has at least thirty-nine feedmills combined with chicken and hog farms, two motorcycle factories, and "the beginning of a real estate empire spread across China." Plans are well advanced for department stores, motor vehicle plants, oil refineries, and petrochemical plants.[23] Like the CP Group, virtually all the Thai companies investing in China are controlled by ethnic Chinese business groups in Bangkok. Putting aside the old "loyalty" bugaboo that haunted Southeast Asia's Chinese business class decades ago, one can nevertheless expect these business groups to strongly support continuing close relations between Thailand and China.

In Thailand itself, the China factor has engendered growing optimism and excitement over economic prospects for the far north of the country. Both Thailand and China are promoting the idea of an "Economic Quadrangle" that would encompass adjacent areas of northern Thailand, southwestern Yunnan, southeast Burma, and parts of Laos. This area, minus China, is better known as the Golden Triangle of heroin fame. The "Quadrangle" name symbolizes the

[19] See, for instance, the report of a Thai deputy cabinet minister urging a speedup in the construction of roads that would link Thailand with China and improve Thailand's competitive position vis-à-vis Vietnam. "Official Quick Action Needed on PRC Transport Links," FBIS, *EA*, July 21, 1993, p. 52, from *Bangkok Post*, July 21, 1993.

[20] *Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly*, June 7, 1993.

[21] See J.N. Mak and B.A. Hamzah, "Navy Blues," *FEER*, Mar. 17, 1994, p. 30.

[22] "Thai Ambassador Urges Investments in China," FBIS, *China*, Jan. 19, 1993, p. 15, from Xinhua, Jan. 16, 1993.

[23] Carl Goldstein, "Full Speed Ahead," *FEER*, Oct. 21, 1993, p. 66.

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goal of breaking with that past and creating a special economic development zone. Businessmen and government officials envision Chiang Rai, Thailand's northernmost city, as the hub for roads to Burma and Laos and, via those countries, to China.[24]

Vietnam

As the only country in peninsular Southeast Asia that holds islands in the South China Sea, Vietnam inevitably finds itself in an unsettled relationship with China. Officially, relations with China in 1993 "remained prickly, with the South China Sea islands issue surfacing every few months."[25] At the same time, economic interaction is growing. Official trade as well as smuggling appear to be still increasing more than a year after the reopening of three border stations in late 1992. The impact of growing China trade still appears to be concentrated in the North, where some Vietnamese consumer-goods manufacturers are being swamped by cheaper, better quality, Chinese products.

One dilemma facing Vietnam's leaders is that, if they continue to liberalize and marketize the economy, the power of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese business class is bound to increase. Indeed, a visible increase in the assertiveness of Sino-Vietnamese businessmen and politicians will probably prove to be an indicator of China's growing influence.

China intermittently attempts to remind Vietnam that it now has the economic and military power to determine the course of the relationship. For instance, China has granted oil-drilling permits for areas where other drillers, with permission from Vietnam, are already drilling. China also appears to acquiesce in the harassment of freighters on Hong Kong-Vietnam runs by armed men in Chinese vessels in international waters. In fact, Vietnam's strategic position is so weak that China can move slowly and, if it wishes, rather gently, in its inexorable drive to establish hegemony over Vietnam. China can afford to continue its military buildup in the South China Sea theater because of its burgeoning economy and growing access to international capital. By contrast, an isolated Vietnam is being forced by its straitened economy and its lack of international patrons to make do with a military that is shrinking in size and unable to buy new equipment.

It must be said that Yunnan's total trade with peninsular Southeast Asia cannot be quantified with confidence. But the available figures are undoubtedly well below the actual amounts. That's largely because a considerable portion of what China exports by land is smuggled or undervalued in order to avoid Chinese taxes or high tariffs and other trade barriers imposed by the importing countries. Yunnan recently reported that its two-way border trade with Burma,

[24] "Regional Economic Zone Plans for Chiang Rai," FBIS, *EA*, June 21, 1993, p. 46, from *Bangkok Post*, June 20, 1993.

[25] Douglas Pike, "Vietnam in 1993," *Asian Survey*, Jan. 1994, p. 70.

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Laos, and Vietnam was about $400 million in 1993, or 27 percent more than 1992.[26] That alone is considerable, but the actual figure could easily be $1 billion. And "border trade" by China's definition covers only a portion of all trade across a particular border. Exports or imports under the auspices of a state trading corporation, for instance, are not included. In addition, Chinese businessmen in Southeast Asia are extremely secretive about their activities and their wealth—and that certainly includes their investments abroad. In China, empathetic local officials cater to their secretiveness. So we cannot be sure, for instance, how much Thai capital is invested in China.

South Asia

China's surging economy is proving to have major strategic implications for South Asia as well. But the nature of the impact of China's economic strength on South Asia has so far been quite different from what it has been on Southeast Asia. Overall, trade and other economic links between China and most of South Asia have long been modest at best. Most notable for their lack of substantial economic ties have been Asia's two giants, China and India, separated by the Himalayas and by bitter memories of the 1962 war. For the foreseeable future, there is virtually no prospect of any South Asian country developing economic interactions with China as intense as those between China and peninsular Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the striking juxtaposition of an economically dynamic China and an economically fragile India is at the heart of major, historic changes in China's relations with South Asia that began only recently. This is not the occasion for a recounting of India's disastrous economic policy choices during the past forty years, let alone its equally disastrous social and foreign policy choices.[27] But as China and India emerged into the post–cold war world, the once ballyhooed rivalry of the two Asian giants—one communist, one democratic—was over. China had won.[28] China had surpassed India by virtually every measure of economic and social development. And while India could boast of free elections, it was arguable whether an ordinary Indian enjoyed more everyday freedoms than an ordinary Chinese.

Although China was not publicly claiming victory, its lead was insurmountable both in terms of economic development and conventional military might. It was outflanking India in Burma (see above) and in Pakistan, where it has long been the military supplier of India's archfoe. In addition, India was

[26] "Yunnan Border Trade Grows in 1993," FBIS, *China*, Feb. 15, 1994, p. 62, from Kunming Yunnan People's Radio Network, Feb. 13, 1994.

[27] For a critical look at past and current economic policy and a pessimistic view of India's economic prospects in the foreseeable future, see Ross H. Munro, "The Loser: India in the Nineties," *The National Interest*, Summer 1993, pp. 62–69. The article also argues that, conventional wisdom aside, India will prove unable to move towards an internationally oriented market economy at anything like China's recent pace.

[28] For an exposition of the argument that Mao Zedong unintentionally helped establish a firm foundation for the economic takeoff that was initiated in 1979, three years after his death, see Ibid.

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dealt a major blow by the collapse of the Soviet Union. It no longer enjoyed all the benefits of its de facto strategic alliance with the Soviets, such as modern weapons, for which it paid in soft currency, and a captive market for its noncompetitive exports. Nor could it count on Moscow as the ultimate guarantor of its security vis-à-vis China. India was particularly taken aback by China's newfound ability, thanks to its rapidly growing economy and Moscow's desperate need for foreign exchange, to purchase sophisticated weapons systems, such as Sukhoi-27 warplanes from Russia. India's former ally was willing to sell such weapons to India as well, but only for hard currency that India does not have.

The striking juxtaposition of an economically dynamic China and an economically fragile India is at the heart of major, historic changes in China's relations with South Asia.

Isolated, India was compelled to seek rapprochement with China. In a significant but largely overlooked event, India signed an agreement in September 1993 that effectively accepted China's territorial gains in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. For all practical purposes, India acknowledged that it no longer had the economic and military strength to challenge China. Neither Indian nor Chinese officials issued any public statements even remotely suggesting this. The closest the Indian media came to the hard truth was the observation of *India Today,* a respected and independent bimonthly news magazine, that "India had to give up the fantasy of maintaining a two-front army."[29]

The actual document signed by Indian and Chinese leaders in Beijing on September 7, 1993, was entitled, "Maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the line of control." It provided for troop reductions and other confidence-building measures along the lines of actual control in the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh sectors of the frontier. Although the agreement has a face-saving provision for future talks to establish a permanent border, one Indian specialist known for his candor declared that the agreement had established a de facto and semi-de jure border that would remain fixed indefinitely. Negotiations to enact the agreement and clarify the details are still under way, but the core of the agreement seems secure.

The agreement has generated a new batch of uncertainties. Some officials and intellectuals in both countries are calling for China and India to develop common positions on international issues, implicitly, in most cases, to oppose U.S. policy. But given the long history of distrust between China and India, the prospects here are modest.

[29] Shekhar Gupta with Sudeep Chakravarti, "Vital Breakthrough," *India Today,* Sept. 30, 1993, p. 23.

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The Sino-Indian agreement has generated anxiety among India's neighbors. Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen visited India's three most important South Asian neighbors—Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka—in late February and early March 1994, on a tour that also included the Maldives and Iran. Apparently, his primary goal was to reassure India's three immediate neighbors that China's rapprochement with India didn't mean that China was endorsing Indian hegemony in South Asia. That, in turn, evidently prompted India's foreign minister, Dinesh Singh, to rush to Tehran to see Qian on the eve of his return to Beijing.[30] In short, China seems to be in the catbird seat, being courted by every country in South Asia!

China seems to be in the catbird seat, being courted by every country in South Asia.

The Sino-Indian agreement in September may well have included some unannounced side deals. For example, India appears to have accepted greater Chinese influence in Nepal, a sore point for many years. A month after the agreement, it was announced that China had opened three additional passes on the Tibet-Nepal border to facilitate border trade and tourism.[31] There had previously been only one such pass. In what may or may not have been a related development, Tibet had earlier opened a trade liaison office in Kathmandu.[32]

In Bangladesh this year, China demonstrated that it has the economic resources to inaugurate a Japanese-style foreign-aid project. It will spend $200 million to build a turnkey coal mine in Bangladesh that will be equipped with Chinese mining machinery.[33] This is the sort of project that one might have expected Bangladesh's neighbor, India, to finance, if only India had by now developed a strong and outward-looking economy.

There is no need here to review the history of China's long friendship with Pakistan, which has persisted through tumultuous changes in the politics of both countries. And it would be premature to assess the implications for Pakistan of the Sino-Indian agreement signed in September 1993. The military relationship remains close even though it could not be characterized as an alliance. It can be assumed on the basis of available evidence and U.S. government charges that, over the years, China has continued to help Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile technology programs. Evidence that the military relationship continues to be close in the wake of the Sino-Indian agreement was the announcement in March 1994 of China's agreement to give Pakistan "the

[30] Xinhua, Mar. 6, 1994.
[31] Xinhua, Oct. 5, 1993.
[32] Xinhua, Aug. 14, 1993.
[33] Xinhua, Feb. 7, 1994.

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capability to manufacture modern tanks like the MBT-2000 and 125mm smooth-bore tank gun."[34]

China and Pakistan have been slowly developing economic ties in the civilian sector. In most cases, their economic cooperation has concrete, strategic implications. For example, China recently committed itself to spending $40 million on highway construction in Pakistan. And both countries have reportedly committed themselves to developing the high-altitude Karakoram Highway, linking Pakistan with China's Xinjiang, into an all-weather road. That has potentially important military implications.

Lastly, China is offering to participate in joint ventures in light manufacturing in Pakistan to produce electrical appliances, pumps, and packaged foods. The Chinese are "suggesting" that the products be exported and that the foreign-exchange earnings be "invested in the defense sector"—in other words, to buy Chinese military equipment or production technology. Once again, it is noteworthy that China has the industrial base and the wealth that make proposals like this practical and feasible.

Central Asia

It is in Central Asia that the two great historic events now under way in Eurasia come together.[35] One is the continuing collapse of the Russian Empire and the Soviet communist system. The other is the rapid growth of China's economy and its military power, a trend that seems destined to make China a full-fledged superpower early in the next century. While the implications of the first event for Central Asia are being widely discussed and intensively examined, the implications for the region of the second event have only recently been noticed. Indeed, the first wave of analyses of the international implications of the emergence of the five newly independent Central Asian republics dealt cursorily, if at all, with China. But, today, it is clear that an economically dynamic and militarily ascendant China must be considered a major player in the region, clearly outranked in importance only by Russia.

Since the Soviet Union began to unravel, China's interests in Central Asia have repeatedly been characterized, as one observer put it, as "primarily defensive—to stop instability from spilling over into Chinese Turkestan,"[36] the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which, despite its name, is a region of China tightly controlled by Beijing. In a narrow sense, the characterization of China's concern over Central Asia is accurate. Chinese rulers have considered Xinjiang a territorial-integrity issue for centuries. This century alone has witnessed several attempts by Xinjiang's Turkic Muslims to win effective independence

[34] Reuters, Mar. 23, 1994.

[35] This section on China's relations with Central Asia updates and draws from my paper, "Central Asia and China," which constitutes chap. 8 of Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994).

[36] "The Silk Road Catches Fire," *The Economist,* Dec. 26, 1992, p. 46.

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from China. Most recently, from 1989 until 1991, unrest intermittently reached serious, and in one or two pockets, insurrectional proportions, among elements of the Turkic Muslim population.[37]

It seems in retrospect that both the Chinese authorities and foreign analysts may have overestimated the significance of these disturbances. That the Chinese overreacted, there is now little doubt. But given other events occurring at the time of the disturbances, the Chinese response is completely understandable. The spring of 1989 was dominated by the demonstrations on Tiananmen square that ended in violence on June 4. We know now that the Chinese leadership really didn't regain its balance and self-confidence before late 1991. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union was unravelling, prompting predictions that Leninism was doomed everywhere, including China. With the formal breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, following the failure of the hardliners' coup attempt the preceding August, the five Central Asian republics were, in effect, set loose. That prompted analysts worldwide to opine that the situation in Central Asia was not only fluid, but volatile. China was not immune to such speculation, particularly when the unrest in Xinjiang suggested that the forces of instability in the former Soviet Union had somehow already leapfrogged the border. Xinjiang officials openly acknowledged that they were concerned about the impact of the breakup of the Soviet Union and that Chinese troops were reinforcing Xinjiang's border with what was then still Soviet Central Asia.[38]

Several factors, in addition to the political comeback of supporters of economic reform, help explain why the alarm of Chinese authorities over the situation in Xinjiang and Central Asia did not last. One was that the wave of Muslim unrest diminished. That, in turn, probably can be largely attributed to China's long-term approach to minority issues. Since 1949, except during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, China's minority policies have arguably been among the world's most sophisticated, although not the most benign. Beijing, on the one hand, deliberately leaves no doubt about its willingness to use force to quell anything smacking of ethnic separatism. On the other hand, Beijing assiduously recruits, co-opts, and rewards members of non-Han Chinese groups who are able or ambitious. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to promote the movement of Han Chinese into Xinjiang and other minority regions in order to tilt the population ratio against the non-Han. Although the official Chinese census declares Turkic Muslims to be 60 percent of the population, they now actually constitute less than half of Xinjiang's residents.

[37] "Tomur Dawamat's Speech at Party Meeting," FBIS, *China*, Oct. 17, 1990, p. 45, from *Xinjiang Ribao* (Urumqi), July 29, 1990. The head of the Xinjiang regional government described the outbreak of violence in Baren Township in 1989 as a "counterrevolutionary armed rebellion."

[38] "Xinjiang Chairman Views Secessionism: Stability Cited," FBIS, *China*, Mar. 26, 1990, p. 49, from *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), Mar. 25, 1990; "Xinjiang Prepares for Crackdown on Separatists," FBIS, *China*, Mar. 13, 1990, p. 50, from Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), Mar. 13, 1990.

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In addition, relieved Chinese leaders seem to have concluded by early 1992 that neither pan-Turkic nationalism nor militant Islam was about to sweep the Central Asian republics. That, in turn, meant that neither force posed a serious and immediate threat to Xinjiang itself. The ruling secular elites of all five new republics had made their hostility to militant Islam very clear.

Even in the 1989–1991 period, when Chinese anxiety about Central Asia was still high, the authorities in Xinjiang were slowly but steadily developing border trade and other ties with the Central Asian republics, which were then an integral part of the Soviet Union. But once these republics achieved de jure independence by the end of 1991, the stage was set for Beijing to establish state-to-state relations and formulate a more ambitious and far-reaching Central Asia policy. Confident by then that it faced no serious and immediate danger from Central Asia, China recognized that it nevertheless has a strong national interest in promoting the stability and economic development of the Central Asian republics. By the beginning of the 1990s, with more than a decade of rapid economic growth already behind it, China could offer major trade opportunities as well as modest amounts of capital and technology to the economically weak Central Asian republics. By doing this, China is strengthening the republics' economies and responding to what Central Asian leaders consider their most basic need. It is not cultural, linguistic, or religious "aid" that Central Asia's elites crave, it is economic development. The Chinese clearly agree that economic development offers the region the best chance of limiting future ethnic and religious conflict.[39]

Of course, China intends to do well by doing good. Increased Chinese trade and investment in Central Asia means increased Chinese influence. Furthermore, given the mutual benefit inherent in market transactions, all this benefits China's domestic economy, particularly neighboring Xinjiang's. Indeed, the Chinese central authorities view Xinjiang as an important growth center owing to its strategic location. In September 1992, Premier Li Peng officiated at the opening of a major trade fair in Urumqi, Xinjiang's capital. Although the fair attracted ten thousand businessmen from thirty-eight countries, the fair's focus was on developing trade and other economic ties between Xinjiang and its Central Asian neighbors.

Xinjiang is attracting the interest of even Hong Kong and Taiwan investors. At the Xinjiang border town of Horgos, a Hong Kong businessman reportedly built a $55 million international trade center.[40] That investment exemplified yet another advantage that China enjoys vis-à-vis Central Asia: it not only can draw on the resources of the burgeoning mainland economy, it also has access to the capital, technology, and entrepreneurial resources of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Nor does it end there. The business communities in

[39] For a typical Chinese view of Central Asia, see Zhang Xiaodong, "Central Asia on the Rise," *Beijing Review,* Aug. 3–9, 1992, p. 12.

[40] "Faster Economic Development Seen in Xinjiang," FBIS, *China,* Nov. 4, 1992, p. 53, from Xinhua, Nov. 4, 1992.

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Hong Kong and Taiwan can also act as a bridge to world capital markets and multinational corporations.

China's emerging economic approach to Central Asia can be better understood by first examining the dramatic developments in its relations with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan since 1991. These relations deserve close attention not only because they are the most advanced and extensive but also because they provide us with ample illustrations of China's overall approach to Central Asia.

Although available statistics are far from satisfactory, they leave no doubt that China's bilateral trade with Kazakhstan has been soaring since early 1992. Despite Kazakhstan's still declining economy, bilateral trade with China increased in 1993 to $434 million from $360 million in 1992, the takeoff year.[41] Xinhua reported that, by late 1992, 50 percent of Kazakhshstan's imports of consumer goods—a broad category that includes food, clothing, and household goods—were from China.[42] (In the spring of 1993, there were peeved acknowledgements of this fact in the Russian media.) The most basic Chinese products—such as soap, matches, and cooking pots—are prized among Asia's poor for their quality and value.

Further evidence of China's burgeoning trade relationship with Kazakhstan came in a May 1992 report that "a network of Chinese shops" had opened in the republic.[43] By April 1993, Xinhua reported, China had established 150 small joint ventures in Kazakhstan as well.[44] The month of June 1992 witnessed the first train to travel the full length of a rail line linking Xinjiang's capital of Urumqi to the Kazakh capital, Alma-Ata.[45] Construction of that rail line had begun in 1956! In November 1993, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev said that "during the past year [?], 15,000 trains [*sic;* probably railway cars] has passed from Kazakhstan to China and vice versa. "That is, about two million tons of freight and . . . a total of 670,000 passengers." In the same interview, he spoke enthusiastically about a double-tracked line linking China through Kazakhstan to the west.[46]

Clearly there are strong constituencies in both China and Kazakhstan that favor closer relations between the two countries in almost every field. Evidence of this emerged after talks between Chinese premier Li Peng and

[41] "Kazakhstan Trade Official on Development of Trade Ties," FBIS, *China,* Mar. 7, 1994, p. 7, from China Radio International, Mar. 3, 1994.

[42] "China Provides Half of Kazakhstan's Imports," FBIS, *China,* Oct. 29, 1992, p. 8, from Xinhua, Oct. 27, 1992.

[43] "Trade Talks Held with Xinjiang-Uighur Delegation," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia* (hereafter FBIS, *CEur*), May 12, 1992, p. 55, from Kazakh Radio Network (Alma-Ata), May 9, 1992.

[44] "Kazakh Minister Seeks Economic Ties with China," FBIS, *China,* Apr. 30, 1993, p. 7, from Xinhua, Apr. 30, 1992.

[45] "Rail Link with PRC City Inaugurated," FBIS, *CEur,* June 26, 1992, p. 81, from Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network (Moscow), June 23, 1992.

[46] "Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev Discusses Ties," FBIS, *China,* Nov. 12, 1993, p. 22, from Ostankino Television First Program Network (Moscow), Nov. 10, 1993.

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Kazakhstan premier Sergei Tereshchenko in Beijing in February 1992. A joint communiqué noted that agreements had been signed in the areas of trade, scientific and technological cooperation, communications and transport, personnel exchanges, and the establishment of a joint committee for the development of further ties.[47]

China has an even greater economic presence in Kyrgyzstan, which also shares a long border with Xinjiang. Four months after China and Kyrgyzstan established diplomatic relations in January 1992, President Askar Akaev visited Beijing. Today, China has a full-fledged embassy in Bishkek. In the summer of 1993, high-ranking Chinese and Kirghiz officials visited each others' capitals. It is on the economic plane, however, that ties have developed most dramatically. Indeed, it is conceivable that Kyrgyzstan's economy will be dominated by China before the end of the decade. China has established a free-trade zone in the city of Naryn. In the capital, Bishkek, Chinese are buying considerable amounts of real estate. China has also posted agricultural and other experts in the country.

There are repeated calls in China for a modern-day version of the ancient Silk Road that linked China with Central Asia and the West.

Trade between the two countries is burgeoning. Basic Chinese consumer goods—such as food, clothing, and simple electronic products—have been flooding into Kyrgyzstan. China has encouraged the trend by extending credits equivalent to $5.7 million.[48] For a time, China was importing such industrial commodities as rolled metal, sheet steel, mineral fertilizer, and copper. Many of these items, the Russian-language media in Moscow charged, were actually re-exports of commodities purchased elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States at fixed low prices and then sold to China at world market prices. China is also purchasing electricity from the republic.[49] In August 1992, China proposed exploring the possibility of exploiting four rivers whose waters are shared by Xinjiang and Kyrgyzstan.[50]

By January 1993, China and Kazakhstan had reached agreement to "jointly build a water conservancy works over the Horgos River along the border."[51] The article implied that all the potential uses of the river—irrigation,

[47] "Kazakh Prime Minister, Delegation Continue Visit," FBIS, *China,* Mar. 2, 1992, p. 10, from Xinhua, Feb. 28, 1992.

[48] "Akayev on 'Realistic, Fruitful' Talks," FBIS, *China,* May 15, 1992, p. 7, from Xinhua, May 14, 1992.

[49] "Electric Power Line Begins Supplies to China," FBIS, *CEur,* Oct. 5, 1992, p. 51, from Itar-Tass (Moscow), Oct. 1, 1992.

[50] "Premier Leaves for PRC for Border Issue Talks," FBIS, *CEur,* Aug. 7, 1992, p. 74, from Radio Rossii Network (Moscow), Aug. 3, 1992.

[51] "Xinjiang, Kazakhstan Plan Border Water Project," FBIS, *China,* Jan. 26, 1993, p. 9, from Xinhua, Jan. 23, 1993.

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hydropower, flood control, and navigation—would be pursued. All such proposals should be carefully watched for their political implications. Water is a vital and scarce resource in Central Asia, and conflict between upstream and downstream users is already a serious one. In fact, at the moment, this appears to be the only immediate issue on which China could find itself in conflict with one or more of the five republics. One possible source of conflict, analysts believe, is that a river development agreement between China and Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan could harm the interests of a downstream user such as Uzbekistan.

Although parts of Tajikistan are still in turmoil, its trade with China is rising rapidly in percentage terms from a tiny starting point. Total bilateral trade in 1992 was a mere $2.7 million, but the first four months of 1993 saw total trade rise to $4.4 million.[52] Understandably, when Tajikistan's senior leader, Imomali Rahmonov, paid an official visit to China in March 1993, nearly all official references to economic ties between the two countries were in the future tense. China granted Tajikistan the equivalent of about $5 million worth of yuan credits to buy Chinese food products and consumer goods. China also gave Tajikistan humanitarian food and medical aid worth approximately $500,000. During the past two years, the two countries have signed ten cooperation agreements.[53] Among other things, those agreements call for the establishment of joint Tajik-Chinese ventures to process cotton. Agreement has already been reached on setting up a Chinese dye works in a Tajik textile mill.[54]

There are repeated calls in China for a modern-day version of the ancient "Silk Road" that linked China with Central Asia and the West.[55] Although it may initially strike many as romantic boilerplate, such Chinese rhetoric is highly significant. China sees a new Silk Road of modern railways and highways as a transmission belt that could project Chinese wealth and influence far westward, not only through Central Asia but to Iran and the Middle East. While most discussions of Central Asia's future physical links with the outside world focus on north-south links, the logic of east-west links are often overlooked. These could well include establishing a modern railway that would directly link Central Asia to the huge and growing China market and ultimately to deep-sea ports on China's east coast. A new Silk Road of modern railroads and highways that would effectively give China a land route far to the west, ultimately to Europe and to Iran on the Persian Gulf, would have enormous strategic consequences, conceivably comparable to the impact that the advent of the Suez and Panama Canals once had.

China's goals in Central Asia were on display in April 1994, when Chinese premier Li Peng paid official visits to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The reception for Li in all four republics was

[52] "Wu Yi Meets Tajik Counterpart; Accords Signed," FBIS, *China,* June 18, 1993, p. 8, from Xinhua, June 18, 1993.

[53] "More on Talks between Wu Yi, Tajik Counterpart," FBIS, *China,* June 21, 1993, p. 12, from *China Daily* (Beijing), June 19, 1993.

[54] "Rakhmanov Reviews PRC Visit," FBIS, *CEur,* Mar. 15, 1993, p. 89, from Interfax (Moscow), Mar. 12, 1993.

[55] See, for example, "Northwest to Revive the Silk Road," *Beijing Review,* Sept, 14–20, 1992, p. 7.

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described by an independent observer as "extremely cordial." Uzbek president Islam Karimov formally welcomed Li, saying that "the Uzbeks have realized that China is a great country and provides great potential for stability in Central Asia." Premier Li, evoking the Silk Road, reached agreement with the president of Turkmenistan, Sapamurat Niiazov, on feasibility studies for a new railway across Central Asia and a pipeline that would carry the region's oil to China. Li called the estimated $20 billion oil pipeline "the project of the century."[56]

China's Central Asia ambitions—particularly an oil pipeline that has major strategic implications—inevitably will clash with Russia's almost proprietary view of the one-time Soviet republics in Central Asia. The clash will pit an economically vibrant China against a declining Russia that nevertheless still has substantial military leverage in Central Asia. For now, Russia keeps a close guard on its political and military prerogatives in the region. For instance, *Alma-Ata Radio was reporting in late 1992 that a "treaty on cooperation and* military assistance between Kazakhstan and China is expected to be signed in the near future."[57] But nothing more has been heard of such a treaty. The explanation is that Russia evidently claims the right to approve any military links between China and the Central Asian republics. For instance, when China discusses border delineation, troop reduction, and confidence-building measures with the Central Asian republics, Russia insists on being present. So China must face a "joint delegation" that includes all three Central Asian neighbors as well as Russia, which effectively heads the delegation and can block any agreement between China and the Central Asian republics that it opposes. This was the format from August 1993 to as recently as March 1994. It was only in January 1994 that Kazakhstan's minister of defense managed to visit China.[58]

Judging by Russian-language media, Russian anxiety over China's role in Central Asia is increasing. During the past several months, there have been several written attacks on the growing Chinese presence in Kazakhstan in particular.

Nearly all of these attacks seem to emanate from Russian, rather than Kazakh, circles. The writing is vintage yellow-hordes propaganda. Typical, except that it appeared in a Kazakh-language magazine, was an article that declared: "It is no secret that the Chinese, who are flooding into Kazakhstan as their future home, are buying . . . Kazakh women. . . . The Chinese . . . are particularly cunning, falsely polite, (and) . . . carefully fulfilling plans set for the centuries."[59]

By every indication, the Chinese will be very careful not to overplay their hand and blatantly use their economic leverage for obvious political or

[56] Ahmed Rashid, "Chinese Challenge: Li Peng Visit Highlights Beijing's Growing Role in Region," *FEER,* May 12, 1994, p. 30.

[57] "Military Treaty with China in 'Near Future,'" FBIS, *CEur,* Dec. 16, 1992, p. 43, from Radio Alma-Ata World Service, Dec. 15, 1992.

[58] "Kazakh Defense Minister, Delegation Visit PRC: Interviewed Prior to Trip," FBIS, *China,* Jan. 13, 1994, p. 10, from Xinhua, Jan. 10, 1994.

[59] "Kazakh Interests in Relations with China Evaluated," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS Report: Central Eurasia,* Jan. 12, 1994, p. 58, from *Aziya* (Almaty), Oct. 1993. Most tirades of this nature are written in Russian.

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strategic gain. Instead, they seem willing to let the contradictions between Chinese economic strength and Russian economic weakness take their course. For example, Chinese proposals to construct a pipeline to transport Central Asian oil into China will almost certainly be blocked, at least for now, by a Russia that fears China and a Russia that has long considered Central Asian oil reserves as its own. But if Russia obstructs this and other Chinese Silk Road projects, that will further alienate Central Asian leaders who naturally favor any development projects that will accelerate their nations' economic growth. So whether or not such proposed projects go ahead, China stands to improve its position in Central Asia and Russia stands to lose.

Conclusion

In September 1993, major party and government leaders from the five provincial-level units in northwest China met in Urumqi. Reports suggest that the leaders were upbeat about the range of opportunities on China's northwest frontier: developing international trade and transport, project and labor contracting in neighboring countries, as well as running enterprises and developing tourist facilities abroad. One report declared that the leaders agreed "the northwest regions should seize good opportunities, take full advantage of their geographical advantages in opening to the countries and regions west of China's northwest, jointly build a great international passage in the northwest, and make joint westward advances."[60] It is that sort of optimistic, ambitious, and outward-looking stance that characterizes the approach of an increasingly powerful China toward its neighbors not only in Central Asia but also in South and Southeast Asia.

China is rapidly increasing its influence in all three neighboring regions. What is particularly noteworthy is that China's advances in all three regions are peaceful, economic, and non-coercive. Indeed, neighboring countries eager for the fruits of China's economic takeoff sometimes seem more enthusiastic than China itself in promoting this trend. Meanwhile, the military element in China's expansionism in these regions is subtle or indirect. First, China is strengthening ties with such countries as Burma and Thailand by selling them military equipment on extremely favorable terms. Secondly, China is continuing its rapid military buildup, which will help deter other countries from resorting to a military response to China's economic expansionism.

What we may be witnessing are the early stages of a reversion of much of continental Asia to the more "natural" state of affairs that prevailed centuries ago. At their full flowering, China's ruling dynasties reigned over a tributary states system under which neighbors, largely independent and unoccupied by Chinese troops, sent "tribute" to Beijing to acknowledge Chinese hegemony.

[60] "Xinjiang Hosts Northwest Economic Conference," FBIS, *China*, Oct. 6, 1993, from Xinhua, Sept. 20, 1993.

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Russian Vital Interests and Western Security

by James H. Brusstar

The fall 1993 crisis in Moscow resulted in more than the forceful disbandment of the old Russian parliament. It marked Moscow's rejection of the principle of integration with the West, ending one key stage in the debate within Boris Yeltsin's government over the underlying principle of Russia's security policies.

It is now clear that Yeltsin made several concessions to Russia's military leaders during his pre-dawn sojourn to the Ministry of Defense on October 4, 1993. In exchange for help in suppressing the parliament, military leaders apparently demanded, among other things, acceptance of their position regarding the essence of Russian security policies: that Russia's *vital interests*—not cooperation with the West—must be the basis on which Moscow's security decisions are made.

Russia's Cooperation with the West

The new cornerstone of security policy differs markedly from both those previously advocated by Soviet president Gorbachev and Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev. Gorbachev and Kozyrev advanced policies that were based on Russia (and prior to 1992, the Soviet Union) acting in concert with the West—particularly the United States—on security matters.

Gorbachev's security concept, which he called "mutual security," rejected the old Soviet dogma regarding a struggle between two social systems by calling for collaboration with the West. It was Gorbachev's view that the Soviet Union and the West could guarantee their own security only if they refrained from challenging the other's security. Each side had to ensure that its actions did not threaten the other—because threats elicit responses that actually decrease one's own security. Moreover, Gorbachev sought a special security relationship between the two superpowers—a strategic partnership—under which the United

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States and Soviet Union jointly assumed a responsibility for global stability and peace that transcended other international alliances.

Kozyrev (supported by Yeltsin) went a step further by identifying the major threat to Russia's security as economic and political isolation. Accordingly, Russia had to pursue revolutionary economic and political reform, and become part of the Western world. Kozyrev believed that Russia could achieve security only through integration, not confrontation or competition, with the West.

What Happened to Integration?

Many Russians who embraced Kozyrev's idea of integration expected the United States to assume a large degree of responsibility for Russia's security. They assumed the United States would seek to nurse Russia back to political and economic health until Russia could again assume its "proper" position in the international community—as one of the two great military powers responsible for international security. They anticipated that the United States and Russia would work in concert to ensure international stability and prosperity for the advanced industrial nations—among whom they counted Russia, even if it was temporarily suffering difficulties.

Russian hopes in this regard were sorely disappointed. The promised U.S. aid was less than expected and slow in coming. The United States praised Russian democracy, but exclusively backed President Yeltsin as the sole symbol of democratic gains, even after Yeltsin threatened to close the legislature in early 1993 and proposed a constitution that provided almost no checks on presidential authority. The United States praised Russia's efforts to move towards the market but insisted on a version of economic reform—the International Monetary Fund-style marketization backed by former acting premier Yegor Gaydar—that most Russians see as a recipe for economic disaster. Moreover, the United States and other Western states began toying with measures that many Russians see as designed to isolate and weaken Russia, such as expanding NATO boundaries eastward. U.S. officials also began discussing the possibility of American mediation in the Caucasus and Central Asia—a move that many in Moscow view as an effort to expand American influence into Russia's backyard.

By late 1993, the perceived disparity between American rhetoric and actions led many Russians who were disposed to trust the United States to question our sincerity. While some may have become ultra-nationalist in their views, many simply made what they consider a more sober assessment of American intentions and capabilities.

Events in the other Soviet successor states were also contributing to a re-assessment. Kozyrev's integration strategy assumed development of normal, cooperative relations with the "near abroad."[1] Over the past two years, however, many of Russia's nearest neighbors have been rocked by continuing turmoil,

[1] Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992, p. 12.

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threatening key Russian security interests, as well as the twenty-five million Russians who found themselves outside of the Russian Federation. Russia has repeatedly found itself intervening militarily—a development that has increased tension with a West suspicious of potential Russian neo-imperialism.

These factors prompted an agonizing reappraisal of Kozyrev's increasingly discredited integration strategy. The result was a growing consensus that Russia must entrust its security and prestige in the world to itself alone. Russia's vital interests became the watchword; and President Yeltsin's October blunder became the opportunity to end the debate with Kozyrev.

Russia's Vital Interests

The current Russian concept of vital interests, while rejecting the old Soviet dogma regarding a struggle between two social systems, falls short of embracing the idea of Gorbachev and Kozyrev that collaboration with the West on security matters is essential. Further, unlike Kozyrev's view, the concept is not dependent on Russia's integration into the Western-dominated international system.

By late 1993, the perceived disparity between American rhetoric and actions led many Russians who were disposed to trust the United States to question our sincerity.

Few Russians have specified what Russia's vital interests might be. At a May 1992 Moscow conference on military doctrine, however, Colonel-General Igor Rodionov, chief of the General Staff Academy, listed a series of goals that he thought would be in Russia's interests:

> the neutrality of East European countries or their friendly relations with Russia;
>
> free Russian access to seaports in the Baltics;
>
> the exclusion of "third country" military forces from the Baltics and non-membership of the Baltic states in military blocs directed at Russia;
>
> the prevention of the countries that constitute the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) from becoming part of a buffer zone aimed at separating Russia from the West, South, or East;
>
> maintaining the CIS states under Russia's exclusive influence;

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> preserving good-neighbor relations with states of the Middle and Far East.[2]

Although Russian decision makers are still debating specifics, official statements (and Russian actions) suggest that many of these goals have been accepted in practice by Russian leaders.

The kernel of the premise is that the security of one's own country must always take priority in any decision. Explaining Russia's new approach to security matters in December 1993, one of Yeltsin's top foreign-policy advisers said that Russia's vital interests would be decided on a case-by-case basis, analyzing both the desirability and consequence of the actions that could be taken by Russia or others.

Emphasizing the difference with the approach that had been advocated by Kozyrev, the advisor made the point that while Russia wanted to cooperate with the West on security issues, it would not hesitate to pursue its own policies when its national interests were involved. Expanding on this point in his February 1994 State of the Nation address, President Yeltsin said:

> Consistent promotion of Russia's national interests is the main task of our foreign policy. Openness and cooperation are prime means for achieving it. But if required to protect the state's legitimate interests, Russia has a right to act firmly and tough when it is really necessary.[3]

The president's advisor fully expected that differences between Moscow and Washington over how to handle international problems would occur more frequently in the future. But, he maintained, the pursuit of one's own security interests also required dialogue, compromise, and the avoidance of conflicts with other powerful nations. From this perspective, he ventured that it would be wrong to view Russia's policy as inherently confrontational.

How to Ensure Vital Interests

Moscow's rejection of integration did not mean that the debate over national security was over. While most within the Moscow decision-making community, including the new, conservative-dominated legislature, accepted the notion that Russian policies should be based on vital interests, there is still no consensus on how to translate this principle into action.

A case in point is the thorny issue of how to protect Russia's interests in the near abroad. One option (pushed by the ultra-nationalists) is to simply re-incorporate many of these regions into a greater Russia. Another approach—the one embraced by Kozyrev and others previously associated with the

[2] Igor Rodionov, "Approaches to Russian Military Doctrine," Speech given at the General Staff Academy's conference on military-science, May 27–30, 1992, reprinted in *Voyennaya mysl'*, July 1992, Special Edition.

[3] Boris Yeltsin, "State of the Nation Address," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia*, Feb. 24, 1994, p. 20, from Ostankino Television First Channel Network (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1994.

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integration strategy—is to use a variety of economic and diplomatic levers to enhance Moscow's influence over these states. These differences surfaced during Yeltsin's January 1994 trip to Georgia. Liberals in the Foreign Ministry advocated that Moscow support embattled Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze in exchange for closer political and security ties with Moscow. Conservatives, whose long-term goal is re-incorporation of all or part of Georgia, opposed any actions that might prop up the Tbilisi government or allow it to re-conquer its separatist-minded Abkhazian province. The liberals and the ultra-nationalists (as well as most groups in between) agreed that Georgia and many of the other former republics are not viable states and that it is in Russia's vital interests to control these areas in order to ensure stability. They disagree only on the means to this end.

In fact, Russia continues to struggle with the question of how best to maintain its influence in the countries of the CIS. Various approaches have been discussed over the last two years, but no single one seems to satisfy all needs. The five general models that have been discussed in Russia are:

> incorporation (in total or in part) into Russia (the USSR model);
>
> total political and economic domination by Russia, but nominal independence (the old East European model);
>
> direct Russian control (formally or informally) over all security forces, but political autonomy;
>
> Russian training and logistical support of indigenous forces, but political independence (the "Nixonov" doctrine);
>
> extensive Russian influence over security decisions, but political and economic independence (the old Finland model).

Most likely, Russia will approach each country individually, taking into account the country's strategic value, likelihood to resist Russia's efforts, potential drain on Russian resources, and lure to the other major powers.

Is This the Last Change?

After swinging from class struggle to integration, the Russian pendulum may seem to be coming to rest in the moderate doctrine of vital interests. However, this may prove false. The extreme nationalistic forces represented by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, among others, present the real possibility that Russia could again accept an ideological premise into its foreign and security decisions.

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Russian ultra-nationalists have openly claimed that Russia has a right to appropriate various foreign territories because of its historic domination of those territories. These same groups also justify their support for particular factions in foreign conflicts (such as the Serbs) on other nebulous grounds, such as "Slavic brotherhood." These groups are vocally expansionist and view other nations as being anti-Russian. Their criterion for security decisions seems to be a romanticized version of Russian historical rights. They do not claim that Russia leads the forces of one social class against another, they reject Kozyrev's argument that Russia must join a Western-style international system conceived by the West, and they do not limit Russia's international security considerations to vital interests.

After swinging from class struggle to integration, the Russian pendulum may seem to be coming to rest in the moderate doctrine of "vital interests." However, this may prove false.

The success of ultra-nationalists in the December 1993 legislative elections suggests that such views resonate with a significant portion of the Russian electorate. There is a very real risk that the next presidential elections (which are currently scheduled for 1996, but could take place well before then if Yeltsin dies or becomes incapacitated) could bring an ultra-nationalist to power—a leader who would scrap the current goal of defending Moscow's vital interests in favor of a far more dangerous Russian revanchism.

The ultra-nationalists do not offer the only (or even, final) possibility for a change in policy. A belief continues to persist among many in Moscow's security establishment—including some who support Russia's current step back from integration—that, in the long run, Russia must have a "strategic partnership" with at least one strong ally in order to guarantee its own security.

The United States is, by far, the first choice for such a partnership. Western Europe (as either NATO or the WEU) is the second choice. Much less desirable, but acceptable, if Russia and the West resume confrontation, is China. Moreover, if China also turns out to be unwilling to cooperate with Russia on security issues, those who believe that a strategic partnership is essential mention the possibility of establishing a compact with Iran and focusing Russia's strategic interests on the Middle East. It is clear, however, that China and Iran are considered to be far less desirable as a strategic partner than are the United States or Europe.

The Challenge to U.S. Policies

U.S. government spokesmen have characterized American post–cold war policies towards the region of Europe formerly controlled by the Soviets

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as encouraging economic and political reform, acknowledging the primary importance of Russia within the region, recognizing all of the newly independent states, and promoting consolidation of nuclear weapons within Russia. A key assumption of these policies is that the Soviet successor states, especially Russia, will develop policies that are congenial to the United States if the region as a whole becomes market-oriented and democratic.

The challenge to the United States is soberly to assess America's—and Western Europe's—interests in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Russia's rejection of integration with the West, however, combined with escalating instability among its neighbors and the growing risk that an ultra-nationalist might come to power in Moscow, have undermined the basic assumptions of Russia's existing American policies, not just towards Russia but towards the whole of the Soviets' former sphere. Russia has become less open to foreign activities or suggestions regarding regions that it considers to be in its vital interests. Accordingly, Russia is more willing to oppose the United States and NATO in public forums and use its veto authority in the U.N. Security Council.

Reacting to the increased assertiveness of Russian foreign-policy spokesmen and exaggerated reports of the ultra-nationalists' victories in the Russian Duma election of December 12, 1993,[4] some analysts in the West immediately concluded that Russia was embarking on a neo-imperialist or "proto-imperialist" foreign policy.[5] Consequently, they advanced the thesis that it was now time for the West to consolidate its cold war victory and conduct some sort of triage for ex-Soviet bloc countries.

Some of these analysts assert that the West should support all of the newly independent countries in the face of renewed Russian expansionism. Others propose that the West should concentrate on sheltering Central Europe—most commonly, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic states—by a rapid expansion of NATO eastward.

[4] On Dec. 15, 1993, *The New York Times,* reporting preliminary election results, wrote that Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) received 25% of the vote. This figure has been mistakenly used in the West as if it were the final election results. In fact, the LDP ended up with 14.2% of the Duma seats, and the political parties that appear to support expansionist policies won, all together, 39.4%. While that is a major share of the parliamentary seats, it does not give these parties a sufficient number to dictate foreign policy—especially since the new constitution that was approved on the same day gives the executive branch primary say on the subject.

[5] See, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs,* Mar./Apr. 1994, pp. 67–82.

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In contrast, it is argued here that while it is essential for the United States to accept as reality the change that has taken place in Russia, it is important that we not overestimate the influence of the Russian ultra-nationalists. They have *not* taken charge of Russia's foreign policy, although they present the threat of doing so in the future. As for now, a more pragmatic group of people still decides foreign-policy issues in Moscow, a group that appears to understand that Russia's vital interests would not be served by reckless adventurism.

The challenge to the United States is soberly to assess America's—and Western Europe's—interests in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. As shown below, such an assessment will support neither the present American policy of equal treatment for all states, nor the proposal that NATO rush in to "grab" the new democracies of Central Europe. Rather, common sense would seem to indicate that the United States acknowledge—and fully accept—Russia's vital security interests, but oppose territorial claims by Moscow that would conflict with the vital, but reasonable, security interests of Western Europe and the United States. In sum, we must recognize that Russia's embrace of vital interests represents a challenge for American policy, but not necessarily a return to expansionism. It may even pose a valuable opportunity to place U.S.-Russian relations on firmer ground than they have been since 1917.

American Vital Interests in Central and Eastern Europe

We should be very clear about what the vital interests of the United States are in the area of the world that was controlled by the Soviet Union. That Russia is less concerned about conferring with the West over issues considered to be in its vital interests increases the chance that there will be a serious future failure of communication.

America's primary security interest today in Central and Eastern Europe is simply for Russia to continue to pursue a moderate (that is, nonthreatening) foreign policy towards the rest of Europe—and, above all, Western Europe. Our vital interest in Europe can be defined as the normalization of relations between the major powers. All other political and economic objectives are supportive of this primary goal. To be sure, political and economic reforms in Russia should help insure the institutionalization of a moderate foreign policy. But, it is time the West recognized that the pace of these reforms is a secondary issue.

The political fate of Ukraine is next in terms of importance to our vital security interests. Though it flies in the face of conventional wisdom, integration of the new democracies of Central Europe into the West is not yet in the vital interests of the West—and will not be unless Russia's ultra-nationalists come to power. Moreover, since a hasty attempt to integrate the Central European countries into NATO may preclude any chance of the West securing its primary security interest in Europe, the expansion of NATO at this time can only be considered *counter* to the security interests of the West.

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Lastly, the fate of the other Soviet successor states is of little importance to American security, and our policies towards these states should be crafted so as not to interfere with the pursuit of our major security interests. It may run counter to the beliefs of many who fought the cold war, but the Baltic states should be included in this last category. We should make it clear to the Baltic states that the Western powers never accepted any responsibility towards them other than upholding their right to sovereign independence. The United States should not pursue policies in the Baltics, the Caucasus, or Central Asia that may provoke confrontation with Russia in the absence of a tangible threat to the United States or our allies in Europe.

American Policy towards Russia

The United States should also jettison the goal of a near-term marketized Russia. Events within Russia over the past two years have demonstrated dramatically the destabilizing consequences of rapid movement towards a Western-style market economy simultaneously with adoption of a Western-style democracy. To put it bluntly, Russians do not share our faith in the free market system. Their commitment to the idea that the state should play a major role in the economy is as strong as it was under communism, and they will vote out any leadership that attempts to reduce the state's role in a manner that appears further to threaten their welfare. Therefore, it makes no sense to continue to put top priority on a policy that will result only in further estrangement between the United States and the Russian electorate. That does not mean that we have to abandon our goals of political and economic reforms but, rather, that we put them in proper perspective. Pursuit of "shock therapy" reform at the expense of good relations with Russia is counterproductive. Continued attempts to impose a Western-style economic system onto the Russians will only weaken the moderate reformers, strengthen the extremists, and feed the growing anti-Western (and anti-American) sentiment in Russia.

Stability, not rapid market reform, should be the United States's major goal for Russia. A destabilized Russia is a dangerous Russia. A destabilized Russia raises the risk of fragmentation or civil war in a nuclear-armed state. A destabilized Russia increases the likelihood that ultra-nationalists will exploit the instability to seize power. Clearly, it would serve our (and Europe's) security interests better if we placed prudent limits on our aspirations for Russian economic reforms in return for Russia's placing prudent limits on *its* definition of vital interests.

American Policy towards Ukraine

Ever since the heads of the three Slavic republics met in Belovezh in December 1991 and agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union, American policy towards Ukraine has been bifurcated: we have supported (albeit, lukewarmly)

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Ukrainian independence, while pressuring Kiev to weaken its own security by giving up its nuclear weapons to Russia. Now, as our relations with Russia become less certain, it is important for us to specify our interests in regions that can cause major problems between us and Moscow. Ukraine is unquestionably one of these regions.

Our major interest in Ukraine rests on its potential to serve as a military counterweight to a revanchist Russia—and even to a revanchist Germany. It would serve Western interests if Ukraine developed into a fully independent state, buttressed by a large military force. But before we endanger our relations with Russia by actively supporting an independent, well-armed Ukraine, we must decide whether Ukraine is a viable state with a population committed to independence.

Unfortunately, developments within Ukraine over the past year cast serious doubt on the assumption that Ukraine is viable. Severing the economic ties that bound Kiev's economy to Moscow proved far more disruptive to Ukraine than to Russia. With Ukraine's economy in free fall, many Ukrainian citizens, particularly in the eastern provinces and Crimea, have started to question the wisdom of independence. Support is growing throughout Ukraine (and not just among Ukraine's eleven million ethnic Russians) for closer ties and even re-integration with Russia. Only in Western Ukraine does commitment to an independent Ukraine remain strong. The result, as the spring 1994 elections clearly dramatized, is an increasingly polarized country.

If Ukraine is not a viable state—at least, not within its current borders—then no amount of American aid and encouragement will keep Ukraine whole and sovereign. Further, we must consider what will happen to Ukraine's present military force if the country, in whole or in part, reverts to Russia or becomes a willing satellite. The most likely case is that the Ukrainian armed forces would also return to Moscow's control. The reason is that the majority of Ukraine's armed forces are stationed in the eastern part of the country, which is the largest section and the one most likely section to seek reunion with Russia. Whether the Ukrainian army is divided up pro rata to the population, or based on current deployments, a large part of the force would probably end up Russian. In any case, the force that remained within a rump Ukraine would not constitute the counterweight we seek in Eastern Europe.

Accordingly, the United States should make an updated assessment regarding Ukraine's viability within its current borders. If we conclude that the country is viable (or can be viable given reasonable assistance) we should *strongly* support Ukrainian independence and military power. But even in that event, it would not be wise to include Ukraine in NATO since it would unnecessarily challenge Russian security interests.

If, on the other hand, it appears that Ukraine's pro-Russian populations in the eastern and central regions favor re-integration with Russia, we should start preparing now for the inevitable and focus on trying to reduce the Ukrainian arsenal so that it does not revert to Russian control. That might be accomplished through a trilateral agreement with Ukraine and Russia that provides economic aid in exchange for the destruction of a large part of the Ukrainian arsenal.

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American Policy towards Central Europe

The current leadership in Moscow has not indicated that it will attempt to dominate its former Warsaw Pact allies in Central Europe. It believes, however, that to satisfy Russia's security interests, the new states of Central Europe must be either friendly to Russia or remain neutral. That was clearly confirmed in the fall of 1993, when, after some initial confusion, President Yeltsin strongly opposed any move by NATO to incorporate the Central European states.

In response to Russia's objections, the West—led by the United States—proposed the Partnership for Peace program in an attempt to satisfy both the Central European countries and Russia. Those security experts in the United States who think it inevitable that Russia will seek to expand into Central Europe, tend to portray the American-sponsored Partnership for Peace program as if it were a new form of appeasement.

However, these criticisms appear to be unfounded. The Partnership for Peace program, according to Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, "is part of our larger strategy of being prepared for the worse, even as we prepare for the best." Specifically, the program "offers the states of Central and Eastern Europe a security relationship with NATO which could be the basis for a rapid and effective expansion of NATO."[6] Of course, the implicit "worse" is an expansionist Russia.

The real problem with the Partnership program, however, is that it could mean all things to all people—a situation that could result in confusion and mistrust at a time when clear understanding of everyone's intention is vital. The confusion about the program results in large part from NATO's failure to define a rationale for future membership in NATO and clear criteria for achieving it. That, in turn, results from the fact that the Partnership program is not a security measure designed to enhance defense but a political compromise aimed at appeasing those who want to join NATO.

It is argued here that the West should not only refrain from immediately granting NATO membership to Central Europe, but should place its highest priority on security cooperation with Russia. Specifically, the West should:

> concede that Russia has a vital interest in Central Europe's being neutral and excluded from any alliance that is hostile to Russia;
>
> confirm that the West nevertheless has a vital interest in Central Europe's being, at the very least, neutral towards the West, *and* that it does not consider Russian military dominance over the countries of Central Europe to be a *Russian* vital interest;

[6] Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, Speech to the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies and the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., Mar. 14, 1994.

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> maintain NATO forces capable of deployment in Central Europe in the event a future expansion-minded Russia threatens to do the same.

Of course, such a policy will draw a loud cry from the dyed-in-the-wool cold warriors, but it is based on a point that should not be overlooked: the importance of bringing the Central European states into the Western security alliance (through the Partnership for Peace Program or otherwise) depends entirely on Moscow's military intentions towards the West.

If Russian intentions towards West Europe remain non-threatening, then the United States's major security interest in Central and Eastern Europe is that of making sure this region is free of military forces threatening to the West—in other words, keeping the region, at a minimum, neutral. Moreover, incorporation of the countries of Central Europe into the Western defense alliances would not significantly enhance Western security. In fact, an attempt to incorporate them into the West would decrease Western security because Russia would then adopt a much more confrontational stance. At the least, it would make the emergence of an authoritarian, expansionist government in Moscow more likely. On the other hand, if Russia goes ahead and adopts an ultra-nationalist philosophy anyway, *then* the West has nothing to lose and everything to gain by expanding into Central Europe before Russia can convert its new philosophy into action.

What is more, a Russian *desire* to expand into Central Europe does not mean it has the capability to do so. Even if an expansionist regime took over in Moscow, it would first have to consolidate its own power and reassert central authority over the Russian provinces. After that, it would most likely turn its military attention to the other former republics—an action that would require military mobilization and training, to say nothing of the time needed to develop public support for the adventure, if any of the states resists. None of these actions could be done quickly, and the Western powers would have ample time to formulate their response.

Is This Appeasement?

Some will say that placing priority on Russia instead of incorporating the new states of Central Europe into NATO is appeasement. They will argue that the cold war was fought over Central Europe, and failure to incorporate that region into NATO amounts to a betrayal of the people who suffered under the harsh control of the Soviet Union.

However, that argument appears to be based on a revision of history. The West did not fight the cold war in order to incorporate the former communist region of Central Europe into the Western alliance. The cold war was forced on the West by the aggressive policy of the communist leadership in Moscow; we fought the cold war to prevent the expansion of communism. Moscow's political and military domination of the area that we again call Central Europe was a manifestation of this expansionist policy, and resulted in Europe's being

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divided into two armed camps. In fact, today there is good reason to believe that if NATO were to expand into the Central European region, Europe would again end up divided into two armed camps.

By contrast, the policy advanced here calls for a return to the original goal of the cold war: a leadership in Moscow that eschews expansionism in Europe and rejects the inevitability of a Europe divided between East and West.

At the same time, the policy takes into account the possibility that we may once again be frustrated in our quest for a responsible Russia. But that time has *not* yet arrived. That the current leadership in Moscow has decided Russia must look out for its own security does not equate to a determination to expand into Central Europe.

The post-Soviet politics in Russia are in turmoil, and will remain so for several more years. Now is not the time to abandon our efforts to obtain our primary security goal in Europe: moderation of Moscow's international behavior towards the West. To be sure, we must not forget the lessons of the 1940s; we must be prepared to act more swiftly in the event of a new Russian threat to Central Europe. But we must also remember the policy failures of the 1920s, when the Western democracies' grudging and niggardly support of the post-war Weimar government played into the hands of Nazis.

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Rethinking the New World Order

by Wallace J. Thies

The debate about the latest "new world order"—the third in this century alone—turns primarily on claims about the obsolescence of war and war-like behavior following the end of the cold war. Three claims in particular dominate recent discussions of the role the United States should play in the post–cold war world.

The first such assumption is that threats are disappearing: "Americans now face no menace from any foreign military power or any hostile ideology."[1] A second is that Americans are therefore justified in expecting a peace dividend "as the rationale for defense spending collapses under the collective influence of glasnost, declining support for NATO, and diminished international tensions."[2] A third is that, as military capabilities shrink in importance, "economic and social strengths will in many ways become the primary determinants of world influence."[3] But the events of the past three years should convince even the most pollyanna-ish observers that none of their assumptions are supportable—at least, not yet.

[1] Ernest May, "Intelligence: Backing into the Future," *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1992, p. 64. See also David Ignatius and Michael Getler, "The Great Non-Debate on American Foreign Policy," *The Washington Post,* Oct. 23, 1988; Stephen Rosenfeld, "Lighten Up, Fellows," *The Washington Post,* May 25, 1990; Joseph Nye, Jr., Kurt Biedenkopf, and Motoo Shiina, *Global Cooperation after the Cold War* (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1991), p. 2.

[2] Jeremy Rifkin, "Turning Arms into a 'Green Dividend,'" *The Washington Post,* Apr. 15, 1990. See also Dan Rostenkowski, "Cold Turkey: How to End the Deficit in 5 Years," *The Washington Post,* Mar. 11, 1990; *The Washington Post,* Jan. 26, 1992 (summarizes a proposal by Senators Ted Kennedy and Paul Wellstone to cut the defense budget by $210 billion over seven years to finance education and public works); *The Washington Post,* Jan. 28, 1992 (summarizes a proposal by Senator Tom Harkin to cut the defense budget by half).

[3] Senator David Boren, "The Intelligence Community: How Crucial?" *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1992, p. 52. See also the remarks by former president George Bush, quoted in Joseph Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs,* Spring 1992, p. 83; *The Washington Post,* June 4, 1989; Nye et al., *Global Cooperation after the Cold War,* p. 16; *The Washington Post,* Mar. 11, 1992.

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Has War Become Obsolete?

Much of the impetus behind claims that military threats are receding derives from developments in the former Soviet empire. Shortly after the revolutions of 1989—but before the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)—many analysts concluded that the likelihood of war had sharply declined because the Soviet Union had "lost the ability to maintain aggressive armies outside its borders."[4] John Mueller asserted that there is "a long-term trend away from war among the developed countries and that the long peace since World War II is less a peculiarity of the nuclear age than the logical conclusion of a substantial historical process." Since the eighteenth century, he argued, once-great or near-great powers have dropped out of the competition for primacy, and thanks to the world wars of this century, "warfare of *all* sorts seems to have lost its appeal within the developed world."[5] An important corollary is that states are more content than in the past to live within current borders—a judgment that appears derived largely, if not entirely, from a plummeting subjective probability of war in Europe.[6]

To be sure, boundaries in Western Europe are more secure than ever before and "military conflict among Western states is unthinkable,"[7] but there is little evidence of a worldwide trend toward the obsolescence of war.[8] On the contrary, in many places, current borders are not accepted as legitimate, and force remains an accepted way of resolving disputes. Bosnia-Serbia-Croatia, Hungary-Romania, India-Pakistan, the former Soviet republics, and the Korean peninsula come readily to mind. Moreover, even Mueller concedes that "outside the developed world . . . war still can seem cheap and tempting, [and] romantic notions about holy war and purifying revolution still persist and sometimes

[4] Don Oberdorfer, "New World Order Galloping into Position," *The Washinton Post,* Feb. 25, 1990. See also James Schlesinger, "Cut U.S. Forces in Europe—Now," *The Washington Post,* Feb. 4, 1990; Lally Weymouth, "Dissolving the Warsaw Pact," *The Washington Post,* Apr. 8, 1990; Senator Sam Nunn, "A New Europe—A New Military Strategy," *The Washington Post,* Apr. 24, 1990.

[5] John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security,* Fall 1988, pp. 55–79 (the quoted excerpts are from pp. 56 and 66, emphasis in original); and John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). See also the comments on Mueller by Robert Jervis, "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security,* Fall 1988, pp. 80–90; and Karl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?" *International Security,* Spring 1990, pp. 42–64.

[6] For Example, Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," *International Security,* Winter 1990/1991, reprinted in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *The Cold War and After* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 193–243. For a less sanguine view, see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security,* Summer 1990, pp. 5–56.

[7] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1993, p. 39.

[8] Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?" p. 60. See also Marvin Small and J. David Singer, "Conflict in the International System, 1816–1977: Historical Trends and Policy Futures," in J. David Singer et al., *Explaining War: Selected Papers from the Correlates of War Project* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979), pp. 61–74; Marvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982); Jack Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983); Evan Luard, *War in International Society* (London: I.B. Taurus, 1986); John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security,* Winter 1992/1993, reprinted in Lynn-Jones and Miller, eds., *The Cold War and After,* pp. 323–88, esp. pp. 342–46.

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prevail." Indeed, wars of that sort "are still far from obsolete and have killed millions since 1945."[9]

Finally, one must strain to detect any trend toward moderation and restraint in recent wars. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt and Syria launched twenty-eight Scud-B and Frog missiles at Israeli military targets; during the 1980s, Iraq and Iran launched hundreds of ballistic missiles at each other's cities and used chemical weapons against military and civilian targets;[10] during the 1990 Gulf war, Iraq launched dozens of Scud missiles at military and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel. Medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles are becoming increasingly common in the arsenals of Third World states.[11] Even in Europe, the ferocity of the fighting in and around Bosnia, the potential for war between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania, the disputes between Russia and the other post-Soviet successor states, and the latent antagonism between Greece and Turkey all suggest that war is far from obsolete in the southern and eastern part of the continent.[12]

Has the Security Dilemma Become Less Intense?

Every country has a security dilemma. A state that buys arms or reduces its military capability to make itself more secure, may, as a result, make itself less so, because a state can never know how its actions will affect other states. An increase in a state's military arsenal may deter another state's aggression, or it may provoke the rival state to build up its own military arsenal; a reduction of a state's military capability may provide an incentive for reconciliation between rivals or it may tempt an enemy state to use force. In northern and western Europe, the security dilemma is indeed less intense than during the cold war, when the Soviet Union maintained dozens of divisions and thousands of nuclear weapons relatively close to the inner-German border. But in other parts of the world, an opposite trend prevails. The spread of advanced jet fighters, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and the ability to manufacture nuclear warheads

[9] Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons," p. 78.

[10] *The Washington Post,* Apr. 5, 1988; *The Washington Post,* May 3, 1990.

[11] Thomas Mahnken and Timothy Hoyt, "Missile Proliferation and American Interests," *SAIS Review,* Winter-Spring 1990, pp. 101–16; Thomas Mahnken and Timothy Hoyt, "The Spread of Missile Technology to the Third World," *Comparative Strategy,* vol. 9, no. 3 (1990), pp. 245–63; Michael Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1993, p. 150.

[12] Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 168–71, and Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1991–1992,* vol. 71, no. 1 (1992), p. 25, stress this point; Van Evera concedes it in "Primed for Peace," pp. 232–36. See also István Deák, "Uncovering Eastern Europe's Dark History," *Orbis,* Winter 1989, pp. 51–65; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1989/1990, pp. 1–25; F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," *International Security,* Winter 1990/1991, pp. 58–91; Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security,* Winter 1990/1991, pp. 5–41; Dmitri Simes, "America and the Post-Soviet Republics," *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1992, pp. 81–82; Andrei Karatnycky, "The Ukrainian Factor," *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1992, pp. 101–4; Sabrina Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs,* Fall 1992, p. 96.

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intensifies the security dilemma for states that see their neighboring rivals acquiring what amounts to first-strike weaponry.[13] It is not surprising, therefore, that even as NATO states scramble to adjust their force structures downward, Third World governments scramble to adjust to a growing likelihood of preemptive strikes and preventive wars.

Preemptive wars are the product essentially of two factors: an influx of offensive weaponry that offers an attacker a potentially decisive advantage if used in a first strike, and a growing awareness in rivals of the consequences of passivity in the face of such a threat. As this mutual awareness percolates through the leaderships of rival states, the pressure on both to strike first is bound to intensify. And inasmuch as few Third World states can afford measures required to reduce vulnerability to surprise attack,[14] hasty decision making in a crisis is all the more likely.[15]

Preventive war, in contrast, is principally the product of differential growth rates in the military power of rival states, resulting in closing windows of opportunity for states that fear being overtaken by an opponent on the rise. The complexity of modern weaponry is such that Third World armies and air forces generally require months, if not years, to become skilled in the use of new systems. That suggests that opening and closing windows of opportunity will be a more or less constant feature of the post–cold war Third World. While the security dilemma faced by Israel has been unusually protracted, that country's successful preemption of an expected Arab attack in 1967, its preventive attacks on Egypt in 1956 and on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, and threats to attack Syrian chemical weapons facilities and missile stockpiles in 1988[16] provide fetching examples of the temptation to strike first. Even before the Gulf war, Israeli military sources were citing "provocative action" by Iraq as a potential justification for a "preventive" attack on Iraqi missile facilities.[17] The potential for preemptive and preventive wars remains high throughout Asia, and future wars are "likely to be far more deadly than any before, with the combatants using chemical weapons, missile attacks against population centers—and perhaps even nuclear weapons."[18]

[13] The dangers associated with a first-strike advantage are discussed by Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics,* Jan. 1978, pp. 167–214; Stephen Van Evera, *The Causes of War* (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1984), pp. 77–123; and Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 197–203.

[14] These fears can be intense even in the case of a militarily well-prepared state—for example, Israeli fears of a Syrian preemptive strike. See Yossie Melman and Dan Raviv, "Why Nobody Will Win the Next War in the Mideast," *The Washington Post,* Nov. 6, 1988.

[15] Ole Holsti, "The 1914 Case," *American Political Science Review,* June 1965, pp. 365–78; Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

[16] *The Washington Post,* Feb. 24, 1988; *Time,* July 4, 1988.

[17] *The Washington Post,* Apr. 12, 1990.

[18] Ignatius and Getler, "The Great Non-Debate on American Foreign Policy." See also William Lewis and Christopher Joyner, "The Runaway Arms Race in the Third World," *The Washington Post,* Oct. 25, 1988; Gary Milhollin, "Why Are We Helping the Third World Go Nuclear?" *The Washington Post,* Apr. 1, 1990.

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Greater International Cooperation

International cooperation is indeed on the rise, in the sense that the foreign policies of the advanced democratic states increasingly take the form of negotiations conducted by trade and functional ministries within a framework of rules and procedures set by international organizations like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.[19] The resulting routinization of international affairs serves to defuse points of conflict that formerly inflamed interstate relations.[20] States that once dealt with foreign policy problems by massing forces along the frontier or dispatching gunboats now deploy battalions of lawyers to argue about rules governing currency conversion, chlorofluorocarbon emissions, greenhouse gases, and so on. This development accords well with the political cultures of the advanced democratic states, which have long been attracted to the notion that relations between states should be governed by legal codes similar to those that regulate political and economic life within a well-ordered state.

There is, however, a dark side to this particular change. As national economies become more tightly intertwined, borders become more porous and societies become more easily penetrated by outside influences, not all of which are benign.[21] As trade increases, advanced technology spreads to more states, and it becomes easier for peaceful and bellicose states alike to buy on the open market whatever they want. As computers become smaller, cheaper, and more powerful, Third World states more easily acquire the machinery needed to design and build weapons of mass destruction. As advanced states reduce their militaries and dispose of surplus equipment, a portion of that materiel seems likely to find its way into the hands of brokers and smugglers who care little about who their customers are. Export controls will become harder to enforce.[22]

The Rich *Are* Different

The most distinctive feature of the latest "new world order" is not to be found in the withering away of war but in a widening gap between the conditions of international life in the advanced democratic states versus those in the Third World. Perhaps the portion of the world within which war is obsolete can be—slowly—enlarged. But outside of that portion, advanced weaponry, nationalist rivalries, and disputed borders suggest an increased danger

[19] Donald Puchala and Stuart Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970s: The Search for a Perspective," *International Organization,* Spring 1974, pp. 251–52; Nye et al., *Global Cooperation after the Cold War,* p. 13.

[20] Puchala and Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970s," *International Organization,* pp. 252–53.

[21] See, for example, the remarks by General Paul Gorman, U.S.A. (ret.), quoted in *The Washington Post,* Feb. 24, 1988. See also Elaine Shannon, "Why We're Facing a World of Noriegas," *The Washington Post,* Oct. 23, 1988; Nye, "What New World Order?" pp. 85–86.

[22] Suggested by Robert Samuelson, "Superpower Sweepstakes," *The Washington Post,* Feb. 15, 1989.

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of preemptive and preventive wars among Third World states. Indeed, the very ideas and technologies that proved stabilizing and reassuring to the great powers during the cold war may prove destabilizing and unsettling in the post–cold war Third World.

John Lewis Gaddis has suggested that one of the foundations for the long peace between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Second World War was the reconnaissance satellite, which made it possible for both sides "to evaluate each other's capabilities to a degree that is totally unprecedented in the history of relations between the great powers."[23] Among Third World countries, whose forces are smaller and more vulnerable to surprise attack than those of the United States or the former Soviet Union, reconnaissance satellites may facilitate preemptive strikes by revealing the location of hostile targets.[24] States whose forces fall short of a second-strike capability *and* lie naked beneath the eye of a foe's satellite(s) will be tempted to strike first, while states with access to satellite intelligence will be tempted to take advantage of windows of opportunity precisely because of their awareness of the foe's incentive to preempt.

Cutbacks in the defense budgets and force structures of NATO members and former WTO members may perversely fuel arms races among Third World states.

During the cold war, negotiated cuts in force structures were widely thought to be one means of reducing the likelihood and destructiveness of hypothetical wars. In the post–cold war world, cutbacks in the defense budgets and force structures of NATO members and former WTO members may perversely fuel arms races among Third World states. First, the supply of weapons potentially available for sale—including nuclear weapons and delivery systems—has sharply increased.[25] Secondly, the global arms bazaar promises to reduce unemployment, earn hard currency, and sustain vital industrial capacity for NATO and former WTO states alike. Thirdly, the concomitant reduction of First World military forces disarms the very "policemen" needed to maintain a watchful presence in potential trouble spots. The paradox of the new world order, therefore, is that the more vigorously the advanced countries liquidate their defense establishments, the less influence they can exert in their efforts

[23] John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace," *International Security,* Spring 1986, p. 124.

[24] Israel orbited its first satellite in Sept. 1988; in Dec. 1989, Iraq became the first Arab country to test a rocket capable of placing a satellite in orbit.

[25] See, for example, John Deutch, "The New Nuclear Threat," *Foreign Affairs,* Fall 1992, pp. 120, 129; Leonard Spector, "Strategic Warning and New Nuclear States," Conference on Improving Strategic Warning for National Security Decision-Making in the Environment of the New World Order, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., Sept. 27–28, 1993.

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to enlarge the zone of peace and freedom in the Third World. If the East-West conflict is put to rest, only to help spawn new South-South and even North-South conflicts, then our purported victory in the cold war will be, at best, problematic.

Challenges to U.S. Policy

This widening gap between the conditions of international life as experienced by the advanced democratic states and those suffered by Third World states suggests three challenges for U.S. policy. First, belief in a new world order and the resulting peace dividend may undermine our ability to anticipate and cope with unpleasant surprises in the Third World. Indeed, the diffusion of first-strike weaponry around the world (including ballistic missiles and chemical and nuclear warheads) means that we can no longer rely on traditional indicators of impending hostilities, such as reserve call-ups and troop movements toward frontiers, while the sheer destructiveness of weapons involved suggests that Third World wars are more likely to imperil nearby countries and even U.S. citizens, investments, and armed forces in the vicinity. In the worst cases, Third World rogues may even acquire the ability to threaten the United States itself.[26]

Secondly, the inclination of Americans and Europeans to equate the new world order with peace breaking out all over has not as yet diminished their impulse to do "good deeds" overseas. Democracies often drift into conflicting policy currents at the conclusion of a great struggle—on the one hand, a drift toward normalcy, retrenchment, and an end to sacrifices and controls; on the other hand, an urge to remake the world so that another such struggle will not be necessary. A comparison of the new world order of the 1990s to that which emerged after the Second World War is especially instructive.

A new (in the sense of structurally different) international order did emerge after 1945, based on a bipolar distribution of power, a universal international system (the result of rapid decolonization leading to dozens of new states during the 1950s and the 1960s), and power-projection capabilities that permitted military intervention on a scale never before achieved. In the case of the post–cold war world, bipolarity is weak, power-projection capabilities are scaled back, but the universalist impulse grows in strength as communications improve and news media compete to publicize the latest war, riot, or atrocity in what used to be thought "distant corners" of the globe.

There is thus a certain irony in the supplanting of the bipolar cold war order by the latest new world order. In the years after 1945, the United States was by almost every measure the world's preeminent power. Yet, the Truman administration, after a brief flirtation with universalism (in the form of extravagant

[26] Milhollin, "Why Are We Helping the Third World Go Nuclear?"; Mahnken and Hoyt, "The Spread of Missile Technology to the Third World," pp. 255–56.

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rhetorical claims accompanying the Truman Doctrine), quickly became fixated on the *limits* of American power. The United States, it reasoned, was not omnipotent, and priorities would have to be set even if this meant accepting losses at some points around the globe. Aid to Europe was the key to reconstituting some semblance of a balance of power there; hence, the defense budget was deliberately held down to free funds for the Marshall Plan, while aid to China was severely restricted because, in the administration's judgment, even a great deal of aid would not affect the outcome of the civil war there. The political consequences of a communist victory in the Chinese civil war were judged harsh but necessary in light of the limits on American resources.[27]

In the 1990s, there is, for the moment at least, a reluctance to accept any diminution of American responsibilities overseas. Defense budgets and force structures are being slashed, the foreign aid budget is hostage to the federal deficit and Congressional moods, while multilateral initiatives are constrained by recessions in Europe and Japan. Yet, these developments have not been accompanied by any redefinition of American interests overseas.[28] Instead, the Bush and Clinton administrations have been trying to do everything from maintaining forward deployments in Europe and Asia, to resisting local aggressions, to peacekeeping operations, to state building in anarchic societies, to humanitarian relief, to drug interdiction in the Caribbean—even as budgets and force structures are cut. This is a prescription for doing nothing well and portends future armed forces that are less than the sum of their parts because the parts no longer fit together very well.

More important, trying to do everything is bound to provoke a series of quarrels with allies over who pays for what, the outcome of which is more likely to be paralysis than effective cooperation. Allies that plead poverty in an attempt to shift the burden of policing the new world order to someone else are unlikely to invest the resources needed to upgrade the intelligence-gathering capabilities necessary for tracking the spread of First World weaponry to Third World states, or to maintain the forces needed to deter or intervene in regional conflicts. Allies that argue over who should do what are unlikely to design an effective division of labor. Allies that argue *are* likely to do things they will later regret, like severing relationships between their intelligence agencies or purposely refusing to move quickly in response to emerging dangers in the hope that someone else will go first (a kind of international Alphonse-Gaston routine).

Last but not least, the United States is bound to be tempted to use subtle (and not-so-subtle) threats to withdraw American forces or withhold support unless and until its allies are more forthcoming on trade and international economic cooperation.[29] Such "linkage" among *allies* is a no-win situation. It

[27] Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), pp. 351–52; H. Bradford Westerfield, *The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1963), pp. 106–7, 129; Wallace J. Thies, "Learning United States Policy toward Europe," in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds., *Learning U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 160–64.

[28] Alan Tonelson, "Superpower without a Sword," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, pp. 166–80.

[29] Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," pp. 272–78.

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can only breed resentment and shatter the coalition that contained the Soviet Union, won the cold war, and made it possible for academics to ponder issues like the obsolescence of war. Threats to withdraw American forces or to sever alliance relationships run the risk of frightening allies like Germany and Japan into full rearmament. One of the great virtues of the bipolar cold war order was that it converted former military rivals into cheerleaders who welcomed increases in each other's forces. But a determined effort by either Germany or Japan to become "normal" great powers would revive suspicions that have lain dormant for nearly half a century now, intensify the security dilemma in Europe and Asia, and bring about a renewed competition among multiple great powers that would probably be more dangerous than the bipolar competition that characterized the cold war.[30]

Suggestions that defense budgets and force structures can safely be slashed are based on a shortsighted view.

That leads directly to the third challenge likely to arise during the 1990s. What if new great powers appear to challenge the position of the United States as the sole superpower? Suggestions that defense budgets and force structures can safely be slashed because military threats have by and large disappeared are based on a shortsighted view of the ebb and flow of international affairs. Deep cuts now will have an impact for years to come: armed forces, once demobilized, take years to rebuild; intelligence-gathering satellites require years to be designed, built, and then launched; ships and planes do not materialize instantly off an assembly line. Between 1933 and 1939 (a period roughly comparable to the seven years left before the end of this century), Germany flung off the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles, re-militarized the Rhineland, bullied Austria into accepting political union, took the Sudetenland and later most of the rest of Czechoslovakia, and started the Second World War. Between 1941 and 1949, the Soviet Union pushed invading German armies off its territory, seized control of Eastern Europe, and exploded an atomic bomb. The absence of a militarily powerful challenger now is no guarantee that the new world order will seem as benign a few years hence, but deep cuts now in defense budgets and force structures will all but guarantee that the United States will

[30] The dangers associated with multipolarity are discussed more fully in Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Summer 1964, pp. 881–909; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), chap. 8; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, Spring 1990, pp. 137–68; and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future." Van Evera, in "Primed for Peace," argues that a post–cold war multipolar order will be no more dangerous than cold war bipolarity because other, more important causes of war offense—dominance, militarism, hyper-nationalism—have been defused by technological, political, and social changes since the Second World War.

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be ill-equipped to respond quickly and effectively if the new world order proves more threatening than current estimates suggest.

Coping with the Post–Cold War World

From this mix of opportunities and dangers inherent in the post–cold war world arise three prescriptions for U.S. policy. First and foremost, we must turn a deaf ear to the sirens' song: the argument that war is obsolete. Among the advanced democratic states, dreams of conquest have long since been supplanted by the pursuit of wealth. But elsewhere in the world, foreign policy too often continues to be driven by "historical animosities or a desire for prestige or loot."[31] The ability of the United States and its allies to deter and, if need be, contain regional conflicts will depend on armed forces capable of maintaining a watchful presence near trouble spots or able to get there quickly in an emergency. That means army divisions, naval task forces, tactical fighter squadrons, and their associated support units—*not* Stealth bombers, strategic nuclear weapons, or nuclear attack submarines. In the post–cold war world, the latter are an expensive luxury that drain scarce defense dollars from forces better suited for the preemptive and preventive wars on the horizon. Why, then, have the Bush and Clinton administrations, even as they talk of a larger role for the United States in managing the new world order, allowed the number of ready divisions, carrier task forces, and tactical fighter squadrons to decline? Was it for the sake of deficit reduction and the elusive peace dividend? If so, then their foreign policies are at best rhetorical, and at worse foolish.

All three of the services are currently undergoing a tumultuous period of reduction and restructuring, but the impact of recent cuts has been particularly severe on the navy—the service most often called upon to project power to distant regions. In November 1979, after the U.S. embassy in Tehran was seized by Iranian radicals, it took the carrier *Midway* and its escorts roughly ten days to steam from the western Pacific to the Arabian Sea. Thereafter, the presence of two carrier battle groups near the Persian Gulf was sustained during 1980 and 1981, essentially, by stripping both the Mediterranean and the western Pacific of one of the two carrier groups normally deployed there. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, it took four days for the *Independence* and its escorts (which were already in the Indian Ocean) to arrive in the Gulf of Oman, six days for the *Eisenhower* and its escorts to move from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea (via the Suez Canal), sixteen days for the *Saratoga* and the battleship *Wisconsin* to reach the Mediterranean, twenty-one days for the *Saratoga* to reach the Red Sea (replacing the *Eisenhower,* which then returned to the United States), and roughly a month for the *Kennedy* to reach the Mediterranean, where it replaced the *Saratoga.* Put differently, despite the most expensive

[31] James Schlesinger, "Innocence Shattered," *The Washington Post,* Aug. 5, 1990.

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peacetime military buildup ever during the 1980s, the projection of naval power during Desert Shield was only marginally faster than a decade earlier and was accomplished to a large extent by stripping carrier groups from their normal patrol areas.

The Reagan administration poured money into naval shipbuilding during the 1980s in pursuit of a six-hundred-ship navy to be organized around a core of nineteen capital ships—fifteen large-deck carriers and four World War II vintage battleships brought out of retirement. The quest for a navy embodying such a potent mix of power-projection capabilities ultimately fell short of its goal for reasons that were more structural than financial. In 1981, nine of the thirteen carriers in the fleet were already two decades old, and the seven years required to build and outfit a Nimitz-class carrier and the lack of shipbuilding capacity (only one shipyard in the country has the facilities needed to build such a ship) meant that the carrier fleet would eventually face a period of irreversible decline no matter how much money was thrown at the problem.[32]

Have the Bush and Clinton administrations allowed the number of ready divisions, carrier task forces, and tactical fighter squadrons to decline for the sake of deficit reduction and the elusive peace dividend? If so, then their foreign policies are at best rhetorical, and at worse foolish.

A thirteen-carrier fleet was sustained during the 1980s, essentially, by increasing the expected life span from thirty to forty-five years (by means of the Service Life Extension Program) and by retaining in the fleet two World War II vintage ships (*Midway* and *Coral Sea*). The result was that Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were supported mostly by carriers that were nearing the end of their service lives. All told, eight of the thirteen carriers available for deployment at the time the Iraqis invaded Kuwait played a role in Desert Shield and/or Desert Storm. Of those thirteen carriers, three have already been retired (*Midway, Ranger,* and *Forrestal*) and five more will leave the fleet over the next fifteen years (*Saratoga, Independence, Enterprise, Kitty Hawk,* and *Constellation).* Only four replacements will be available (*Lincoln, Washington, Stennis, United States*), which means that any replay of Desert Shield/Desert Storm during the first decade of the next century will have to be carried out by a carrier fleet roughly one-third smaller than that available in 1990. Put differently, a Desert Storm–type operation a decade hence would

[32] The navy's problems in this regard are described more fully in Mark Randol and Wallace J. Thies, "The Opportunity Costs of Large-Deck Carriers," *Naval War College Review,* Summer 1990, pp. 10–15.

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require almost the entire carrier fleet, leaving little in reserve to respond to contingencies elsewhere.

What, if anything, could be done to improve the navy's ability to maintain a presence near potential spots where American interests are threatened? A growing danger of preemptive and preventive wars among Third World states suggests that the navy needs more ships capable of performing presence and power-projection missions. What it has at present, and will have unless current policy is changed, is a dwindling band of capable but expensive supercarriers. Because of the long lead times required to build new Nimitz-class carriers, the only promising solution in the short term is to supplement the remaining large-deck carriers (that is, carriers that can launch any of the navy's tactical aircraft, regardless of size) with a new class of smaller, less expensive, but still very capable carriers equipped with vertical and short take-off aircraft (VSTOL) like the AV-8B Harrier.[33] A fleet of VSTOL carriers would allow the navy to use existing frigates, destroyers, cruisers, and Marine amphibious units to form additional, independently deployable task forces. Improving the navy's ability to perform the power-projection mission by means of a new class of ships will not be cheap (VSTOL carriers cost about $1 billion each, versus $3.5 billion for Nimitz-class ships), but in a world of heavily armed regional powers, it will probably be cheaper in the long run to buy more deterrence now than to allow future Saddams to run wild, or to gear up from scratch to defeat them.

A similar line of argument can be used to set priorities for dividing available defense funds among the services and for choosing among each service's menu of existing and future programs. A post–cold war military establishment that is merely a small-scale replica of that which existed during the 1980s will not be a good match for the challenges most likely to arise during the rest of the 1990s and beyond. Among the services, naval task forces and marine amphibious units offer a better fit to the demands of the post–cold war world than army divisions and air force tactical fighter squadrons, because the former are largely self-contained, self-supporting, do not require extensive land bases, and are less dependent on scarce and costly airlift than the latter. Within each service, judgments about the worth of specific programs will depend on the contribution that each can make to preventing or containing preemptive and preventive wars among Third World states. Within the navy, for example, nuclear attack submarines will be less important than surface combatants that can maintain a visible presence (for deterrence or power projection) near crisis spots. All three services should remember that American armed forces are already the most sophisticated in the world. Quantity will be needed in the near future more than enhanced quality.

A second prescription for coping with the post–cold war world is to recognize that the new world order of the 1990s does not mean a diminished role for the alliances with Europe and Japan. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, biological—in combination with virtually

[33] Ibid., pp. 19–29.

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unstoppable yet vulnerable (while on the ground) ballistic missile delivery systems means that embryonic balances of terror in the Third World are growing more fragile, not less so. Reversing this trend will require decades of concerted action by the democratic states in the sharing of intelligence, tightening of export controls, and sending of coordinated military deployments to trouble spots.

Even if the danger of future preemptive and preventive wars were not increasing, the American alliances with Western Europe and Japan would still be worth a great deal in the post–cold war world. Together they represent the best opportunity available to build an international concert of powers with the economic and military wherewithal to manage the global economy, coordinate peacekeeping and humanitarian relief activities, and ameliorate the consequences of civil war or anarchy in places like Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.[34] These alliances should not be allowed to atrophy because of annoying disagreements about trade issues. They should instead be used as a forum for increasingly regular consultations about a broader spectrum of issues.

Thirdly, we must recognize that the only constant in international politics is the unexpected. The Bush administration let it be known early in its tenure that it anticipated four years of careful, steady-as-she-goes management of U.S. foreign policy.[35] Instead, "the abrupt end of the cold war, an unanticipated hot war in the Persian Gulf, and the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union astonished almost everyone, whether in government, the academy, the media, or the think tanks."[36] What have been the real results? First, Russia and Eastern Europe, while no longer competitors with the West, are now transformed into rivals of the Third World states for access to the limited aid budgets of the Western democracies. Secondly, the diminution of East-West competition has provided extra incentives to Third World states to pursue more and better weaponry as a way of mitigating their own marginalization in world politics.[37]

So what constitutes effective preparation for the new surprises inevitably in store? The proliferation of ballistic missile systems and their increasing range and sophistication suggest that demand for strategic warning will increase substantially in years to come because more countries will have to be watched more closely for indicators of a surprise attack. Better intelligence will be essential, but so too are efforts to defuse emerging dangers—for example, by offering to buy nuclear warheads and delivery systems from the cash-strapped successor states to the former Soviet Union.[38] A suppliers' cartel made up of states capable of exporting sophisticated weaponry would not be a bad idea either. In the long run, it might well be cheaper to subsidize defense conversion in the former Soviet Union and China than to cope with advanced weaponry in the hands of ambitious regional powers.

[34] See also Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," *Foreign Affairs,* Spring 1992, pp. 64–82.

[35] *The Washington Post,* Apr. 9, 1989.

[36] Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," p. 323.

[37] Suggested by Nye et al., *Global Cooperation after the Cold War,* p. 17.

[38] Suggested by Daniel Yergin, "The New World Disorder," *The Washington Post Book World,* Jan. 1, 1992, p. 11.

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Ideas about strategic warning should also be reoriented to incorporate a longer time horizon and a more overtly political content. A decade can seem like an eternity in American electoral politics, but it is only a moment in the lifetime of formerly great powers like Russia and China. Both are preoccupied with enormous problems, but even a few years of sustained economic growth would likely lead both to rediscover ambitions and interests that are for the moment out of reach.[39] Should Russia or China, not to mention Germany or Japan, recover the means and the will to pose new strategic threats to Western interests, the United States will truly have "lost the peace." So even as we re-orient our *military* posture to confront today's conflicts born in a militarized Third World, our diplomatic efforts must focus on preventing a recurrence of strategic conflicts among the world's great powers, former friends as well as former enemies.[40]

[39] Concerning the prospects for Russia, see Simes, "America and the Post-Soviet Republics," pp. 73–74, 76–77; Walter Laqueur, "Russian Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1992/1993, pp. 103–16; Dimitri Simes, "The Return of Russian History," *Foreign Affairs: Agenda 1994* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), pp. 28–42. Concerning China, see Barber Conable, Jr., and David Lampton, "China: The Coming Power," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1992/1993, pp. 133–49; and Nicholas Kristof, "The Rise of China," *Foreign Affairs: Agenda 1994,* pp. 73–87.

[40] Suggested by Nye et al., *Global Cooperation after the Cold War,* p. 44.

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Documentation

Rules of Engagement for U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia

by Bruce D. Berkowitz

Like most military units, the U.N. Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia operate under explicit Rules of Engagement (ROE), or written orders defining when the troops can use force. The ROE printed here were issued by General Jean Cot, then commander of U.N. forces, and were intended to establish the conditions under which the forces could use their weapons as they carry out the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. (As of this writing, the ROE were due to be re-issued under the current U.N. commander, General Michael Rose, but were expected to be similar.)

ROE have a two-way function. First, they are intended to make sure that military operations are consistent with policy objectives; civilian leaders can review the ROE to determine if they are too violent, too risky, or result in too much collateral damage. Secondly, ROE are intended to provide a clear set of guidelines for the commander and his troops, under the presumption that the military's role is to carry out orders and not make policy decisions.

These ROE were drafted to conform with Security Council Resolution 721, which authorized the Bosnian operation. They presumably were reviewed and approved (or at least were not rejected) by the secretary general, who reports regularly to the Security Council. The Security Council indirectly controls how U.N. forces are used through the process of approving the authorizing resolution and the subsequent resolutions that establish general policy for U.N. forces after they are deployed. The United States is a permanent member of the Security Council and has veto power over Security Council resolutions.

The ROE for U.N. forces in Bosnia are much more detailed and complex than the rules of engagement a U.S. military commander would likely use. The

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ROE for a typical U.S.-led military operation are about a page in length and would not use the "option" or "decision tree" approach used here. Military forces need to know exactly what they are supposed to do when deployed and often must act quickly; they don't have time to analyze long documents.

U.S. military commanders—familiar with the micromanagement problems encountered in Vietnam and the disasters caused in part by the ambiguous orders issued in the 1983 Lebanon peacekeeping operation—tend to insist on simple and concise instructions. Also, U.S. commanders want to make sure that their troops have a clear understanding of their mission and what they are supposed to do.

The complexity of the UNPROFOR rules of engagement is partly a result of the difficulty in establishing leadership in the multinational U.N. headquarters in Bosnia. Unlike Desert Storm, in which the United States was the clear leader and the U.N. role was secondary, U.N. forces in Bosnia are in fact operating under the leadership of the United Nations. The ROE thus are a political document as well as a military document, as General Cot and General Rose lack the discretion that General Norman Schwarzkopf enjoyed.

A more significant flaw with the U.N. Rules of Engagement, however, is that they could leave U.N. forces in a highly vulnerable position. Under the ROE, U.N. forces cannot carry out offensive operations without specific approval; must use the minimum force necessary; can use their weapons only as a last resort; cannot retaliate; and must cease fire when an opponent ceases fire. Thus, hostile forces (usually Bosnian Serbs in this case) can ratchet up their provocation to just under the threshold beyond which UNPROFOR can use force. It is also possible that they could draw U.N. forces into a vulnerable position and then attack them. The resulting military and political loss could be heavy, along the lines of Beirut in 1983 and Somalia in 1993.

The underlying problem is that the ROE, which might work in a true peacekeeping operation, are being used in a situation in which there is no peace. The U.N. forces are expected to operate in the Bosnian countryside, securing safe areas, protecting civilians, and monitoring the opposing forces (see the section on "Cordon and Search Operations"). Yet, the ROE do not allow the forces the means to carry out such operations effectively or at an acceptable level of risk.

The UNPROFOR Rules of Engagement raise important questions concerning the ability of the United Nations to play a leading role in peacekeeping and whether the United States should commit U.S. military forces to operations governed by such rules. U.S. leaders have so far refused to commit ground forces to Bosnia, but they did commit troops to Somalia and have considered committing forces to U.N.-led operations in Haiti. It is also important to note that the United States, with its disproportionate weight in Security Council voting, bears a disproportionate responsibility for preventing the United Nations from adopting such ill-advised policies.

One must also seriously question whether the U.N. military commitment can be expected to exert any kind of leverage on a political settlement in Bosnia. The rules of engagement are so restrictive that U.N. forces are at a

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fundamental disadvantage. Bearing in mind the maxim that diplomacy cannot win at the table that which is lost on the battlefield, it would seem that the U.N.-sponsored negotiations to achieve a settlement in Bosnia are dubious.

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Force Commander's Policy Directive Number (13) Rules of Engagement Part I: Ground Forces

General

1. The conduct of military operations is controlled by the provisions of international and national law. Within this legal framework, the United Nations (U.N.) establishes the parameters within which the U.N. Forces can operate. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the means by which the U.N. can provide direction and guidance to commanders at all levels governing the use of force. They are approved by the U.N. and may only be changed with their authority.

2. The U.N. has stated, in the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991) dated 11 December 1991, Annex III, para 4: "Those personnel who were armed would have standing instructions to use of force to the minimum extent necessary and normally only in self-defence." The UNPROFOR is equipped with weapons for defensive purposes only. The use of weapons is authorized normally only in self-defence. Retaliation is forbidden. Self-defence includes resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force from discharging its duties under the mandate for the UNPROFOR. In applying these rules the principle of minimum force is to be strictly adhered to. The definitions provided at Annex A should be understood and used.

3. The ROE stated in this document apply to all nations contributing to the UNPROFOR. The ROE are written in form of prohibitions or permissions, Annexes B and C refer. Issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Issued as permissions, they will be guidance to commanders that certain specific actions may be taken if they are judged necessary to achieving the aim of the mission.

4. Changes to these rules will be issued to suit each operational situation as it occurs or to implement changes in the political policy. The classification of these rules is U.N. RESTRICTED.

Authority

5. UNPROFOR personnel may use their weapons:

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a. to defend themselves, other U.N. personnel, or persons and areas under their protection against direct attack, acting always under the order of the senior officer/soldier at the scene;

b. to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force from discharging its duties; or,

c. to resist deliberate military or para-military incursions into the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) or Safe Areas.

Rules of Engagement

[Note that the following rules No. 01 through No. 07 describe options in terms of which the key paragraph, 13, sets forth the "normal, daily situation."]

6. Rule No. 01: Authority to Carry Arms

   Option A: No authority.

   Option B: Authority granted to carry weapons.

7. Rule No. 02: Status of Weapons

   Option A: Weapons will be carried with loaded magazines.

   Option B: Weapons will be carried charged and made safe.

8. Rule No. 03: Response to Hostile Intent (without Use of Fire)

   Option A: Observe and report, withdraw in order to preserve own Force.

   Option B: Observe and report, stay in place. Make contact and establish liason with opposing Force(s) and/or local authorities concerned.

   Option C: Observe and report, stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means without opening fire (i.e.: cock weapons, deploy troops, etc.).

9. Rule No. 04: Response to Hostile Act (with Use of Fire)

   Option A: take immediate protection measures, observe and report. Warn the aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means. Warning shots are authorized (See paragraph 15 and Annex A). Report action taken. If the hostile act does not cease and life is threatened, Option B can be ordered by the troop commander.

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Option B: On order, Open Fire (See paragraph 16 and Annex A). Report action taken.

Note: In both Option A and Option B the following manoeuvres are authorized (Depending on the situation, orders and reports given by the troop commander):

(1) Withdraw in order to preserve own Force,

(2) Stay in place and defend, or

(3) Move through to escape and preserve own force.

10. Rule No. 05: Response to Hostile Act (Self-Defence)

Anytime, in self-defence situations, take immediate protection measures and/or return fire without challenging (See paragraphs 16, 17 and Annex A). Report action taken.

11. Rule No. 06: Disarmament of Paramilitary, Civilian and Soldiers

Option A: No authorization granted.

Option B: Authorization is granted if failure to do so prevents the UNPROFOR from carrying out its task. In doing so use minimum necessary and proportional force up to and including use of fire, if hostile intent so warrants, or a hostile act is committed. Hand over to appropriate authorities at the earliest opportunity.

12. Rule No. 07: Control of Weapons Systems

Option A: Manning, in preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of the forces in conflict is prohibited.

Option B: Designated activity (See Note) in the presence of the forces in conflict is prohibited.

Note: Designated activities in this rule will be signalled from the following list, using the numbered prefix:

(1) Overt manning of weapons.

(2) Movement of weapons.

(3) Firing of weapons.

(4) Others (to be specified).

13. In the normal, daily situation the following ROE status applies:

Rule No. 01, OPTION B

Rule No. 02, OPTION A

Rule No. 03, OPTION B

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Rule No. 04, OPTION A

Rule No. 05, PERMANENT

Rule No. 06, OPTION A

Rule No. 07, OPTION A

14. Changes in normal status of ROE as described in para 13 for the Force as a whole will be ordered by the Force Commander. Sector Commanders are authorized to change ROE within their sectors and to delegate this authority to battalion commanders if time does not permit sector Commanders' authorization.

Challenging Procedure

15. The following challenging procedure is to be followed in all cases except as outlined in para 17 unless the requirement to fire immediately in self-defence dictates otherwise:

a. Warn the aggressor to stop.

b. Repeat the warnings as many times as possible to ensure that the aggressor has understood the situation.

c. Charge weapons if not already authorized.

d. Fire warning shots in the air.

e. If the warnings are ignored, on order open fire (See Annex A).

Principles of Opening Fire

16. When it becomes necessary to open fire (Rules 04 and 05), the following principles apply:

a. Action which may reasonably be expected to cause collateral damage is prohibited.

b. Fire is to be used only until the aggressor has stopped firing.

c. Retaliation is forbidden.

d. Minimum force is to be used at all times.

Opening Fire without Challenging

17. The only circumstances in which it is permissible to open fire without challenging is in Self-Defence. When an attack by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that even a moment's delay could:

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a. lead to death or serious injury to the U.N. personnel;

b. lead to death or serious injury to persons whom it is the UNPROFOR duty to protect; or,

c. the property which UNPROFOR has been ordered to guard with firearms is actually under attack.

Cordon and Search Operations

18. Cordon and Search Operations are a military responsibility but, in general, the military will establish the Cordon, and the police will conduct the Search. Searches of buildings are not to be conducted at random. They will only be carried out in response to specific evidence that indicates the probable presence of a violation of the Vance Plan[1] or U.N. Security Council Resolution. The military have overall responsibility for initiating, and for the command and control of all Cordon and Search Operations. Searches should be carried out by local police. In the event they refuse to co-operate, UNCIVPOL [United Nations Civil Police] will carry out the Search with a security element (the minimum necessary) from the military inside the building. Cordon and Search Operations will be conducted using the principles outlined at Annex D.

[signed]
Jean Cot
General
Force Commander

Attachments:

Annex A - Definitions
Annex B - Rules of Engagement
Annex C - Instructions to Military Personnel
Annex D - Principles of Cordon and Search Operations

Annex A: Definitions

Self Defence: Action to protect oneself or one's unit, when faced with an instant and overwhelming need, leaving no choice of means and no time for deliberation.

[1] The peace plan, proposed in January 1993 by mediators Cyrus R. Vance of the United Nations and Lord Owen of the European Community, called for the division of Bosnia into ten autonomous provinces. According to the plan, each of the republics' major ethnoreligious groups—Muslims, Serbs, and Croats—would administer three provinces. The three groups would share power in the tenth province, and the capital city of Sarajevo would be declared an open city patrolled by U.N. peacekeeping forces—*Eds.*

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Hostile Intent: Hostile intent is an action(s) which appears to be preparatory to an aggressive action against personnel or equipment of Peacekeeping Forces and/or personnel or property placed under their responsibilty.

Hostile Act: A hostile act is any aggressive action against personnel or equipment of Peacekeeping Forces and/or personnel or property placed under their responsibility. When deciding on appropriate reaction by Peacekeeping Forces, it has to be kept in mind that the use of armed force is only permitted in the presence of an attack or imminent attack.

Minimum Force: The minimum authorized degree of force which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances.

Collateral Damage: Damage to persons or property adjacent to, but not part of an authorized target.

Positive Identification: Assured identification by a specific means can be achieved by any of the following methods: visual, electronic support measures, track behavior, flight correlation, thermal imaging, passive acoustic analysis, or IFF [identification, friend or foe] procedures.[2]

Armed Force: The use of firearms including warning shots.

Unarmed Force: The use of physical force short of firearms, such as stones, batons, shields, CS-gas (when not delivered by firearms). This directive will not discuss further unarmed force.

Warning Shots: A warning shot is used in the challenging procedure (See paragraph 15). It is limited to single shots in the air (and not aimed shots above the target).

Open Fire (See paragraph 16): Open Fire initially with single aimed shots until the protection task is complete. The use of automatic fire is a last resort.

Annex B:
Rules of Engagement Guidelines
For Issue to All Personnel Authorized to Carry Arms and Ammunition in UNPROFOR

General Rules

1. You have the right to use force in self-defence.
2. In all situations you are to use minimum force necessary. FIRE ARMS MUST ONLY BE USED AS A LAST RESORT.

[2] *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* defines IFF as "the electronic equipment or the system used to identify approaching craft as friendly or hostile"—*Eds.*

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Challenging

3. A challenge must be given before opening fire unless:

a. to do so would increase the risk of death or grave injury to you or any other person;

b. you or others in the immediate vicinity are under armed attack.

4. You are to challenge in English by shouting:
"U.N.! STOP OR I FIRE!"
or in Serbo-Croat by shouting: "UJEDINJENE NACIJE! STANI ILI PUCAM!" (utyedinyene natsiye! stani ili putsam)

Opening Fire

5. You may only open fire against a person if he/she is committing or about to commit an act LIKELY TO ENDANGER LIFE, AND THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO STOP THE HOSTILE ACT. Dependent always on the circumstances, the following are some examples of such acts:

a. Firing or being about to fire a weapon.

b. Planting, detonating or throwing an explosive device (including a petrol bomb).

c. Deliberately driving a vehicle at a person, where there is no other way of stopping him/her.

6. You may open fire against a person even though the conditions of paragraph 5 are not met if:

a. He/she attempts to take possession of property or installations you are guarding, or to damage or destroy it; and,

b. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY OF PREVENTING THIS.

7. If you have to open fire you should:

a. fire only aimed shots; and

b. fire no more rounds than necessary; and,

c. take all reasonable precautions not to injure anyone other than your target.

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Annex C:
Instructions to Military Personnel

To:

From: (Note 1)


You are not authorized to bear arms
As of _____ you are ordered by _____ to bear arms (Note 2)
Your weapon will not be charged
As of _____ you are ordered by _____ to charge your weapon and make safe (Note 3)
As of _____ you are ordered by _____ to unload weapons and make safe
As of _____ you are ordered by _____ to warn the aggressor without firing (Note 4)
As of _____ you are ordered by _____ to warn by fire
As of _____ you are ordered by _____ to cease fire and make weapons safe
As of _____ you are ordered by _____ to defend your mission by fire

Notes:

1. Normally issued by a Company to a Platoon Commander or detached Section or patrol.
2. Authorization may refer to radio call-sign or other appointment title.
3. Bayonets may be fixed or unfixed at any stage in escalation or de-escalation.
4. See Challenging Procedures.

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Challenging and Opening Fire Procedures

1. Warn the aggressor to STOP.
2. REPEAT the warnings; ensure UNDERSTANDING.
3. CHARGE or COCK the weapons.
4. Fire WARNING SHOT.
5. If warning shots are ignored, ON ORDER, FIRE SINGLE AIMED ROUNDS until task accomplished. Automatic fire is a last resort.

Search Procedures

1. Searchers are not to humiliate nor to embarrass.
2. The object of the search must be clearly stated in orders.
3. Females will be searched by scanners or other females if available.
4. Searchers must be neither overly friendly nor overbearing.
5. A searcher will always be "covered" by a comrade(s).
6. Searches will be reported promptly and fully.

Annex D:
Cordon and Search Operations

Principles

1. Principles of Cordon and Search Operations are as follows:

   a. A Cordon and Search must be justified by a clear violation of the Vance Plan or the U.N. Security Council Resolution. Justification must not be sought through illegal procedures which violate the human rights of citizens in the UNPAs or Safe Areas;

   b. Cordons will only be conducted if the situation warrants isolation of that area. This should be the exception. In most cases, only a search should be required;

   c. Military will not conduct searches inside buildings;

   d. Searches should be done by local police but, in the event they do not respond, UNCIVPOL will conduct the search;

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e. The military will provide the appropriate security force to support to *[sic]* UNCIVPOL searches. The requirement for a preliminary search for mines/booby traps, etc., is the responsibility of the OC in consultation with UNCIVPOL/local police (Engineers may be used in the recce party if judged appropriate);

f. The military officer commanding the operation should accompany the search team;

g. The search should be conducted in such a manner so as to cause the minimum disruption to the occupants. Damage to property is to be kept to the absolute minimum. Any property damages are to be recorded immediately and signed by the OC of the operation. A copy is to be given to the occupant and the original is to be processed for reimbursement as soon as possible; and,

h. Every effort will be made to explain, through interpreters, the reason(s) for the search. Those involved, especially inside private houses, must be cognizant of the fact that it is private property. Although security is a priority, it is not an excuse for belligerence or the adoption of a confrontational attitude. All involved should display a highly professional, fair firm, but friendly attitude.

[An official close to the UNPROFOR has been invited to reply to this article.]

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Correspondence

Germany's Radical Right

To the Editor:

At a time when it has become fashionable in many circles to portray the former German Democratic Republic as a flawed but morally righteous experiment . . . David M. Keithly's indictment of this regime's truly heinous character is more than welcome ["Shadows of Germany's Authoritarian Past," Spring 1994, pp. 207–23]. Countering a currently fashionable nostalgia which bemoans the disappearance of the GDR and attributes this to the alleged rapaciousness of the Federal Republic, Keithly's article conveys convincingly the terrible legacy bequeathed by the GDR's dictatorial ways to the already burdened political process of uniting West and East Germany into one country. . . .

And yet, Keithly's commendable article exhibits serious flaws. Its most fundamental omission in its completely justified indictment of the former communist regime's complicity in fostering a right-wing authoritarianism in the new Germany is its concomitant uncritical exoneration of West Germany. Indeed, not once is West Germany mentioned in Keithly's article in connection with the ugly manifestations of renewed right-wing extremism in German politics. Instead, the reader is left with the impression as if right-wing violence occurred solely east of the Elbe. Not a word of mention here about the lethal brutalities in Mölln and Solingen, both West German towns; nothing about the vast array of reliable empirical data showing that right-wing activities are much more prevalent in the western part of Germany than in the former East; and complete silence about the studies which reveal West Germans to harbor a significantly more acute level of anti-Semitism than their eastern counterparts. In other words, by offering us a much-valued indictment of the ugly legacies of East Germany's communist regime, Keithly presents us with a complete whitewash of some of the West's equally reprehensible right-wing blemishes. Indeed, by anchoring his argument entirely in the East (among seventeen million people), Keithly undermines the potential power of his article by offering us only a limited analysis of the true dangers of right-wing politics in today's unified Germany (nearly eighty million people), doubtlessly Europe's most important "player" on all fields of politics, economics, and society.

Moreover, Keithly loses much of his argument's punch by concentrating mainly on what he correctly terms "puerile" expressions of right-wing politics

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rather than focusing on its rapidly growing and much more dangerous "acceptable" manifestations. Violent skinheads and other overt neo-Nazis are unpleasant but quite ephemeral to the changes in Germany's political culture. This is most certainly not the case concerning the powerful opinion-making influence on the part of major editorial writers of Germany's paper of record the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. Together with *Junge Freiheit,* which—telling of this atmospheric shift to the right in the new Germany's acceptable political discourse—has recently advanced to a daily publication from its formerly weekly appearance, we are witnessing the rapid and forceful emergence of a nationalist right wing which harkens back to the politics of the "conservative revolutionaries" of the 1920s. Vehemently anti-American, dismissive of liberal democracy, hateful of anything Western, and contemptuous of the "constitutional patriotism" which framed much of the identity of the *Bundesrepublik's* intellectuals and elite, this "acceptable" new right's declared agenda is the complete redefinition of German national identity in the new Deutschland. Once the Western nature of the old *Bundesrepublik* is exposed as alien to Germans, and once the German people's pride is restored by silencing and minimizing (or in some cases openly denying) Germany's criminal deeds under the Nazi regime, these increasingly vocal rightists are confident that the very nature of politics will be substantially different (i.e., less liberal and Western) in the new Deutschland. The primacy of anti-Americanism has activated a long-dormant affinity between the world of the new right and leading intellectuals of the left-wing pacifist milieu of the mid-1980s.

That these nonviolent and "acceptable" developments are far more potent than neo-Nazi skinheads is brilliantly demonstrated in a new book by Friedbert Pflueger properly entitled *Deutschland driftet. Die Konservative Revolution entdeckt ihre Kinder* (Duesseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1994) (Germany adrift: The conservative revolution discovers its children). . . . Pflueger's argument attains particular importance since he has been one of former president Richard von Weizsaecker's major advisors and continues to be one of the CDU's most respected and influential young leaders. Thus, his alarming findings cannot be dismissed as the exaggerated worries of a liberal intellectual or the sensationalist opinions of a cynical journalist. They have to be taken very seriously precisely because they hail from one of the old *Bundesrepublik's* finest political participants, who fears that in the new Deutschland, the discourse which weaned him so successfully might indeed be seriously damaged, if not permanently eroded. Keithly's piece was a fine description of the tip of the iceberg. Alas, what lurks beneath the treacherous waters is a good deal more troubling than any of the ugly developments so well illustrated by Keithly. Above all, the matter involves all of the new Deutschland, not merely the remnants of the former German Democratic Republic.

Andrei S. Markovits
University of California, Santa Cruz

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To the Editor:

Will Germany always be haunted by its past? Troubling developments over the past four years suggest that it will. As Germany's economy has sputtered and its political system has drifted, right-wing and neo-Nazi extremists have captured German and international headlines more and more. David Keithly's article explores the potential dangers of Germany's Nazi and Communist pasts in the current crisis, and calls for expanded American involvement and leadership, particularly through economic investment in eastern Germany. . . .

Without greater American involvement, Keithly warns, Germany faces the frightening prospect of "a new wave of rightist nationalism that could jeopardize the country's social harmony [p. 207]." He believes that this disturbing possibility might well be triggered by the neo-Nazi movement in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Like other authors who hold the GDR responsible for many of Germany's contemporary problems, from environmental degradation and increased crime to economic recession, Keithly locates the origins of today's right-wing, neo-Nazi upswing in the now defunct ideology and social system of East Germany. . . .

But does Keithly's analysis adequately explain the rise of neo-Nazi hate groups in Germany? The answer is no. By focusing exclusively on the GDR, the author excludes the broader West German and European context within which right-wing extremism, anti-foreign violence, and anti-Semitism have escalated in the past five years. That 60 percent of all violent acts directed against foreigners in 1993 occurred in the old Federal Republic makes right-wing extremism more than an eastern problem.[1] According to official government statistics, in fact, the number of right-wing extremists in the Federal Republic grew from twenty thousand to thirty-two thousand between 1980 and 1990, and stands at about forty-two thousand today. If these figures are even close to being accurate, and if almost every new recruit since 1990 came from eastern Germany, it still means that almost three-quarters of all right-wing extremists come from western Germany. Of the eighty right-wing extremist groups tracked by authorities, moreover, many have nationwide contacts, orchestrate national campaigns of intimidation, harassment, and violence, especially against foreigners, and have found a strong resonance among young people from all across Germany.[2]

Keithly's narrow focus leaves other important questions unanswered. To what extent, for example, have the impetus and support for eastern neo-Nazi groups come from older generations in West Germany? What role has Chancellor Kohl's initial refusal to condemn or combat anti-foreign violence in 1990–1992 or West German public opinion played in the escalation of right-wing and neo-Nazi extremism in eastern Germany?

[1] Dale Tuttle, "Violence against Foreigners in the New Germany," *German Politics and Society,* Spring 1994, p. 67.

[2] Martin Klingst, "Ein Netz und viele Spinnen," *Die Zeit,* Feb. 18, 1994.

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Knowing more about rank-and-file members would also help explain the nature of this menace. Many eastern neo-Nazis are undoubtedly young, frustrated, disillusioned, and unemployed, as the author suggests. But one should also keep in mind that over half of all easterners belong to mainstream political parties like the conservative Christian Democratic Union or the moderately leftist Social Democratic Party, and only a small minority acknowledges membership in right-wing organizations.[3] Apparently, most politically unaffiliated easterners have turned away from politics altogether since 1990, disillusioned by unfulfilled expectations or alienated by their second-class treatment.

Keithly's analysis of eastern neo-Nazi leaders does help to explain why so many come from old elite families in the GDR, but the argument that these isolated, disillusioned, or opportunistic young communists found in neo-Nazism what they had lost in communist youth groups is not convincing and raises difficult new questions. Have Nazis and communists, for example, always used the terms "community and comradeship" in the same way? Are the similarities in national socialism and communism far greater than the differences? Is it possible that the privileged children of the old communist elite will form the core of a neo-Nazi hierarchy? Raising these kinds of questions muddles our understanding of Germany's authoritarian past and diverts our attention from the real issues facing Germany today. . . .

It may well be that Germany's future hinges more on questions of national identity and social values than insulation from its authoritarian pasts. Some Americans may look back nostalgically to an earlier, more noble time when the U.S. played a decisive role in the world. But the world has changed dramatically and permanently in the last few years, and the United States may not be able to exercise the leadership and influence that it once did. A few may still cringe at the thought of trusting Germans to manage their own affairs in difficult times. But in this new world order, troubled through it may be, the resourcefulness and resilience of mainstream Germans may be far more important than shadows from their past.

Rennie W. Brantz
Appalachian State University

To the Editor:

Recent manifestations of right-wing extremism within Germany's social fabric have caused considerable consternation inside the country, and among Germany's neighbors and allies. Although wide sections of the population have condemned the resurgence of racism and chauvinism, fresh doubts arise about the backlash of Germany's unification, and the new electoral gains of rightist political parties. . . .

[3] *The Economist,* May 21, 1994, p. 27.

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David M. Keithly's article, "Shadows of Germany's Authoritarian Past," offers a refreshing clarity in analyzing the country's turmoil. His focus on the historical context of the current wave of racist violence presents the reader with compelling insights into the new brand of nationalism that has plagued Germany since its unification in 1990. Instead of the common characterization of the movement as a subculture of skinheads, hooligans, and malcontents, Keithly's investigation illuminates the full profile of the problem. It festered long before the fall of the Wall, and extends well beyond the discontent caused by unemployment and economic displacement in the reconstituted German state of the former GDR.

The author's analysis goes a long way in tracing the twisted shadows cast by the authoritarian system of the GDR. Its insular identity, its militant educational practices, its "we-they" mentality, its terror against dissidents, its condemnation of cultural diversity, its scapegoating of Zionism, and its practice of segregating outsiders all contributed significantly to the current right-wing backlash.

An interesting point Keithly brings to light focuses on the phenomenon that many extremists in the East have family ties to the country's former power elites. Not unlike the left-wing terrorists of the seventies in West-Germany, these radicals take delight in the political provocation their violence poses against the former establishment. However, their one-sided political education, and an inverted sense of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* makes their violence not only more dangerous but also more degrading. It is a bitter truth that much of this militancy and brutality has its roots in the bellicose training GDR youngsters were exposed to since a tender age. Among the disquieting factors behind the extremism of the new Right, the article lists the influence of many former GDR functionaries and educators. Disillusioned by the demise of the socialist "dictatorship of the proletariat," they simply retooled their authoritarian mind-sets to fit other dictatorial doctrines which are now framed by neo-fascist ideologies. Socialist militancy, authoritarian thinking, and parochialism formed the spawning grounds for much of the manifest prejudice and racism which inform the right-wing movement in the new states. . . .

The article seems less convincing in the discussion of the refugee question. True, the influx of emigrés since 1990, particularly those from Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, has certainly strained the country's welfare net and fueled economic anxieties. The stated numbers are beyond dispute—almost a million came to Germany in 1992. When Keithly writes, however, that "waves of asylum seekers have poured into Germany" during the last few years, he conjures up images of dangerous floods which inundate the nation. He establishes a direct link between the rise of racist attacks in the East and the influx of foreigners. This claim, that right-wing extremism in Germany is linked to the dramatic increase in asylum seekers, seems problematic. Many East German cities, Magdeburg, for example, experienced a decrease of foreign residents

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since 1990. In May of that year, over 9,000 foreigners lived there, while in 1992, the numbers had dwindled to 1,400.[1] Yet, despite this departure of foreign residents, the frequency of racially motivated attacks increased sharply. This reflects racism driven by pure hatred rather than ethnic conflict. The irrational correlation between the increase of attacks and the decrease of foreigners indicates that the problem can hardly be linked to outsiders but instead illuminates the depth of the German identity crisis itself.

It is more difficult to explain the increase of racially motivated attacks in the West, which houses the majority of refugees. While some of the perpetrators there were unemployed, others came from well-to-do families without economic problems. This suggests that latent forms of xenophobia are surfacing in West-Germany at a time when the "successes" of the East German movement encouraged sympathizers in the West. Unfortunately, Keithly's article hardly focuses on the West German situation, and his analysis does not address similarities and differences between East and West. . . .

Notwithstanding these omissions, Keithly has otherwise done a superb job of probing behind the surface of Germany's social travails and their possible impact on Europe and the United States. I fully subscribe to the author's conclusion that the importance of greater American involvement in Germany through public assistance, direct private investment, and academic exchanges with the eastern states is paramount. The vital importance of this triple strategy becomes clear when one remembers the historical success of similar initiatives following World War II, and the ensuing benefits for both U.S. and West German industries and institutions.

Andreas Lixl-Purcell
University of North Carolina at Greensboro

To the Editor:

Reading David M. Keithly's "Shadows of Germany's Authoritarian Past" leaves me with ambiguous feelings. The article certainly represents a correct and fair summary of all the disturbing news coming out of Germany; it is, however, the interpretation of all this that makes me wonder.

What is typically lost over all these alarms and warnings is the basic truth that the Federal Republic of Germany with all its flaws and shortcomings is the best Germany its citizens and its neighbors have ever had. Germans enjoy liberty and prosperity (despite present difficulties!), none of the borders with its nine neighboring countries are contested, and German help is sought and received by the international community.

West Germany successfully integrated some 12 million expellees and refugees after World War II, almost as many as the 16.5 million it now needs to acculturate to its democratic institutions. It will take a little time, of course.

[1] "Ausländer raus. Fremdenfeindlichkeit und rechtsextremistische Gewalt in Deutschland. Ein Bericht," Report published by Helsinki Watch, Bonn, 1992, p. 8.

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In the meantime, the widely lamented friction between easterners and westerners (*die Mauer im Kopf*) testifies to everything but a rebirth of the *Volksgemeinschaft*.

The Federal Republic of Germany has offered refuge to the largest number of Kurds and Bosnians outside their homelands, and yet it is criticized for its restrictive immigration laws that give preference to ethnic Germans. National homogeneity is indeed largely fictional, but people have suffered in the diaspora for being "German," and it seems rather appropriate that a German government accepts a special responsibility for them. Maligning Germany's *jus sanguinis* as crypto-racist is not only unfair, it also ignores that this policy removes many minority enclaves such as have often given rise to conflict and war in the past.

The unification of Germany has obviously brought along unanticipated economic problems. Privatizing and restructuring the run-down East German economy so that it can operate in a competitive market system has led to massive layoffs. . . . So, German unemployment climbed to 3.8 million (April 1994) for a rate of 8.4 percent in the west and 16.2 percent in the east. These are alarming figures, but they stand no comparison with the 44 percent jobless rate in 1932 that helped Hitler to power. Again, the déjà vu is more apparent than real.

To call for American aid to East Germany seems to be a bit off. Not only are the U.S. taxpayers unwilling to foot such a bill, Bonn is pumping plenty of aid into the "new Länder" already. As a matter of fact, it is the Federal Republic which spent $75.7 billion between 1989 and 1993 to assist the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union).[1]

Characterizing the authoritarianism and secluded provincialism of the former German Democratic Republic as the breeding ground for the truly disturbing incidents of anti-Semitism and hostility toward foreigners is quite to the point. Forty-five years of democratic re-education and sometimes convulsive efforts at "coming to grips with the past" (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) had bypassed the Easterners. Instead they had been subjected to a distorted "anti-fascism" hijacked by the communists. The historically unenlightened East German skinheads apparently reversed this logic by equating anticommunism with fascism. . . . And yet, it is not *the* German youth doing this; by far the majority of them are as appalled by these acts of violence as anybody. The hundred thousands participating in the "chain of lights" demonstrations testify to it.

Police officials in Germany will also tell you that it has so far been impossible to discover any organizational connection between these so similar incidents. While right-wing political parties, like the *Republikaner,* may contribute to a general political climate in which acts of violence become more likely, they have so far not been linked to specific incidents. Electoral gains of the *Republikaner* and other right-wing parties seem to be insignificant, compared

[1] "The Stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe" (New York: German Information Center, April 1994).

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with those of the National Front in France and Italy's National Alliance. The German national elections in October will, of course, be the ultimate test.

The drumbeat of hyper-critical reporting on Germany appears to be particularly ill-advised, when it encourages the German government to set aside due process in order to demonstrate its determination "to do something" against right-wing violence. Is it, e.g., a triumph for civil liberties, when the Federal Constitutional Court decides (April 26, 1994) that spreading the "provenly untrue assertion" that the Holocaust never occurred is not protected as free speech and thus a punishable offense? Isn't it better to suffer the impertinence of some revisionist scribbling than to renew the baneful custom of having historical truth sanctioned by the government? Is book burning the answer, particularly when there is no indication that these untruths are making any significant headway?

Karl H. Kahrs
California State University, Fullerton

To the Editor:

Philip H. Gordon's article on "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy" [Spring 1994, pp. 225–43] contains many excellent observations and offers an accurate picture of the current German debate. The only problem I have with the article derives from Mr. Gordon's terminological obsession with the word "normal." I do not believe that this unspecific term can contribute much to the understanding of the issue. To make things worse, Mr. Gordon uses the term in varying ways; I counted five different definitions. It is not clear to me why he picked exactly this term as his key word. . . .

Nobody writes articles about any other country's having a "normal" foreign policy. What makes Germany's normality so special that we feel a need to think and write about it? Does the term "normal" mean that all is possible again in Germany? Is the continuation of the Federal Republic's multilateral approach to international relations as practiced by the Kohl/Kinkel government just one of several available foreign-policy options, while other, less friendly ones might soon be pursued? Which factors are likely to drive, and limit, German foreign policy?

Obviously, in the German case, there are special conditions for normality. Some things that pass for normal in France or Britain, such as having nuclear weapons, clearly don't in Germany. History sets this country apart, not just because of the lasting memory of its military expansionism and genocide in our century. From the viewpoint of Germany's smaller neighbors, even older concerns about dominance, unilateralism, and the prospect of great-power rivalries are still a fact of life.

By geography, Germany is bound to be the least insular among the world's leading economic powers. Together with France, it is placed at the geographical pivot of Europe. In the European Union, united Germany is the biggest, though far from dominant, member. Its currency has become a transnational power factor of its own, largely beyond the German government's

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control. Its open borders expose its stable but yet untested social, economic, and political fabric to the effects of dynamic social change in the east. At the same time, the comparatively affluent German democracy is seen by many Central and East Europeans as their main source of hope for a sustained process that will lead toward their complete adoption into the Western community. . . .

Given these factors, German foreign policy is bound to remain substantially different from the crude "realist" image of a normal foreign policy based on status, spheres of influence, and unilateral advantages. The success or failure of policies in Germany's interest will be decided, above all, by the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation in coping with the multitude of shared challenges to European societies. This is why it makes sense to talk about a "European" foreign and security policy, as a result of flexible cooperation between all relevant actors in Europe. In Yugoslavia and elsewhere, evidence was piled up that neither the European Union's members nor the Atlantic Community (let alone the U.N.) can yet live up to such a multilateral approach. Germany's stake in changing this lack of pooled, multilateral power tools in time seems so high that I don't think calling its foreign policy "normal" is quite the right word.

Once the exceptional character of the tasks faced by German foreign policy today is recognized, a number of crucial questions arise. How fast can Germany's political system adapt to the new demands? How long will the institutional effects of Germany's prudent abstention from taking the initiative and pressing for action in a leading role during the East-West conflict limit its ability to muster the necessary analytical, decision-making and executive power of its own in matters of international security? How can Germany support the evolution of the high degree of shared identity and political confidence among European powers needed for averting perpetuated misery and societal collapse in Eastern Europe? How can Germany ensure that its own policies will remain compatible with those of essential partners? Can political support be built in Germany for a strong and active role in enforcing international security and order? We are only just beginning to analyze and understand Germany's new foreign policy.

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Review Essays

Oh Henry! Kissinger and His Critics

by Walter A. McDougall

Diplomacy. By Henry Kissinger. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. 912 pp. $35.00.)

"The cunning writer will choose an indefinable subject," wrote William Sydney Porter—*nom de plume* O. Henry—"for he can then set down his theory of what it is; and next, at length, his conception of what it is not."[1] But Dr. Henry Kissinger, whose cunning no one disputes, lacks the freedom to define his own subject and expect his theories to be received dispassionately. It is not because Dr. Kissinger cannot write a normal book, but because he cannot be a normal author.

We all seem to *care* about Kissinger whether or not (as Walter Russell Mead has it) we all love or loathe him.[2] And there is no denying the grip that Kissinger still exerts, two decades after leaving government, on all Americans concerned with foreign policy. If you doubt that, consider the rapt attention accorded his testimony by Congressional committees, the presidential requests for consultations, the networks' open invitations for airtime, and the liverish reception his books unfailingly receive from the academic establishment to which he once belonged.

Perhaps Kissinger's notoriety is born of the fact that he is the only secretary of state to achieve not only fame, but "glamour."[3] Perhaps it is because he offered us hope that America could cope during an era when everything, home and abroad, seemed to be spinning out of control. Perhaps it is because

[1] O. Henry, "The Country of Elusion," in *Selected Stories,* ed. Guy Davenport (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 58.

[2] Walter Russell Mead, "Peace Keepers and Power Brokers," *The Washington Post Book World,* Apr. 3, 1994, pp. 3, 14.

[3] Robert W. Tucker, "Masterwork," *The National Interest,* Summer 1994, pp. 78–87: "[Glamour's] one common denominator is the ability to evoke fascination. This Kissinger has done in abundance" (p. 78).

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the man radiates an aura of secrecy and brilliance to some and Strangelovian devilry to others. But, no one suggests that Henry is passé. No one passé writes books that split the reviewers like a maul splits fresh oak.

That is why one cannot do justice to an event such as the publication of *Diplomacy,* except by reviewing the reviewers (predictably, the most distinguished lot of dons and pundits of international relations) as well as the book itself. A quarterly journal such as *Orbis* affords the chance to do just that. To be sure, reviewing the reviewers risks offending half a dozen senior colleagues in my own profession. But I take courage in the advice of Helmuth von Moltke, who instructed his Prussian lieutenants: First reckon, then risk.

Henry's History

Some 5 percent of Kissinger's 835-page *Diplomacy* is devoted to current world affairs. Like Paul Kennedy in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,*[4] Kissinger obliges readers to wade through a long historical narrative before arriving at the contemporary payoff. Otherwise, the Kennedy and Kissinger books could not be more different. Whereas Kennedy explained the rise and fall of powers in terms of economic forces and an almost mechanical tendency of empires to overextend themselves, Kissinger accounts for the twists of time in terms of statesmen's personalities, ideas, and skills. So it is that Kissinger credits Cardinal Richelieu for discarding a European politics of universalism and religiosity in favor of *raison d'état,* William III for promoting the concept of the balance of power, and Prince Metternich for understanding the need for a community of values to underpin (or overlay) the balance.

And so it is that Ernest R. May, Charles Warren Professor of History at Harvard, has reviewed *Diplomacy* under the title "The 'Great Man' Theory of Foreign Policy." Not to put too fine a point on it, May tries to bury Kissinger. He begins by describing *Diplomacy* as "a book of maxims disguised as a history of statecraft. The maxims are often splendid. The history is not." He ends by expressing his disappointment that Kissinger, who once wrote "good professional history," has "little or no sense of how diplomacy and statecraft evolved." As a result, Kissinger's *Diplomacy* (if not his diplomacy) is "amateurish."[5]

May is right that Kissinger ignores long-range forces in international affairs, but he does not suggest what those economic, technological, ideological, or social forces might be. Instead, he wastes valuable inches of ink in two vain pursuits. The first is to indict Kissinger for admiring every statesman who eschewed vain moralizing in favor of realpolitik, be they authoritarians like

[4] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987).

[5] *The New York Times Book Review,* Apr. 3, 1994, pp. 3, 24. Newspapers today, led by the *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post,* shamelessly ignore official publication dates in an effort to scoop competitors with the first notice of major new releases. In this case, the *Times* and *Post* ran a dead heat.

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Metternich and Otto von Bismarck, or tyrants like Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler. May's second pursuit is to tick off alleged factual errors, the sort, he says, "for which students fail to get pass degrees in history." But all that May offers are three allegations regarding who coined a campaign slogan from Britain's "khaki election" of 1918, which generals attended Hitler's harangue recounted in the Hossbach Memorandum, and whether or not Wilsonian self-determination put Europeans on "unfamiliar terrain."

Kissinger must have fumed at having to check such trivial points, but his letter of rebuttal to the *Times* not only parries May's "nitpicking," but exposes an embarrassing error on May's part. On the larger issue, Kissinger quotes himself to the effect that Stalin was a "monster" and Hitler's advent to power "one of the greatest calamities in world history" by way of refuting the charge that "I never met a dictator I did not like." Kissinger concludes in withering fashion: "Professor May has done significant historical research in the past; it is therefore not possible to consider his comments as inadvertent."[6]

May in turn dismisses the charge that his review was motivated by "personal animus" and lunges at Henry's open flank: his reputation for amoral diplomacy. What his review really stressed, writes May, is Kissinger's "*new* insistence that political leaders must respect values as well as power." And with this, we have leaped out of the pages of the book and into history. While this dig may be lost on youngsters, those who faced the Nixon administration from the other side of the barricades will say "touché." May then tries to turn Kissinger's prominence against him. Even minor errors are significant in a Kissinger book because, May argues, his name on the cover is equivalent to "a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval." How sad, therefore, that "Thousands of readers may think 'Diplomacy' an authoritative history. . . ."[7]

What are we to make of this fur-fight in the pages of *The New York Times?* Is May one of Mead's Kissinger-loathers? Were they rivals years ago at Harvard? Or have certain of Kissinger's old colleagues never forgiven him for "selling out": for grasping power and glory beyond the dreams of any professor, siding with the likes of Nixon, approving of the invasion of Cambodia and the Christmas bombing of Hanoi, ordering the wiretapping of associates—and then cashing in on his infamy through a private consultancy that yields him an income estimated at $7.5 million per year?

Walter Isaacson's recent biography of Kissinger records that in May 1970, after the Cambodian incursion, a distinguished Harvard delegation visited Henry in Washington. May was among them; as dean of the college, he was a target of protesters. Nixon's policies were "tearing the country apart domestically," said May. Kissinger replied that Cambodia was a tactical, not a moral question; that, in effect, the administration had bigger fish to fry and a larger

[6] Henry A. Kissinger, Letter to the Editor, *The New York Times Book Review,* Apr. 24, 1994, p. 31. May had faulted Kissinger for failing to mention Harold Nicolson's excellent book, also titled *Diplomacy,* whereas, in fact, Kissinger cites Nicolson in a footnote and on the copyright page.

[7] Ernest R. May, Letter to the Editor, *The New York Times Book Review,* May 1, 1994, p. 35. Emphasis added.

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moral purpose in mind. "The meeting completed my transition from the academic world," said Kissinger; May and the others "left embittered."[8]

Whatever May's motives for panning *Diplomacy,* he missed the chance to make a constructive critique of Kissinger's history. Stanford University professor emeritus Gordon Craig missed his chance, too, but because he was too kind. Craig's main contention is that Kissinger's title is a misnomer. The book is not really about the practice of diplomacy as it evolved from fifteenth-century Venice to the present. Echoing the post–World War I generation of statesmen, he laments the decline of Europe's tradition of professional statecraft and decries "that worst of all diplomatic inventions, the summit conference." But, having unburdened himself, Craig forgives Kissinger for ignoring institutional history in order "to concentrate on the search for international order and upon the statesmen who, like himself, sought to establish systems that would preserve it, and he has accomplished this with great skill and shrewdness." Granting Henry the right to this delimited province, Craig concludes that "Kissinger's account leaves nothing to be desired. . . ."[9]

At one level, therefore, professional judgments of Kissinger's history turn on the "great man" assumption that undergirds it. Simon Schama likes the assumption, but is bothered by its implementation. *Diplomacy* "is an unrepentantly old-fashioned book," he writes, "a narrative of great men and events, studded with epigrams and lapidary utterances on the practice of power."[10] Such an approach "needs no apology" because people and ideas do matter, and politics is the stuff of irony, unintended consequences, and contingency. Moreover, history is the best school for contemporary statesmen, who would do well to recognize that realism without a moral compass, and moralizing in the absence of calculus, are equally vain.

The trouble, according to Schama, is that Kissinger doesn't always know his great men well enough. For instance, Richelieu, far from jettisoning Catholicism for an amoral *raison d'état* (as Kissinger has it), believed that "what is done for the state is done for God." To be sure, he made alliances with Protestant princes and fought to maintain France against Catholic Hapsburg "hegemony," but Richelieu never stopped thinking of Protestants as heretics, and he fashioned policy partly to enable the Bourbons to stamp out the Huguenots at home.

Kissinger also errs, according to Schama, by contrasting Europe's power-political tradition to an idealistic American one. America, after all, was a creation of early modern Europe, and the notions we associate with American exclusivism trace their roots back to Europe's own quest for an alternative to balance of power—from the just war theory of the medieval church to Hugo Grotius's invention of international law in seventeenth-century Netherlands to the British promoters of a League to Enforce Peace. Michael Howard, the retired Robert A. Lovett Professor at Yale, also wonders how Kissinger can be so "curiously

[8] Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger. A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 280–81.

[9] Gordon Craig, "Looking for Order," *The New York Review of Books,* May 12, 1994, pp. 8–14.

[10] Simon Schama, "The Games of Great Men," *The New Yorker,* May 2, 1994, pp. 92–97. See also Timothy Garton Ash, "The Rules of the Game," *The New Republic,* July 18, 1994, pp. 41–43.

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blind to what was happening in Britain in the nineteenth century. . . . Gladstone was the voice of the future . . . the true avatar of Woodrow Wilson."[11] But Kissinger says exactly that on page 161, and, as we shall see below, his sense of what is European by tradition and what is truly American is subtler than either Schama or Howard suggest.

Diplomacy *tells us much not only about the past, but about history as a craft, about Kissinger himself, and (through our reactions to it) about ourselves.*

So, is *Diplomacy* "good history" or not? That depends not on a few errors of fact—which any nine-hundred-page book is bound to contain—but on the strength of its interpretations in light of the facts. And there are at least some questionable interpretations.

I do not agree, for example, with Kissinger's twice-stated remark that the United States did not consider its westward expansion to be "foreign policy" at all. Manifest Destiny publicists may have believed as much, but Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, James Polk, and William Henry Seward knew better. I think Kissinger claims too much for *raison d'état* as a cause for the Bourbon ascendancy, exaggerates the self-consciousness of Britain's balance-of-power policy, and ignores popular nationalism and the Zollverein (customs union) in his explanation of German unification.

Moving to the twentieth century, Kissinger's portrait of Stalin strikes me as too confident, given the mysteries that still surround that era, and he is too ready to believe that Stalin was "the supreme realist—patient, shrewd, and implacable" (p. 333). One can argue from the same evidence that Stalin was weak, paranoid, too clever by half, and lucky. After all, he botched Soviet policy in China, gave away Manchuria to Japan, helped fascists into power through his Comintern activities, turned too late to the Popular Front strategy, misread Hitler and became the greatest appeaser of all, and provoked the cold war with his needless, heedless impositions in occupied Europe. Kissinger is also too kind to Franklin Roosevelt, in my judgment. He says nothing about U.S. policy toward the Chinese Civil War, and his account of the origins of the Korean War relies on the dubious old saw about Dean Acheson's oversight in a speech.

On the other hand, much else in Kissinger's book, especially his summary of the First World War era—from origins to peacemaking—is superb. So, too, is his insightful account of the origins and execution of the containment doctrine.[12]

[11] Michael Howard, "The World according to Henry. From Metternich to Me," *Foreign Affairs,* May/June 1994, pp. 132–40.

[12] See also, Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on Containment," *Foreign Affairs,* May/June 1994, pp. 113–30, which is adapted from Kissinger's *Diplomacy.*

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So, with much justification, Robert Tucker finds *Diplomacy* "brilliant though thoroughly idiosyncratic,"[13] and Schama "an oddly engaging Cracker Jack assortment of gems and howlers." He thinks (as do I) that the narrative improves mightily in style and insight as it reaches the nineteenth century, the pages sparkling "with intelligence and insight." Schama's real disappointment lies in the fact that Henry chose to write history at all instead of "an anatomy of the methods and stratagems of the [diplomatic] craft, written with the sharp analytical intelligence of a former Secretary of State who has been both an insider and an outsider and whose sensitivity to the nuances of diplomatic language is unmatched."[14] Peter Grier put the same complaint pithily: "Cut out all the Metternich; leave in the tips."[15]

Good advice—for Kissinger's *next* book. But *Diplomacy* is like an oriental carpet, as interesting for its flaws as its brilliant patterns. For it tells us much not only about the past, but about history as a craft, about Kissinger himself, and (through our reactions to it) about ourselves. You can't ask much more of a history book.

History's Henry

The reception given *Diplomacy* reveals as much about the historical construction of Henry Kissinger as it does about Kissinger's construction of history. For Henry, it seems, is a stranger in our midst. Or so the reviewers would have it.

"For more than 900 pages," writes Robert A. Divine, the George A. Littlefield Professor at the University of Texas and a dean of American diplomatic history, "Kissinger reveals a profound knowledge of world diplomacy and a nearly total ignorance of American culture." In Divine's view, "Kissinger preaches a sophisticated sermon on the virtues of realpolitik without ever acknowledging that the success of the United States in world affairs stems directly from a repudiation of this Old World concept." Kissinger remains a stranger in his adopted land; he "knows all the words, but never learned the music."[16]

This is as neat a statement as one may ever find of the hoary supposition that Kissinger is a nineteenth-century Central European plunked down in the middle of twentieth-century America. Kissinger is indeed of German origin and education (especially if one counts the reputed influence of Fritz Kraemer, his "discoverer" and mentor). He appreciates balance, order, and predictability of behavior, without which no ideals of any kind can be advanced in domestic or international society. Some of his relatives died in the Holocaust; he knows the danger of unrestrained ideology. And he knows from experience the price paid by American soldiers to redeem the folly of democratic politicians. His

[13] Tucker, "Masterwork," p. 78.
[14] Schama, "The Games of Great Men," p. 96.
[15] Peter Grier, "Kissinger's Top Diplomatic Tips," *The Christian Science Monitor,* Apr. 27, 1994.
[16] Robert A. Divine, "Diplomacy according to Kissinger," *The Philadelphia Inquirer,* Apr. 24, 1994.

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early writings explain, and to some extent extol, the efforts of hard-headed "realists" like Metternich and Lord Castlereagh, who built the most successful international system of modern times. Once in office, he spoke of "a generation of peace," not peace for all time, and "an era of negotiation," not a new world order. And he practiced what Divine says he "preached" (a strange verb to choose under the circumstances).

But as we know, Kissinger was attacked from the American Left and Right alike, each of which spied something alien in Nixon and Kissinger's realpolitik. Now, Divine criticizes Kissinger for believing that a balance-of-power approach might have won over the public were it not for Watergate. In fact, writes Divine, it was not a president versed in geopolitical manipulation but a confessed Wilsonian and critic of détente—Ronald Reagan—who "finally achieved the long-sought goal of ending Soviet tyranny." Kissinger, blind to the fact that "American idealism has been a powerful force," could neither appease it at home nor wield it abroad, and so he was forced to explain the end of the cold war as a matter of irony and timing. Divine asserts that Wilsonianism, not realpolitik, won the cold war, and that our goal today should be "based on fulfilling Jefferson's dream of an empire of liberty, not on Richelieu's balance of power."[17]

Schama makes a similar point. According to Kissinger's argument, Reagan's "addiction to demonizing rhetoric coupled with impulsive negotiation ought to have represented a unique foreign policy nightmare," whereas in fact the progress he made in relations with Moscow would have been beyond the means of either a liberal or a realpolitiker. Schama is even impelled to ask: "Is an American realpolitik a contradiction in terms?"[18]

Paul Johnson's review of *Diplomacy* is decidedly favorable, but he, too, interprets Kissinger's instincts as those of "a civilized European."[19] Tucker says, "We are urged to heed the lessons of the [European] past in order to meet the challenges of the [American] future."[20] According to Mead, "Kissinger believes that American diplomats and public opinion need to absorb European ideas about realism and balance of power politics."[21] *The Economist* sees Kissinger trying "to reconcile his advocacy of the European approach of *Realpolitik*" with American exceptionalism.[22] Howard suggests that Kissinger employs the neutral euphemism "geopolitics" so as not to offend his American audience with his real subject, "power politics." Howard points with irony to the fact that the American people, in the heat of Vietnam, elected a president "who, much as he admired Woodrow Wilson, shared few of his ideals, and Nixon selected as his adviser Henry Kissinger, who shared none of them."[23]

[17] Ibid.

[18] Schama, "The Games of Great Men," p. 92.

[19] Paul Johnson, "The World Stage," *Commentary,* Apr. 1994, pp. 55–56.

[20] Tucker, "Masterwork," p. 81.

[21] Mead, "Peace Keepers and Power Brokers," p. 3.

[22] "Henry Kissinger Weighs In," *The Economist,* May 14, 1994, p. 93.

[23] Howard, "The World according to Henry," pp. 136–37.

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Are we to accept as given this "European" Kissinger whose lifelong calling has been to educate naïve Americans about the realities of power? If so, what are we to make of the fact that *Diplomacy* contains high praise for Woodrow Wilson? (Craig read the book closely enough to see that "Kissinger's admiration of Wilson is undisguised" for he "grasped the mainsprings of American motivation."[24]) What all this suggests to me is that the supposed dichotomy between a "realistic" European approach to foreign policy and an "idealistic" American one is simply false—and that Henry knows it. Certainly, Americans have always wanted to *believe* that they were more idealistic than other nations—which is not surprising since the *novo ordo seclorum* was a major plank in our revolutionary and national propaganda. But we have never fully lived our ideals—ask any foreigner—and in any case, our ideals were themselves inspired by Europeans. Thus, the brilliant contrarian Conor Cruise O'Brien suggests that it would be "nearer to the truth to say that the *rhetoric* of American foreign policy has been shaped by Wilsonian rhetoric, while the substance has been shaped mostly by considerations of national interest." Indeed, O'Brien (a biographer of Edmund Burke) faults Kissinger for making too *deep* a bow at the altar of American moralism.[25]

The supposed dichotomy between a "realistic" European approach to foreign policy and an "idealistic" American one is simply false—and Henry knows it.

So here we are again, hung up on the old dialectic of American idealism versus European realism. The argument always runs the same: nations must pursue ideals lest they succumb to Ozymandian pride and their majesty prove ephemeral; no, statesmen must be realistic lest they do more harm than good with their moralizing; no, history proves that idealism is in fact a higher realism—look at the fall of the Soviet empire; no, realism is really a higher idealism—even our victories in two, now three, world wars have not sufficed to fashion a new world order. And so to the synthesis: we must be idealistic as to our goals, and realistic as to our means, keeping always in mind the ethical principles governing the use of force. Choice cannot be avoided, balances must be struck. Does any serious observer disagree with any of this?

If not, then the critics all agree with Kissinger, and it is not a European or American thing at all but a function of geopolitical circumstance. The United States was blessed with advantages that allowed it to emphasize its idealism,

[24] Craig, "Looking for Order," p. 10.

[25] Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Realpolitik or Moral Values," *Insight*, May 16, 1994, p. 31. See also Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Kissinger Best on Diplomacy of Predecessors," *The Washington Times* (National Weekly Edition), June 6–12, 1994.

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making it seem more millenarian; Europeans rarely had such a luxury and generally suffered when they tried to claim it anyway.

This is neither more nor less than what Kissinger argues in *Diplomacy.* Of course one ought to serve values in one's foreign policy *to the extent that circumstances permit.* The statesman's essential task is to create circumstances propitious to the flowering of one's values—if he can. Kissinger admires Metternich not because he thought in terms of balance of power (Craig, a German historian, caught this), but because his Vienna system rested on "a sense of shared values. . . . There was not only a physical equilibrium, but a moral one. Power and justice were in substantial harmony" (p. 79). Tell that to the Poles, or Italians, Hungarians, or Irish, an idealist might reply. Metternich's system may have been "just" as dynasts or local hegemons defined justice, but it was a prison of peoples no less than the Soviet empire. Ah, but there were no holocausts under the Vienna system, and the forces of democracy and nationalism were largely satisfied without cataclysmic eruptions thanks to the stability of the Vienna architecture. What Kissinger means when he deploys the word "balance" is not only balance of power, but balance between ends and means, aspirations and limits, ideals and realities, risks and rewards. It is another word for wisdom, and it has nothing to do with "European" or "American" states of mind.[26]

To be sure, Kissinger is comfortable at the chessboard of world politics and manifestly uneasy in the arena of American politics. A Daniel Patrick Moynihan might have been a Kissinger, but Kissinger could never have been a Moynihan. Perhaps that is a function of his status as an "outsider," or simply his temperament. He may even envy the "great communicators" who can reach out and strum American heartstrings. But—*pace* Robert Divine—a lack of talent for the piano does not make one contemptuous of music.

There is another way to approach "history's Kissinger": the Kissinger created by his flight from Nazi Germany, by World War II, Harvard, Rockefeller, Nixon, Washington, and rarified consultancy. Kissinger says nothing of his own intellectual formation in *Diplomacy* (perhaps saving it for an autobiography) and almost nothing of ideology (perhaps because *A World Restored,* his classic on the Congress of Vienna, deals with little else). And since his mask is opaque, perhaps the American reader cannot quite believe that Kissinger has emotions to manage, or wrestles with moral dilemmas. If reviewing *Diplomacy* means (for most) reviewing Kissinger himself, then much vexation stems from the fact that Henry doesn't tell us about Henry in *Diplomacy.*

[26] A late reviewer came to the same conclusion as I, and cites a 1968 article, "Central Issues in American Foreign Policy," in which Kissinger argued that the United States had to strike a balance between American idealism and European realism. In effect, therefore, Kissinger "has done what immigrants to this country have always done: taken the best in their own tradition and blended it with the best in the American tradition to produce something . . . at once authentically American and genuinely cosmopolitan." See Joseph Strattan, "Diplomacy," *The American Spectator,* July 1994, pp. 68–70.

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More important, Kissinger's silence on ideology invites misunderstanding. That is because the *raison d'état* approach identified with him commanded the historical stage only until the modern secular ideologies leapt from the Pandora's Box of the French Revolution: liberalism, socialism, nationalism. (Conservatism, by contrast, is an anti-ideology, a rejection of *any* ideological impress upon institutions.) Since Kissinger does not deal explicitly with the ideologization of world politics, certain questions persist about Kissinger's true beliefs, acts in office, personality, and comfort with America itself. Are Americans themselves ideological, and Kissinger a conservative, in which case a philosophical divide may well exist between him and our political culture? Or does Kissinger accept liberalism for purposes of domestic politics, but remain skeptical of attempts to promote it abroad? Or does he in fact believe that the United States ought positively to strive to "enlarge" the global realm in which popular sovereignty and free markets thrive?

What Kissinger means when he deploys the word "balance" is not only balance of power, but balance between ends and means, aspirations and limits, ideals and realities, risks and rewards.

One would expect a "European" Kissinger to eschew ideologies and values in his current policy prescriptions. And sure enough, his final chapter, "The New World Order Revisited," has much to say about geopolitics and little to say about values. The United States, he reminds us in terms reminiscent of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman, is "an island off the shores of the large landmass of Eurasia" (p. 813), hence the prevention of any one power from dominating Europe or Asia remains the first task of American strategy.

In other words, the United States must play the role of the balancer, but not in the aloof manner of Britain, which tended to intervene on the continent only after a hegemonic threat arose and risk of war was the only recourse. Kissinger recommends to America the policy of constant engagement practiced by Bismarck: prophylactic diplomacy designed to stabilize Europe and Asia and nip potential conflicts in the bud. Thus, he urges the United States to retain close ties to Germany and Russia, lest those old rivals for hegemony either come to blows or join forces, and extend NATO's security umbrella to the new democracies of middle Europe.[27] The same goes for East Asia, where

[27] *The Economist* spies a problem with Kissinger's program that all other reviewers (including myself) missed. If the United States must resist domination of Europe by a single power, "cold war or no cold war," then what U.S. policy would he suggest "towards development of an enlarged European Union capable of acting as a single unit? Or towards a potential entente between the European Union and Russia?" Good question.

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the United States must continue its military presence and never allow disputes over trade or human rights to interfere with constructive security relations.

Kissinger's realism also makes him impatient with talk of "new world orders." The end of the cold war, he writes, "has made it far more difficult to implement the Wilsonian dream of universal collective security. . . . The world community is willing enough to cooperate in 'peacekeeping'—that is, in policing an existing agreement not challenged by any of the parties—but it has been skittish about peacemaking—the suppression of actual challenges to world order" (p. 809). What is more, the major players today—the United States, united Europe, Russia, China, Japan, and India—have little in common except their *lack* of experience in cooperative, multipolar international systems. "Never before has a new world order had to be assembled from so many different perceptions, or on so global a scale" (p. 26). He grants that American policy must "take into account" the core values of a nation forged in the name of liberty, but if it ignores contemporary realities, then our "foreign policy will turn into righteous posturing." In sum, whatever new order emerges will be decades in gestation, and the best the United States can hope for is "the patient accumulation of partial successes" (p. 835).

Most reviewers do not deny the wisdom of Kissinger's advice, but few are wholly comfortable with the notion that a "Bismarckian" diplomacy paying lip service to Wilsonianism should define America's role in the twenty-first century. Divine believes that Kissinger misses the lesson of the cold war. Mead slams him for his apparent failure to understand the importance of economics in "our homegrown American foreign policy tradition."[28] Howard objects to Kissinger's counsel because the spread of democracy and economic interdependence around the world make it "questionable whether the concept of a purely 'national' interest makes sense any longer."[29] Enoch Powell thinks that Kissinger's vocabulary is inadequate to the post–cold war world, "that just at this point his lights become dimmed."[30] The cleverest comment on Kissinger's *tour d'horizon* is Craig's: "He does not say that a prerequisite of success would be a negotiator as inventive, and as tireless as he was himself, but we are perhaps justified in believing that this is assumed."[31]

Kissinger's aversion to "taking a pledge" on issues of morality, political philosophy, trendy new subjects of international relations such as poverty, population, resources, and the environment, or indeed anything having to do with the ordering of domestic societies does not surprise anyone familiar with his past writings and career. But his reticence leaves room for the suspicion that Kissinger is an elitist preoccupied with power and impatient with the irrational play of mass politics. Schama gets off a nasty crack when he writes that "Kissinger has a peculiar way of averting his gaze from the ideological content of the regimes served by the diplomatic virtuosi he most admires. . . .

[28] Mead, "Peace Keepers and Power Brokers," p. 14.
[29] Howard, "The World according to Henry," pp. 139–40.
[30] Enoch Powell, "How Nixon's Metternich Sees the World," *The Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 27, 1994.
[31] Craig, "Looking for Order," p. 14.

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G. Gordon Liddy and the rest of the gang would have felt right at home working for Richelieu or Metternich."[32] Howard refers to "that *ancien regime* from which [Kissinger] derived his values and to which he now looks back with such understandable nostalgia."[33] And Timothy Garton Ash doubts that Kissinger's bows to Wilsonianism "will actually make his peace with America."[34]

So even if Henry's alleged "European-ness" is a myth, as I suspect, it will apparently die hard, if only because Americans seem unable to live in an unideological world, a world with too much power and not enough virtue. But a far more important question is simply whether Kissinger is right when he concludes (as Margaret Thatcher's private secretary puts it) "that America will have to learn to operate in a balance-of-power system not a million miles removed from that of nineteenth-century Europe."[35]

Henry's Heresy

As Kissinger stood with his parents upon being named secretary of state, he observed with emotion that such a thing could only happen in America. Schama sees in this a "poignant irony. For all his sense that American democratic ideals have placed an unbearable burden on the free agency of our foreign policy, Kissinger would be the last to dispute their essential nobility."[36] The episode calls to mind Gustav Stresemann, who reconciled himself to the Weimar Republic only upon being made chancellor. Commoners like himself could never have achieved such rank in the Kaiser's day, and so they were called *Vernunftrepublikaner:* republicans of the head if not of the heart.

I cannot help but wonder how much of the angst expressed about Kissinger is born of wonderment over the contents of his heart. Is it in fact the apparent "heartlessness" of Kissinger's writings and doings that makes hearty Americans uneasy? Is his "heresy" a matter of sentiment as much as doctrine? I do not know the answer, but I know that the inquiry must begin with Kissinger's reading of the Vietnam War. For, as we have stressed, Kissinger's views do not separate well from his career, and the critics rarely try to keep them apart. Nowhere do theory and practice collide with a bigger bang than in Vietnam.

According to *Diplomacy,* the American debacle in Vietnam was implicit in the universalization of containment, itself a dubious imposition of American moralism on what was otherwise a sound geopolitical response to Stalinism. As early as 1950, the United States decided that Southeast Asia had to be defended, and the Domino Theory became conventional wisdom. But how

[32] Schama, "The Games of Great Men," p. 95.
[33] Howard, "The World according to Henry," p. 140.
[34] Ash, "The Rules of the Game," p. 43.
[35] Charles Powell, "No Diplomat," *National Review,* June 13, 1994, pp. 63–65 (quote on p. 63).
[36] Schama, "The Games of Great Men," p. 96.

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could containment, which was meant to shelter democracies, be extended to the Mandarin polities emerging from colonialism? It could not be, but, says Kissinger, something about Vietnam "consistently blighted the reasoning power of foreigners who ventured into it" (p. 630). Hence, the U.S. military believed it could win where the French had lost, the Kennedy administration forgot what Korea had done to Truman just nine years before, and McNamara's whiz kids, far from believing that military might could solve a political problem, convinced themselves that political "nation-building" could solve what was really a military problem.

According to Kissinger, Eisenhower understood that Southeast Asia was a military problem and that its key was Laos. But the Kennedy people shrank from "so cold-blooded a strategic analysis" and deemed it "inappropriate for a conflict still perceived largely in ideological terms" (p. 647). So it bargained away Laos in 1961, providing Hanoi with a sanctuary and supply route to South Vietnam. Finally, in hopes of bringing the commitment to Saigon in line with American rhetoric, John F. Kennedy jettisoned the authoritarian Diem and Lyndon Johnson pronounced the real danger in Indochina to be hunger, ignorance, poverty, and disease. "Ultimately, every revolutionary war is about governmental legitimacy; undermining it is the guerilla's principal aim. Diem's overthrow handed that objective to Hanoi for free" (p. 655). The U.S. military, barred from cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail, then proceeded to adopt the hopeless strategy of suppressing the insurgency throughout the entire length of South Vietnam, thereby ensuring a stalemate that could only benefit the enemy.

Critics soon blamed Johnson for an unwillingness to negotiate. In fact, says Kissinger, "Johnson's eagerness to start negotiations was so palpable as to be self-defeating" (p. 663). As the costs in Vietnam grew out of proportion to the geopolitical stakes, critics came to equate the North and South Vietnamese governments, obviating the American need to defend "democracy," and then concluded that the war must reflect a moral rot in the *American* government, in which case the North Vietnamese were the real good guys. Kissinger points more than once to poll data showing that the majority of Americans remained "hawks" on the war throughout, but the group that "lost its nerve represented the very Establishment figures who had backed intervention all along" (p. 671). Hence, Johnson threw away his chance to crush the enemy after its disastrous Tet Offensive of 1968, and took himself off the stage. That, Kissinger writes, was unconscionable. Johnson could have stood for re-election, thus creating a popular mandate either for winning or getting out. Or he could have stood down, but exerted maximum pressure on North Vietnam in order to expand the options for his successor. Instead, "by simultaneously de-escalating, renouncing his candidacy, and offering negotiations, Johnson combined every disadvantage" (p. 672).

Nixon and Kissinger were left to pick their way toward "peace with honor." Unilateral withdrawal was not an option: it would take fifteen months or more to extricate five hundred thousand men, might precipitate a rout, and could turn into "geopolitical disaster" if America's friends and enemies concluded that it no longer stood tall. But "the leaders of the Peace Movement considered

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The Wisdom of "Super K"

[Revolutionaries] prevail because the established order is unable to grasp its own vulnerability. This is especially true when the revolutionary challenge emerges not with a march on the Bastille but in conservative garb. (p. 121)

Heads of government are notoriously vulnerable to arguments that question their courage. (p. 214)

Woe to the leader whose arguments at the end of a war are not as plausible as they were at the beginning (from Bismarck). (p. 217)

Confused leaders have a tendency to substitute public relations maneuvers for a sense of direction. (p. 280)

Statesmen always face the dilemma that, when their scope for action is greatest, they have a minimum of knowledge. (p. 294)

The democratic public is unforgiving in the face of debacles, even when these result from carrying out its own immediate wishes. (p. 316)

All great leaders walk alone. Their singularity springs from their ability to discern challenges that are not yet apparent to their contemporaries. (p. 370)

Presidents who appear to be the most guileless often turn out to be the most complex. In this sense, Eisenhower was a precursor of Ronald Reagan. (p. 631)

Bureaucratic compromise often reflects the subconscious hope that something will happen in the interim to cause the problem to resolve itself. (p. 651)

Authors of memoranda who are not willing to fight for them are more likely to find their words turn into *ex post facto* alibis than guides to action. (p. 683)

Hell hath no fury like a bureaucrat scorned. (p. 744)

When a country abjures its intention of exploiting a conflict between two other parties, it is in fact signaling that it has the capacity to do so and that both parties would do well to work at preserving that neutrality. (p. 724)

Posterity is always more given to assigning the blame for failure to individuals than to circumstances. (p. 791)

History . . . will not excuse failure by the magnitude of the task. (p. 834)

What no leader must ever do is to suggest that choice has no price, or that no balance needs to be struck. (p. 834)

American unity is both a duty and the hope of the world. (p. 702)

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the war so repugnant that an honorable extrication from Vietnam had come to sound like an absurdity" (p. 675). Indeed, having "transmuted the war into a domestic conflict between good and evil at home, the Peace Movement preferred—for reasons it viewed as highly moral—America's collapse in Vietnam to an outcome which, precisely because it might be considered 'honorable', might also whet its government's appetite for further foreign adventures" (p. 688). American idealism, far from getting lost during Vietnam, was never so in evidence. But the idealistic tradition had split, precipitating civil war in the streets, and was thus of *no use* to Nixon even if the president had had the charisma to invoke it.[37]

Meanwhile, Nixon pursued détente with the Communist powers and Kissinger hammered out peace in Paris. He hoped "that it would enable America to start the process of national healing" (p. 692). But Congress refused to enforce the peace, Nixon became mired in Watergate, and the critics of the war refused to be reconciled. Kissinger holds to the view that the Paris Accords might have worked, and reserves the ultimate blame for America itself. "The test of a society is whether it can submerge its differences in pursuit of common objectives, and whether it can keep in mind that societies thrive on their reconciliations, not on their conflicts. America failed that test in Indochina" (p. 694).

Think for a moment about this account. It is objective, lucid, and devastating. No wonder Divine says that Kissinger remains a stranger in American hearts, for you simply cannot tell all factions in a country that suffered so much that all of them failed—*even if they did.* First, Kissinger indicts the "idealistic" cold war liberals for the misapprehensions and hubris that got us into Vietnam, then he blames the "idealistic" Vietnam protesters for contributing to the agony rather than a resolution, then he castigates the whole country for cracking up when it needed to pull together. He may be right to indict *all* Americans for letting their moralism lead them astray. But it is heresy to say so.

Heresy's Henry

How dare Kissinger criticize our moral tradition? Has it not been our badge of honor since 1776 *and* our best weapon in world affairs? Isn't the world today turning more and more to our ideals and institutions? Isn't it America's calling to lead the world into habits and institutions that will *liberate*

[37] This decisive point was implicit in *Diplomacy.* But Kissinger was obliged to make it explicit as a result of the flap following publication of the Haldeman diaries. First, Albert Hunt (*The Wall Street Journal,* May 26, 1994), then Anthony Lewis (*The New York Times,* May 30, 1994) charged that Kissinger and Nixon made Vietnam policy on the basis of domestic political considerations, implying that they sacrificed the lives of thousands of soldiers in the interest of Nixon's re-election. Kissinger rebukes Lewis for levelling such a heinous accusation on the strength of "a single entry in 600 pages of the H.R. Haldeman diaries" ("Hanoi, Not Nixon, Set Pace of Vietnam Peace," *The New York Times,* June 3, 1994), and—in reply to Hunt—writes, "Vietnam was a tragedy because the commitment . . . grew out of America's idealistic tradition and the extrication became a nightmare because that idealism turned on itself" ("I Stand by My Eulogy to Nixon," *The Wall Street Journal,* June 3, 1994).

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nations from thralldom to geopolitics? If we believe that the answers are "Yes," whether or not we believe that America has always lived up to its calling, then we *must* ostracize Kissinger in our hearts, if not in print.

But what if Kissinger is orthodox and the Wilsonians are the real heretics? He surely bases his politics on the orthodox doctrine of human imperfectability, hence on the contingency of all human creations. Aristotle and the Greeks, and the Jewish and Christian scriptures all said the same. So did our own Founding Fathers, who designed their "more" perfect union on the principle that checks and balances are needed to contain the play of human corruption. The City on a Hill notwithstanding, no sensible American believed that his country would be free of vice or faction. From these first principles, the Founding Fathers deduced a foreign policy meant to shelter America, to the degree possible, from the dangers inherent in a wicked world: isolationism when possible, power politics when necessary, and balance of power once U.S. interests reached the coasts of Europe and Asia. What we now think of as hard-boiled "realism" is not some import carried to America by the likes of Hans Morgenthau or Henry Kissinger. It was fundamental to the classical wisdom on which the country was founded.

But gradually, over the course of the nineteenth century, Anglo-American Protestants reacted to the ills they perceived in the industrial, imperialist world by overestimating the power of law and good works to change human behavior, then transferred their private calling to public life, then exported it. So it was that an otherwise devout Christian like Woodrow Wilson began to sound like that old Enlightenment radical Tom Paine, blaming governments for the corruption of men instead of men for the corruption of governments. Wilson seduced Americans into believing that whole nations could be converted and that wars were just only if crusades. That millenarian heresy inspired everything from the botched peace at Versailles to the smug isolationism of the thirties to the "bear any burden" mentality that landed us in Vietnam. Could it be, therefore, that Kissinger more truly reflects the philosophical sobriety of our nation's founders? That Kissinger is more American than Wilson?

There is at least one undeniably un-American thing about Kissinger, and that is his pessimism. Americans may have been traditionally suspicious of men and of governments, but they were always bullish on America. Reagan was the first Republican since Teddy Roosevelt who understood that, which is why his heart was required to win the cold war, just as Kissinger's head was required, in much darker days, not to lose it. For that, above all, let us say, *lebe wohl,* Dr. Kissinger. Or, as my generation learned to say from another alien avatar of logic: "Live long and prosper."

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The Attack on Science and Reason

by Paul Hollander

On Looking into the Abyss: Untimely Thoughts on Culture and Society. By Gertrude Himmelfarb. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994. 191 pp. $23.00.)

Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science. By Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 314 pp. $25.95.)

The American role in world affairs has always been in large measure determined by domestic conditions, not just economic and political ones but intellectual and cultural ones, too. That is especially the case in the present post–cold war period; with obvious and direct external threats no longer exerting compelling pressures, domestic factors have become more consequential. Under these conditions, prevailing levels of social cohesion, the cultural climate, the nature of domestic social and political conflicts, the beliefs of American elite groups, the attitude of intellectuals, and the vitality of American society as a whole become especially important in shaping the American role in global affairs both for now and, more important, for the future, when the foreign pressures weighing upon us may be greater.

Although their ostensible subjects are fairly narrow, the two very different books here reviewed provide profound insights into the state of present-day American society and culture. These volumes, Gertrude Himmelfarb's *On Looking into the Abyss* and Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt's *Higher Superstition,* are indispensable for updating our knowledge and understanding of what goes on in the academic marketplace and how it influences society at large. The authors, Himmelfarb a historian, Gross and Levitt scientists, provide from their different vantage points both information and argument that ought to give pause to all those concerned with the life of the mind generally, and the social role of intellectuals in American society in particular.

Both books ought to be read by members of Congress, the White House staff, high-ranking civil servants, heads of foundations and universities, staffs of think tanks, literate journalists, and other elite groups who exert influence on American social institutions and monitor cultural trends. Unfortunately, even if the books were widely read, it is not clear how many minds would be changed in the process, for one of the distressing aspects of present-day cultural-intellectual life in the United States, highlighted by both these volumes, is that groups of highly intelligent, well-educated people no longer fruitfully communicate with one another. Hopes of persuasion through rational argument are greatly

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diminished; the notion of rationality itself is under attack. The possibilities of dialogue between groups of different ideological or philosophical persuasion have become modest; protagonists talk past each other, and points of views are routinely dismissed not on the basis of their substance but on the basis of their source. Why has this come to pass?

The notion of rationality itself is under attack.

Few outside the academic world know or care about the ideas and posturings associated with postmodernism, deconstructionism, or structuralism, but, despite their abstruseness, such ideas have become entrenched in many branches of academic life. Postmodernism, in particular, has become, as Gross and Levitt put it, "the unifying doctrine of the academic left" (p. 72). Accounting for its popularity they write:

> If we examine the popularity of postmodernism with a view to understanding its appeal to the politically discontented, we see that psychological factors are at work echoing those that lured previous generations to Marxism-Leninism. As before, what is offered is the possibility of becoming an initiate, part of a blessed elect whose mastery of a certain style of discourse confers insight unobtainable elsewhere, and authorizes a knowing (and often smug) attitude (p. 73).

But so what? It is far from self-evident that the obscure goings-on in departments of English, "cultural studies," or the social sciences affect the cohesion or decline of a society. But they do. Although neither of the books under review explicitly raises the idea of decadence, it is difficult to read them without bumping up against the concept. Indeed, what these two excellent books do best is to help us to grasp the connections between the life of the mind and the cohesion of social institutions. As Gross and Levitt argue: "It is not without historical precedent that incoherent or simply incomprehensible opinions have had great and pernicious social effect" (p. 15). One need only recall the impact of "scientific" racism, complete with phrenological subdisciplines, on European intellectual life from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century to appreciate the point.

The pernicious social effects of incoherent, barely comprehensible or obscurantist opinions is clearly discernible as its flows from present-day academic and intellectual life in the United States into society at large. Foremost among the destructive social effects of postmodernism and other adversarial currents (such as radical feminism, Afrocentrism, radical environmentalism, and so forth) has been a growing hostility to science and, more generally, to rational thought and argument. When entire school districts adopt texts produced by manifestly unqualified people, and the "inanities of Afrocentric 'science' . . . have a free rein in a number of urban, predominantly black school districts," and when "the condescending belief has taken hold that black children can be persuaded to take an interest in science only if they are fed an educational diet of fairy

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tales" (pp. 247, 208)—under such conditions, the social and educational consequences of certain ideas become distressingly clear.

By attacking science and suggesting that multiculturalist, or Afrocentrist, or feminist versions of "science" are no less (but more) authentic, postmodernist intellectual relativism helps to perpetuate the scientific illiteracy of black students and all students. Even pointing that out is likely to provoke accusations of racism and sexism, which is why this is rarely done in public.

It is the moral, psychological, and intellectual aspects of decadence, or decline, that these two books elucidate.

While most discussions of the decline of the United States focus on matters economic or narrowly educational (that is, mastering competence sufficient for jobs in a modern economy), decline and decadence have more elusive aspects that must be understood before one can proceed to tangible issues, such as the imbalance of trade, declining international competitiveness, productivity, and research and development. Decadence has two major dimensions: moral-psychological and functional-instrumental. Thus, if our work force is less educated, less able to meet the demands of present-day technologies, we must start by understanding the ideas and the ethos that contributed to this state of affairs in the first place, and that is communicated to the supposed beneficiaries of higher (and increasingly) lower education as well.

It is the more elusive, moral, psychological, and intellectual aspects of decadence, or decline, that these two books elucidate, including the decline in the clarity of communications painfully apparent in so much of current academic "discourse."

The eclipse of moral certainties and the crusade against reason are at the core of the first aspect of decadence; it is associated with lack of purpose, and a moral relativism unchecked by sustaining and widely shared values or beliefs. Admittedly, such attitudes are often a form of posturing: few people, including postmodernists, are in fact capable of genuine and consistent moral relativism, let alone unlimited benign tolerance, much as they may advocate such a position. More characteristically, we encounter a selective relativism, a peculiar combination of professed moral (or intellectual, or aesthetic) relativism, and an unstated moral absolutism and partisanship that can be inferred from the unskeptical advocacy of positions taken by the putative relativist. As Gross and Levitt point out, "the strange combination of scepticism ad credulity . . . characterizes the postmodern stance" (p. 180). In turn, Himmelfarb notes, for example, that while many intellectuals in the liberal democracies glory in 'demystifying' their own culture and nation as Eurocentric, xenophobic, sexist, and racist, they fawn on illiberal Third World nations, provided they are sufficiently anti-Western (p. 121). Likewise, while they subject to merciless scrutiny their own Western culture, they cannot bring themselves to critically

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examine, among other things, the claims of "multiculturalism," especially its Afrocentric variety.

It is significant and paradoxical that the postmodernists who claim to believe that everything is a matter of opinion, are among the fiercest, most virulent, and radical critics of Western culture. They emerged as the heirs of the sixties' rejection of American society, unable or unconcerned to propose a positive vision for replacing the multiple evils of our allegedly racist, sexist, patriarchal, capitalist, homophobic, and Eurocentric culture. Unhappily, "one of the saddest facts of life is that frustration rarely begets wisdom but it frequently ignites irresponsible fantasy" (Gross and Levitt, p. 233).

Gertrude Himmelfarb is among the handful of scholars in the humanities who powerfully confronts and publicly rejects these trends. It is her premise that "there is an intimate, pervasive relationship between what happens in our schools and universities, in the intellectual and artistic communities, and what happens in society and the polity" (p. xii). Her collection of essays addresses both the intellectual and moral aspects of the burgeoning obscurantism and relativism, especially as they appear in the study and teaching of history. She arrestingly sums up the current state of affairs in the humanities and some of the social sciences: "The beasts of modernism have mutated into the beasts of postmodernism—relativism into nihilism, amorality into immorality, irrationality into insanity" (p. 16).

Her collection includes not only illuminating critiques of postmodernist historiography but also examinations of current approaches to the teaching of literature and philosophy, reflections on Karl Marx, Georg Hegel, and John Stuart Mill, and the contemporary political-historical roles and relationships of religion and nationalism. Looking at current trends in history and biography in particular, Professor Himmelfarb observes that the very idea "that there is such a thing as greatness, genius, uniqueness, that people should celebrate and aspire to such qualities, that there are truths that transcend race, gender and class" is under attack (p. 40). The anti-intellectual and amoral thrust of this attitude is quite momentous. Himmelfarb writes:

> Postmodernism is now confronting us with . . . a relativism so radical, so absolute as to be antithetical to both history and truth. For postmodernists deny not only supra-historical truth but historical truth, truths relative to particular times and places. . . . (p. 131)

> The presumption of postmodernism is that . . . because there is no absolute, total truth there can be no partial, contingent truths. More important still is the presumption that because it is impossible to attain such truths, it is not only futile but positively baneful to aspire to them (p. 135).

Passing moral judgments even over phenomena such as Nazism or Soviet totalitarianism becomes problematic, if not altogether impermissible, for the postmodernist: "Looking into the most fearsome abysses of modern times, these historians see not beasts but faceless bureaucrats, not corpses but statistics, not willful acts of brutality and murder but the banal routine of everyday life,

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not gas chambers and gulags but military-industrial-geopolitical complexes" (p. 18).

The embrace of such a far-reaching moral-intellectual relativism has profound consequences for the life of the mind. Ever more professors of literature disdain the study and interpretation of actual literary works, and there are historians who do little research about actual historical events or periods (pp. 140–42). The contempt for facts even finds expression in the progressive abandonment of footnotes, in the lofty indifference to documenting views and opinions, as Himmelfarb documents in "Where Have All the Footnotes Gone?"

In this compact volume, Himmelfarb succeeds in lucidly cataloging and exposing some of the most profound ills and ailments of American society and cultural life as it approaches the end of the century. In doing so, she personifies and reinvigorates the ideal of the responsible intellectual.

It is of great significance, if not generally realized, that during the past quarter century or so critiques of science have become a major form of social and culture criticism in the United States. While the social criticism of the 1960s focused on particular social institutions, practices, or evils, the more recent varieties seek fundamental change through "a wholesale revision of cultural categories" (Gross and Levitt, p. 3), that is to say, concepts, ideas, words, ways of looking at the world. This orientation also explains the extraordinary efforts made at purging and transforming our vocabulary so that the "correct" usage should reflect "correct" ideas; the obsession with appropriate terminology on the part of radical feminists, Afrocentrists, and other victim groups is a form of intended thought reform.

In the course of the past two decades, the hostility to science has become a common denominator of the adversary culture and its different constituencies. These attitudes had their roots in the social-cultural protest movements of the 1960s, especially in the counter-cultural fulminations against the impersonality and the rational ordering of society and the highly romantic rejection of the routinized, predictable aspects of life. As the representatives of the protest movements of the sixties and adherents of the adversary culture settled down to academic life, the attacks on science emerged as their major shared preoccupation. Gross and Levitt write:

> Postmodern scepticism rejects the possibility of enduring universal knowledge in any area. It holds that all knowledge is local, or 'situated'. . . rigidly circumscribed by interests and prejudices. . . . (p. 72)

> The traditional Marxist view that what we think of as science is really 'bourgeois' science, a superstructural manifestation of the capitalist order, recurs with predictable regularity in its own right, or refurbished as the doctrine of 'cultural constructivism'. The radical feminist view [is] that science, like every other intellectual structure in modern society is poisoned and corrupted by ineradicable gender bias . . . multiculturalists . . . view 'Western' science as inherently inaccurate and incomplete by virtue of its failure to incorporate the full range of cultural perspectives . . . radical environmentalism condemns science as embodying instrumentalism and alienation from direct experience of nature. . . .

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> What enables [these views] to coexist congenially . . . is a shared sense of injury, resentment and indignation against modern science (p. 5).

The authors see a shared resentment as the main source of the attack on science. But while splendidly describing its varied manifestations, they stop short of attempting to locate the deeper sources of this resentment. And while they observe, correctly, that "science becomes an irresistible target for those Western intellectuals whose sense of their own heritage has become an intolerable moral burden" (p. 220), they do not pursue the matter further to ask: What aspects of this heritage have become so burdensome and loathsome and for what reason?

What really ails the academic Left, the ideological survivors of the sixties, and the adversary culture that make up a large portion of American intellectuals here discussed? The resentment against science, I believe, derives from a broader and deeper source: the resentment of modernity itself. When all is said and done, and when we put together both the most articulate as well as the most inarticulate critiques of capitalism, American society, Western culture and civilization, and Eurocentric thought, what stands out is the rejection of the lack of meaning, purpose, and lost sense of community associated with modernity. To be sure, there are also grievances and injuries (real and imagined) peculiar to gender, race, ethnicity, and (decreasingly) class. But the actual experiences of victimization do not come close to accounting for the ferocity and generality of the rejection and critique directed at American culture and society, since the critics themselves are generally privileged, for the most part academic, intellectuals.

The rejection of the pains of modernity is not the only way to explain the alienation of intellectuals that is behind their postmodernist, multiculturalist hostility to science. Critics of Western intellectuals (among them Raymond Aron, Paul Johnson, Lewis Feuer, Eric Hoffer, Christopher Lasch, Arthur Koestler, and Edward Shils, to name only a few) repeatedly suggested that intellectuals turn on their (Western) societies because they do not feel sufficiently appreciated, because these societies, and the American in particular, have failed to satisfy their need for recognition, influence, and even power—or as Richard Pipes put it recently, because of frustrated ambition.

Gross and Levitt themselves ask in their last chapter: How much difference does the hostility to science really make to the state of American culture and society? Is it an indicator of general decadence, or is it much ado about nothing as far as the country as a whole is concerned? As suggested above, the attitudes and beliefs examined by the two books under review are indeed powerful indicators of decadence precisely because they join together its moral-psychological and functional-instrumental aspects. The hostility to science is significant both as symptom of a profound estrangement from Western culture and rationality, and it is significant in its consequences. The latter include the rising levels of scientific illiteracy and the diminishing numbers of Americans interested in its pursuit, as indicated in the gradual takeover of departments of the hard (not social!) sciences by students from abroad.

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The extraordinary and increasingly radical animus against American society and Western culture that finds expression in the hostility toward science is, in the final analysis, a protest against life perceived as both meaningless and unjust. Perhaps the most serious threat the attitudes here discussed represent—and the most profound symptom of the decadence, at once moral and intellectual, they embody—is that, as Gross and Levitt put it, they leave "no ground whatsoever for distinguishing reliable knowledge from superstition" (p. 45). A noteworthy example of the inroads made by the trends here discussed has been the career of John Mack, M.D., professor of psychiatry at Harvard. After years at the "cutting edge" of various New Age and peace movements, Mack has recently taken to writing about claims of massive extraterrestrial kidnappings and copulations, and advocating their veracity.[1] What is so stunning about Mack's new cause is not that he has adopted it, but the astonishing respectability his claims have garnered in the commercial publishing and media world.

If, as Gross and Levitt persuasively argue, "the health of a culture is measured in part by the vigor with which its immune system responds to nonsense" (p. 217), then we truly find ourselves in sad shape. But thanks to Gross and Levitt and Himmelfarb, among many others, mostly unsung, perhaps the tide will start to turn back.

[1] John Mack, *Abduction: Human Encounters with Aliens* (New York: Scribners, 1994). See, also, Stephen Rae, "Humans Report Abduction by Aliens! Harvard Psychiatrist Swears It's True!" *The New York Times Magazine,* Mar. 20, 1994.

Beyond Apartheid: South Africa's Hazy Future

by L.H. Gann

Apartheid's Genesis 1935–1962. Edited by Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, Deborah Posel. (Braamfontein: Ravan Press, and Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1993; distributed in the United States by University of Ohio Press. 455 pp. $24.95, paper.)

Policing South Africa: The South African Police and the Transition from Apartheid. By Gavin Cawthra. (Atlantic Highways, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993. 226 pp. $55.00; $19.95, paper.)

L.H. Gann is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California. He has held appointments at St. Anthony's College, Oxford; Historische Kommission, West Berlin; and the Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, N.J. He is the author, co-author, or co-editor of thirty-eight books and monographs, most dealing with modern Africa.

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South Africa's Crisis of Constitutional Democracy: Can the U.S. Constitution Help? Edited by Robert A. Licht and Bertus de Villiers. (Cape Town, South Africa: Juta and Co., and Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1994. 261 pp. $31.75.)

For years now, South Africa has been seen by many as a pariah state of a special sort, an evil unto itself, an unreconstructured example of a Western civilization twisted by racism and geographical isolation. However true such an image may or may not have been, South Africa is better described as a microcosm of the world at large, containing within its borders problems that confront many of the world's countries.

It is, for example, a land where many races and ethnic groups live together without fusing in a common melting pot. It is a country where the First and the Third World coexist within the borders of a single state. And, until recently, South Africa had been ruled by a minority (white in this case) who imposed their rule on the majority (black in this case) through a complex and contradictory system known as apartheid. Apartheid was unique, but minority oppression of majorities is not. Perhaps, then, we can learn something more general from South Africa's past that applies to the futures of many lands.

Apartheid and the State

All three books under review deal in some measure with apartheid—how it arose, how it was enforced, how it was opposed, and how it can be transformed. One book looks broadly at the institutionalization of apartheid, a second at the specific function of the police, a third at legal issues.

The essays edited by Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel in *Apartheid's Genesis* look at South Africa's recent history from the perspective of the ruled. These essays deal with particular themes of social and economic history, centering on the first phase of apartheid, National Party–style. (Apartheid was not invented by the National Party, but was rigidly formalized starting in 1948.) Most of the essays focus on the Witwatersrand (where most of the contributors happen to live) and deal with specialized subjects, such as local African revolts, gang warfare in urban areas, African trade unionism, officially sponsored "removal schemes," African political organizations, "Bantu education," "influx control," and other aspects of social engineering attempted by the dominant state and its intellectual supporters (particularly those within the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs).

A book so varied in content defies simple review, but certain points are worth stressing. Unlike traditional South African leftists, the editors do not see the state simply as an instrument of either Afrikaner exploitation in particular or capitalist exploitation in general. Rather, they argued that the state was an "internally differentiated . . . site of conflict, and . . . an important locus of power in its own right which both grappled with, and was influenced by wider contradictions and conflicts" (p. 21).

In short, the editors stress, correctly, that the South African state was an instrument for social engineering. But the engineers worked at cross purposes as white farmers, workers, industrialists, intellectuals, and bureaucrats fought

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for conflicting and often mutually exclusive objects. Apartheid had many fathers. These included, as the authors might have better stressed, missionaries, secular humanists, academics, and more enlightened white politicians, such as Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer. Odd though it may sound now, missionaries, in particular, once dreaded that Africans would be "corrupted" by permanently settling among white miners and their kind. In a more general sense, humanitarians feared the operation of a free and unrestrained land market in which tribal communities would alienate their land and thereby create over time a propertyless and potentially revolutionary proletariat. The Native Land Act of 1913, which consolidated territorial apartheid, met with initial approval from the (then ultra-moderate) African National Congress (ANC). As the Reverend John Dube, president of the organization, put it in 1914 in a letter to the South African prime minister, Louis Botha, "We make no protest against the principle of segregation in so far as it can be fairly and practically carried out."[1]

U.S. Africanists have widely underplayed the role of the South African Communist Party in the development of the ANC.

The state was also important as an instrument for providing jobs to the Afrikaner bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie—especially so at a time when the Afrikaner middle class was small, and English-speaking South Africans dominated alike the economy and the state machinery. Having secured power in 1948, the Afrikaners thereafter "colonized" the state, a process that will be continued by the growing African bourgeoisie within South Africa's emerging new order. It has become an article of faith among many progressive intellectuals that race, class, and gender are the three main keys to a proper understanding of history. But according to the editors, "ethnicity was [also] a crucial dimension of consciousness of both migrant and immigrant groups. It was not static, nor was it the inevitable consequence either by the state or by African elites" (p. 13).

Bonner, Delius, and Posel likewise make an interesting contribution to the history of the communist party in South Africa. U.S. Africanists, fearful of being slandered as McCarthyites and anxious to legitimize the ANC in American eyes, have widely underplayed the role of the South African Communist Party (SACP, formerly the Communist Party of South Africa—CPSA) in the development of the ANC. The authors show how communism took a leading role in ANC affairs, through CPSA-dominated trade unions, in linking rural and urban constituencies. As Delius shows, there was in the 1940s "a considerable overlap in membership and leadership," as leading communists, such as Moses Kotane and J.B. Marks, played major roles in the Congress (p. 146). The "revolutionary

[1] Cited in Peter Walshe, *The Rise of Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress, 1912–1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 47. Similar considerations also applied in the creation of territorial apartheid in Southern Rhodesia. See L.H. Gann, *A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965), p. 268ff.

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alliance" between the ANC and SACP continues to the present; communists hold some key positions in the new South African cabinet and within the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

Polis and Police

How was apartheid maintained for so long, and against so much opposition? Apartheid was sustained in part by the South African Defense Force. The army intervened in emergencies, but soldiers always regarded interference in African townships with distaste—unglamorous work, not conducive to professional advancement. It was the SAP (South African Police) that was apartheid's first line of defense. A detailed account of the SAP has now been written by Gavin Cawthra, a white South African who refused to be drafted on conscientious grounds.[2]

Cawthra dislikes the SAP rather a lot. Without a touch of squeamishness, he stigmatizes its European constables for being usually drawn from "the lesser-skilled and lower-class sectors of that [the Afrikaner] community" (pp. 2–3). Cawthra isn't the only one who dislikes the SAP, however.

Not surprisingly, the SAP is unpopular among Africans. (Still, according to opinion surveys, Africans dislike gangsters even more than policemen.) Nor does the formerly regnant National Party seem to think much of the SAP, which has been poorly paid and neglected to a surprising extent. In South Africa, then, the Gilbert and Sullivan generalization applies with particular effect:

> When constabulary's duty's to be done
> A policeman's lot is not a happy one.

But, according to Cawthra, the SAP has multiplied its troubles by enforcing bad legislation with even worse methods. Shootings, torture, and individual murders are the order of the day. SAP corruption is deemed widespread. As far as Cawthra is concerned, every accusation is accepted as proven—no defense is admissible, and no real proof is deemed necessary. The police, moreover, are said to have a poor record in solving ordinary crimes in what has become a lawless country. More specifically, Cawthra accuses the police of supporting Inkatha's onslaughts against the ANC. All that must change for the country to have much of a future, says Cawthra, who ends with a chapter showing how the SAP should be reorganized in the new South Africa.

As Peter Duignan and I have pointed out many times, there was indeed a great deal wrong with apartheid and its agencies, such as the Bantu Investment Corporation.[3] Nevertheless, South Africa's record must be seen in the wider

[2] Another book on the same subject, John D. Brewer's *Black and Blue: Policing in South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), was received just as *Orbis* was going to press. A cursory look suggests that Brewer's account is more balanced and less shrill than Cawthra's.

[3] See L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive: A Historical Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), and Gann and Duignan, *Hope for South Africa* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1991).

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African context. Until 1990, when the ANC suspended its armed struggle, South Africa was in a state of internal war. Yet, South Africa, unlike most other African states, was a constitutional country with a legal opposition, a relatively free press often highly critical of the government, independent courts, independent publishing houses (such as the Ravan Press), and relatively free universities and research institutes mostly hostile to the established order. The South African Establishment, like the British Victorian Establishment praised by Marx, produced a huge array of official reports, enquiries, and investigations. This material, amply used by Cawthra and others, has no equivalent in scope or number anywhere else in Africa. For all its police brutality, South Africa, during the 1970s and the 1980s, remained a relatively peaceful state when compared to such blood-soaked African republics as Uganda, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan. All these countries saw more violence than South Africa, but received much less publicity since they offered few opportunities to Westerners for investigative reporting or scholarly fieldwork.

South Africa, during the 1970s and the 1980s, remained a relatively peaceful state when compared to a dozen blood-soaked African republics.

In waging the armed struggle, the ANC's military instrument, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in particular, concentrated on assassinating police officers (especially black officers) and their families. Not surprisingly, some constables paid back in kind. Fighting between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the ANC was likewise initiated by the ANC, which used to accuse Inkatha supporters of being *Chombes* ("Uncle Toms"), sell-outs, and mercenaries of apartheid who should be subjected to "popular justice." Popular justice entailed beating suspected traitors or "necklacing"—burning victims to death in custom-fitted, gasoline-soaked tires. But the recipients of "popular justice" had friends and relatives who sought vengeance in return. The new South Africa, which Nelson Mandela hopes to build, has still to deal with the resultant cycle of violence.

The armed struggle created other unforeseen problems that remain to plague the new government. Firearms spread among the black as well as the white populace. Local political dignitaries turned to private crime, and many advanced to be "shack lords" with their own urban fiefs. Untoward effects were also produced by the ANC's campaigns to disrupt African education in the townships. "No education before liberation" made a ringing slogan. But school boycotts added to that great army of ill-educated youths who are hard to employ and who provide recruits for the ever-expanding army of crime in the townships. The ANC had endeavored to make the townships "ungovernable." The ANC, moreover, had indulged in most serious civil rights abuses against its own dissidents. Now the ANC reaps what it sowed.

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Ironically, then, the new ANC-led government will have to rely on those very security services that it, and supporters such as Cawthra, have loved to deride. In reforming the police, the new authorities face many difficulties. Nelson Mandela has promised a general amnesty for crimes committed in defense of apartheid. The SAP's morale has been thus shaken while the policeman's job remains as high-risk an occupation as ever. The police must operate in a country where the ANC has acted "as they were above the law."[4] (Policemen in 1994 were stopped from searching the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg after Zulu marchers had been shot in the street outside.) The police must confront the problem of unionism, as well, for two rival police unions now vie for power. There are also conflicting ethnic allegiances within the ranks.

In the past, too, Africans justly complained that the police was more concerned with crimes against whites than crimes against blacks. The SAP will now have to provide far more services to African townships, but this will not be easy. Politically, the SAP has always been under crossfire, blamed both for intervening in the townships and thereby stimulating violence, and for *not* intervening and thereby leaving violence unpunished. South Africa is, in fact, an underpoliced country. (The SAP'S strength has risen to 120,000 men—60 percent of them black—but that is still inadequate for a huge, heterogeneous country with a population of more than 45 million people.) Chances are it will remain so for a long time to come, with what general political effects we shall have to wait and see.

Democracy and the Rule of Law

Policing South Africa isn't the only problem ahead for the new government. Police, after all, enforce the law, and the law is changing. Indeed, the legal structure itself, the constitution, is at the center of intense scrutiny and inevitable change.

In this scrutiny, some Americans presume to tred and advise. In *South Africa's Crisis of Constitutional Democracy,* Robert A. Licht and Bertus de Villiers present a series of excellent theoretical and legal essays designed to consider how American constitutional principles can be applied to South Africa. Some of the contributors, both American and South African, discuss questions such as federalism and unitary government, commerce and prosperity, parties and administration.

But can the United States really teach pragmatically applicable lessons to South Africa? Not likely, for the underlying assumptions that many of the authors seem to carry into the project are little more than wishful thinking.

It is tempting—perhaps too much so—for Americans, especially black Americans, to see South Africa as Mississippi writ large—Mississippi in the Antipodes. South Africa and the United States do both have a black-white

[4] "South Africa: Sinking Hopes," *The Economist,* Apr. 9, 1994, p. 46.

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problem, and in both countries people wear what Hilda Kuper once called "the Uniform of Colour." But otherwise the United States and South Africa are quite distinct. Most Americans speak English as their native tongue; most Americans also have a sense of common citizenship. South African blacks and whites and "coloureds," by contrast, employ many different tongues and are ethnically distinct. As George Calpin put it in the title of a book published more than half a century ago, *There Are No South Africans* (1941).

Try as they might to pretend otherwise, black Americans are not in the least like Zulu or Tswana or Xhosa. In fact, black Americans most nearly resemble South African coloureds (mixed race people) who speak mostly Afrikaans, generally attend Dutch Reformed churches, and sympathize with the conservative National Party rather than the ANC. Likewise, assumptions about compatible legal experiences are off the mark. The American Constitution grew out of the natural law tradition of Lockean England and flourished because federal structures fit the realities of an expanding nation and modernizing economy. Neither such roots nor such circumstances apply to modern South Africa; it will have to find its own way.

South Africa's main problem is not its constitution, its police force, or communists in the cabinet. Its problem is wider and deeper. First, it is a state without a nation, and secondly, its political culture is rooted in zero-sum ethnic politics within the state. The task of building a common nation from different components has never been easy; it has failed in places as far afield as the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and Lebanon. It may also fail in South Africa.

South Africa's Crisis of Constitutional Democracy illustrates aspects of this deeper conundrum. As contributor David Welsh points out, South African politics are ethno-politics to an extent unknown in the United States. South Africa, moreover, has a long tradition of unitary government, a legacy shared alike by the ANC and the formerly regnant National Party. Welsh is surely right when he predicts that democracy will be a tender plant in South Africa, and when he insists that democracy will flourish best if the future South African constitution reduces rather than increases the stakes to be won in political battles.

So much for liberty, what about free enterprise?

Traditional liberals in the West would like to see South Africa develop into a capitalist democracy operating on free market principles. The mood has been upbeat; when Nelson Mandela won the 1994 election, a mood of euphoria swept over black South Africans (and visiting foreign dignitaries). But the prospects for such an evolution are not very good. All South African parties now have some nice things to say about private business—even the communists. But only the Inkatha Freedom Party stands unreservedly for free enterprise. For different historical reasons, both the Afrikaner Nationalists and the ANC developed a strong commitment to a potent central state and a powerful unitary government. The National Party built a huge state sector designed to benefit Afrikaners, in particular. The ANC will doubtless follow in the National Party's footsteps—but now with the aim of advancing black Africans as opposed to Afrikaners.

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The ANC's victory at the polls in 1994 was acclaimed by American media of every stripe, with the ANC inevitably identified with the U.S. civil rights movement. But the ANC differs strikingly from U.S. political parties in that it looks to the ultimate transformation of society. Unlike any U.S. party, moreover, the ANC remains linked in a "revolutionary alliance" with the SACP. As noted above, leading communist cadres hold key positions within the ANC, and hold them formally as communists. (Whereas the ruling *Front de Libération Nationale* [FLN] in Algeria had insisted that communists could only join the FLN as individuals, the ANC cooperates with the communists in a formal sense.) The SACP remains committed to the strategy and tactics of the "Popular Front" devised during the Spanish Civil War. But the SACP and the ANC alike hope to build, in the long run, a socialist South Africa. In this respect, neither the ANC nor the SACP have come to terms with the experiences of their former allies, the once socialist countries of the Warsaw Pact.

In the short run, the ANC looks to a gradualist redistribution of property. Dennis Davis, another contributor, provides a rationale. The unequal distribution of property along racial lines threatens the social equilibrium of the total population. Any new constitution that entrenches existing property rights will only reinforce the patterns of inequality and create a major obstacle to popular political participation. Certainly, the ANC's victory in 1994 has enormously increased black expectations of material payoffs, especially among radicalized township youth and radicals within the leadership of the ANC and COSATU.

But the new South African government will face great problems in carrying out a redistributive program. First, changes in tax policy cannot easily accomplish such a goal. Contrary to U.S. media stereotypes, South African taxes are already high, and whites pay the bulk of public imposts.

Secondly, a combination of protectionism, autarky, and past international boycotts have combined to make many South African industries uncompetitive on the international markets. (In this respect, South Africa resembles post-Peronist Argentina.) Also, like the formerly communist countries, South Africa has to cope with a host of inefficient "parastatals" (public corporations), especially with a huge armament industry requiring conversion to civil use. So there isn't excess capital to shift about without hurting the most productive sectors of the economy.

Thirdly, while South Africa depends overwhelmingly on domestically generated capital (a fact that escaped SACP theoreticians who mistakenly regarded South Africa as the captive of international monopoly capital), in the future, South Africa will need more foreign investment and foreign skills. These investments and skills, however, cannot be secured if the new South Africa embarks on the politics of confiscation. Confiscation is also risky because the whites are well armed, well trained, and have many local allies.

In any case, past property transfers in post-colonial Africa in no sense profited their intended beneficiaries. After independence, something like one million white settlers left Algeria; between six hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand Portuguese and Afro-Portuguese departed from Angola and Mozambique. Their entire property was seized by the successor governments; these massive property transfers, however, neither improved the lot of the indigenous

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poor nor added to general prosperity. There is no reason to think the result would be better in South Africa.

Thankfully, such disasters do not have to happen. South Africa's political rivalries are not envenomed by religion. Race relations on an individual level were always better than guilt-ridden literati assumed. South Africa has a long tradition of parliamentary rule, albeit restricted in the past by the shackles of color. South Africa has a well-developed infrastructure, with excellent communications, a modern agricultural sector, manufacturing industries, mining enterprises, a mercantile and a banking network. South Africa also possesses a substantial reservoir of managerial, entrepreneurial, and academic skills.

Still, many problems remain. Given the terms on which F.W. de Klerk negotiated the transfer of power to the ANC, given the extensive powers granted to the central government, given South Africa's long-standing hostility to a free market, given the strength of South African ethno-politics, excessive optimism concerning the country's future is out of place. None of the books reviewed here suggest a different conclusion.

ERRATA

Unfortunately, the Summer 1994 issue of *Orbis* contained a number of errors.

In Angelo M. Codevilla's "The Fundamentals of American Security," the last full sentence on page 397 should read: "Thirdly, since permanent alliances with other powers are imprudent for a young and weak nation, treaties should require super-majorities, such as two-thirds of the Senate."

In Gerald M. Steinberg's "Non-proliferation: Time for Regional Approaches?" the highlighted text on page 422 is drawn from an unrelated article.

In Gale Stokes's letter to the editor, pp. 480–81, the second sentence of the text should read "From Carlton J.H. Hayes to Liah Greenfeld, civic nationalism has been associated with pluralist democracy and ethnic nationalism with homogenizing styles of thinking." The first full paragraph on p. 481 should begin "Unfortunately, short of military occupation, the West has only one realistic option in Serbia, and that is to work with Milosevic."

The editors regret these errors.

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

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Let the Sea Make a Noise . . . A History of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur, by Walter A. McDougall (Basic Books, 1993)

Russia and America: From Rivalry to Reconciliation, edited by George Ginsburgs, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Oles Smolansky (M.E. Sharpe, 1993)

The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite, by Robert D. Kaplan (Free Press, 1993)

Palestinian Autonomy, Self-Government and Peace, by Harvey Sicherman (Westview Press, 1993)

Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel, 2d ed., by Vladimir Tismaneanu (Free Press, 1993)

An American Missionary in China: John Leighton Stuart and Chinese-American Relations, by Shaw Yu-ming (Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1993)

War, Water, and Negotiation in the Middle East: The Case of the Palestine-Syria Border, 1916–1923, by Adam Garfinkle (Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1994)

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